# 1AC Modules

### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States federal government should increase cooperative investment in land ports of entry with Mexico.

### 1AC – TPP Advantage

#### Cooperation on border efficiency is critical to developing a common agenda on trade with Mexico for the Trans Pacific Partnership agreement.

Villareal & Fergusson 2013  
M. Angeles Villareal Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Trade and Finance; Ian F. Fergusson Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Trade and Finance “NAFTA at 20: Overview and trade effects.” Congressional Research Service . . This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key\_workplace/1034

The rising number of regional trade agreements throughout the world, in addition to the rising presence of China in Latin America, could have implications for U.S. trade policy with its NAFTA partners beyond the proposed TPP. Some trade policy experts contend that a deepening of economic relations with Canada and Mexico will help promote a common trade agenda with shared values. In addition to economic effects, forming deeper trade and investment ties would have positive implications for corporate governance, labor rights, environmental protection, and democratic governance.88 Some policy experts emphasize the importance of North American trade in intermediate goods and supply chains. They argue that the governments of the three countries should improve cooperation in this area and invest more in improving border infrastructure. The increased security measures that began after September 11, 2001 have resulted in a disruption in production chains due to extended and unpredictable wait times along the border. This has disproportionately hurt small and medium sized businesses.89 The United States and Mexico have recognized the need to enhance cooperation on prioritizing the economic relationship and security and have developed the Twenty-First Century Border Initiative for this purpose.90 While the initiative has resulted in improvements along the border, some observers contend that policymakers could devote more energy to improving cooperation and enhancing efficiency in cross-border trade.

#### Only cooperation with Mexico in the TPP will create strong enough incentives for China to join the agreement.

Wilson May 2013   
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The United States and Mexico are among the most open economies in the world, having integrated their manufacturing sectors through NAFTA and having negotiated trade agreements granting preferential access to a combined fifty-plus nations and two-thirds of global GDP. This presents a tremendous opportunity for the sale of jointly produced exports and cooperation on global trade issues to ensure North American products receive fair treatment around the world. Whether in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement being negotiated by 11 Pacific Rim countries, or other initiatives, the United States, Mexico and Canada could improve their chances of successfully completing mutually beneficial trade deals by negotiating and working to implement them as a bloc, recognizing that each country shares in the advantages of a competitive North America. Though the TPP is the next step, it should be understood in the context of a broader strategy to drive progress on the global trade agenda. If the current parties successfully negotiate a comprehensive, 21st Century trade agreement linking the world’s largest economic region (North America) to its most dynamic (Asia-Pacific), China may decide it has more to gain by joining in than by sitting out, which would in turn create a strong incentive for longstalled progress at the World Trade Organization, strengthening the competitiveness of regional exports. A similarly continental approach might also be considered as the U.S. gets ready to begin negotiating a trade agreement with the European Union.

#### If the TPP excludes China, the pivot to Asia will be perceived as containment and create US-China conflict in Asia.

Kissinger, 2012 Henry A. A recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, he served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. "The Future of US–Chinese Relations." Foreign Affairs 91.2 (2012): 44-5.

The current world order was built largely without Chinese participation, and hence China sometimes feels less bound than others by its rules. Where the order does not suit Chinese preferences, Beijing has set up alternative arrangements, such as in the separate currency channels being established with Brazil and Japan and other countries. If the pattern becomes routine and spreads into many spheres of activity, competing world orders could evolve. Absent common goals coupled with agreed rules of restraint, institutionalized rivalry is likely to escalate beyond the calculations and intentions of its advocates. In an era in which unprecedented offensive capabilities and intrusive technologies multiply, the penalties of such a course could be drastic and perhaps irrevocable. Crisis management will not be enough to sustain a relationship so global and beset by so many differing pressures within and between both countries, which is why I have argued for the concept of a Pacific Community and expressed the hope that China and the United States can generate a sense of common purpose on at least some issues of general concern. But the goal of such a community cannot be reached if either side conceives of the enterprise as primarily a more effective way to defeat or undermine the other. Neither China nor the United States can be systematically challenged without its noticing, and if such a challenge is noted, it will be resisted. Both need to commit themselves to genuine cooperation and find a way to communicate and relate their visions to each other and to the world. Some tentative steps in that direction have already been undertaken. For example, the United States has joined several other countries in beginning negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free-trade pact linking the Americas with Asia. Such an arrangement could be a step toward a Pacific Community because it would lower trade barriers among the world’s most productive, dynamic, and resource-rich economies and link the two sides of the ocean in shared projects. Obama has invited China to join the TPP. However, the terms of accession as presented by American briefers and commentators have sometimes seemed to require fundamental changes in China’s domestic structure. To the extent that is the case, the TPP could be regarded in Beijing as part of a strategy to isolate China. For its part, China has put forward comparable alternative arrangements. It has negotiated a trade pact with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and has broached a Northeast Asian trade pact with Japan and South Korea. Important domestic political considerations are involved for all parties. But if China and the United States come to regard each other’s trade-pact efforts as elements in a strategy of isolation, the Asia-Pacific region could devolve into competing adversarial power blocs. Ironically, this would be a particular challenge if China meets frequent American calls to shift from an export-led to a consumption-driven economy, as its most recent five-year plan contemplates. Such a development could reduce China’s stake in the United States as an export market even as it encourages other Asian countries to further orient their economies toward China. The key decision facing both Beijing and Washington is whether to move toward a genuine effort at cooperation or fall into a new version of historic patterns of international rivalry. Both countries have adopted the rhetoric of community. They have even established a high-level forum for it, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which meets twice a year. It has been productive on immediate issues, but it is still in the foothills of its ultimate assignment to produce a truly global economic and political order. And if a global order does not emerge in the economic field, barriers to progress on more emotional and less positive-sum issues, such as territory and security, may grow insurmountable.

#### A confrontational US-China relationship causes major power war.

Ratner, 2013 Dr. Ely Ratner is the Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Dr. Ratner recently served in the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the State Department as the lead political officer covering China’s external relations in Asia. "Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China." The Washington Quarterly 36.2 (2013): 21-38.

China's foreign policies have for decades reflected the principles of biding time, pursuing a restrained foreign policy, and viewing the first decades of the twenty-first century as a period of strategic opportunity to focus primarily on internal development.41 This strategy, however, has relied on the belief in Beijing that China's commitment to the path of “peaceful rise” was leading the country toward greater prosperity and security, a supposition coming under increasing scrutiny in Beijing.42 U.S. analysts are correct to assert that, to date, China's leaders have continued to recognize the importance of pursuing a constructive U.S.–China relationship.43 That said, particularly with China emerging from the inward-looking period of its decennial leadership transition, an array of potential scenarios—Chinese economic slowdown, domestic political cleavages over the pace and direction of economic reform, a spike in nationalism due to perceived external challenges—could raise the political cost for Chinese leaders who seek to perpetuate U.S.–China relations in their current state. The danger in the years ahead is that deepened U.S. engagement in Asia and its associated perceptions in China could amplify already existent voices in Beijing who argue that the current trajectory of regional affairs is placing China under siege in a deteriorating security environment.44 Precisely how Beijing would respond is unknown, but it is hard to imagine that the United States would benefit from a China less committed to its relations with the United States. More rapid military modernization, the development of trade or diplomatic blocs that exclude the United States, assertive behavior in its near seas, the cultivation of explicit security ties with regional partners, more aggressive use of cyber intrusions into the United States, and increasingly discriminatory trade practices are among the policies Beijing could pursue. Even if China viewed its options in these domains as relatively limited and ultimately undesirable, it could still throw sand in the gears of U.S. efforts in the region. Although China's behavior has been problematic on regional issues ranging from the South and East China Seas to North Korea, Burma, and ASEAN, there is no doubt that Beijing could create far more mischief if it perceived a truly zero-sum rivalry with the United States that compelled a hard-nosed competition for influence in Asia. Preventing this outcome—and the major power war that could accompany it—are chief among the tasks of U.S. China policy.

#### War between China and the US would go nuclear.

Goldstein 2013 First Things First The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania. International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89

For at least the next decade, the advantage of the United States in terms of the number and accuracy of its conventional weapons, together with its technically superior and more redundant sources of targeting intelligence, enhance the feasibility of such a strike during the kinds of crises in the Western Pacific described above. The higher the value the United States places on its interests at stake, and the more imminent war seems, the greater the temptation would be for it to use force. China, too, if it believed it had the more vital interests at stake, would have an incentive to act first, before such a U.S. attack could either eliminate or reduce its lesser capabilities to manipulate the risk of nuclear escalation. This scenario echoes the classic recipe for crisis instability in which a reciprocal fear of surprise attack takes hold. The resulting degree of instability is limited, however, by the strategic role that any use of conventional force plays in a crisis between states with nuclear weapons—manipulating the risk that refusing to settle the crisis would lead to escalation that escapes the rivals’ control and results in a catastrophe. The inescapable danger of prompt catastrophe exerts a dissuasive effect on both sides that is absent in purely conventional dyads. The effect is strong, but it is not certain. During a Sino-American crisis, the shadow of nuclear escalation would likely inhibit the United States from using force, perhaps even from undertaking a limited conventional strike against militarily valuable targets on the mainland, such as missile bases and radar installations vital to the effectiveness of China’s operations in the Western Pacific.86 Other American uses of conventional force, however, including the ASW and ASAT operations mentioned above, and especially nonkinetic cyber- and information warfare, might be tempting because they seem less risky. They probably would be less risky, but they would not be risk free, and crisis stability would not be fully assured. On the contrary, as analysts who have begun to examine the implications of growing cyber- and space-warfare capabilities have indicated, the advantages that the attacker enjoys in these realms and the integration of such assets with both nuclear and conventional forces generate distinctive but still unknown “cross-domain” escalation risks. During peacetime, mutual vulnerability of important satellite and computer systems encourages restraint. If that restraint is breached, however, the lack of self-evident firebreaks in cyber- and spacewarfare operations, and the lack of historical experience with military operations in these domains during a crisis, will require both sides to improvise, raising novel challenges for crisis management.87 In a crisis, the U.S. and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either side could decide that the risk of escalation introduced by conventional, space, or cyberattacks was worth running. Even though no stake in a crisis would be high enough for either the United States or China to choose an unrestrained nuclear exchange, some stakes might be high enough for either one to choose to initiate military actions that elevate the risk of escalation to such a disastrous outcome.88 As discussed above, both China and the United States have important interests over which they could find themselves locked in a warthreatening crisis in the Western Pacific. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese and U.S. statements about the handling of persistent disputes in the South China Sea, for example, suggests that both sides attach a high and perhaps increasing value to their stakes in this region. Whether that value is high enough to contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that cannot be answered in advance. The most worrisome source of instability, however, is clear—the temptation to use nonnuclear strikes as a way to gain bargaining leverage, even if doing so generates an unknowable risk of nuclear catastrophe that both China and the United States will have incentives to manipulate. Conclusion Sino-American crises that could erupt in the near future, while China remains militarily outclassed by the United States, present distinctive dangers. The preceding analysis offers some reassurance that the interaction of conventional and nuclear capabilities would limit the degree of instability. Because it is so difficult to fully eliminate the adversary’s ability to use military force to generate a shared risk of catastrophe, the incentives that can make striking first so tempting in a conventional world are diminished. But because instability in a nuclear world could result in disaster, even a small chance that the parties would initiate the use of force is troubling. During a crisis, the desire to achieve a favorable outcome will provide incentives to manipulate risk and may encourage the use of force if only to signal resolve as each side seeks the upper hand. This suggests that the most worrisome possibility is a crisis in which the United States and China fail to grasp each other’s view about the importance of its interests at stake. If one side believes that its stronger interests ensure that it will be more resolute, it could be tempted to signal resolve through the limited use of conventional force to manipulate risk. Because the risk being manipulated is ultimately the genuine risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange, this should be sufficient reason for scholars to provide policymakers with a better understanding of the current prospects for such dangerous instability in U.S.-China crises. Concerns raised by the possibility that China could one day grow strong enough to become a true peer competitor facing the United States have received much attention. Although clearly important, that is a discussion about the distant future. In the meantime, greater attention needs to be paid to the immediate danger of instability in the kinds of crises that could ensnare the United States and China while China is still relatively weak. Ironically, perhaps, whatever new security challenges a much stronger China could one day pose, the end of China’s currently profound military weakness would at least mitigate the key near-term problem identified here—the potential for crisis instability exacerbated by asymmetry in Sino-American power. But before any such major shift in power occurs, there is a real, if limited, possibility that a mismanaged Sino-American crisis will render all speculation about the long term tragically moot.

### 1AC – North American Integration

#### Advantage\_\_\_: North American Integration

#### North American regional economic strength is vulnerable. A breakdown of cooperation with Mexico would cause the decline of American power.

Clarkson & Mildenberger ‘11 Stephen Clarkson, professor of political economy, University of Toronto, and former fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center Matto Mildenberger, Ph.D. student, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Dependent America?: How Canada and Mexico Construct Us Power p. 272

The United States’ relationship with Canada and Mexico thus presents a paradox. Does North America Exist? showed that globalization was reducing the salience of North America as an economic entity, whether in the steel sector ‘s global restructuring or in the international consolidation of banking regulations. However, even as North American regionalism falters, the United States’ immediate periphery is becoming a more important partner in sustaining its material power. Constrained by its global partners’ superior growth rates, the United States can still count on the unusually beneficial economic relationship it quietly maintains with its continental periphery. Although it normally ignores its neighbours’ interests when dealing with other countries, its gradual decline no longer affords Washington this luxury without having to pay a price. That price is its two neighbours expanding their strategic gaze from the continent to the world. Canada and Mexico are endeavouring to strengthen their economic links with other countries. Indian capital is already investing in iron-ore extraction in Quebec, while Chinese firms are staking out Alberta’s tar sands. Even with disputes over Newfound land’s seal industry and its visa restrictions on Czech visitors, Canada has busily negotiated a comprehensive economic trade agreement with the European Union. Hosting the G-20 Economic Summit in 2012, Mexico is positioning itself as the champion of emerging economies and the developing world. This economic internationalization could mitigate Canada’s and Mexico’s lopsided dependencies on a US market to which their access has been curtailed since 9/11. Should they succeed in diversifying their economic links by attracting more FDI from overseas and should their extra-regional imports and exports abroad begin to expand more than their intra-regional trade, the United States’ economic perimeter in North America will contract, and their construction of US material strength will ipso facto diminish. The North American periphery has been Uncle Sam’s gold-laying goose for as long as most can remember. It would make an ironic epitaph for the United States’ hegemonic decline if alienating its most valuable and easily cultivated foreign asset accelerated its self-induced fall.

#### The plan solves, Cooperation between the US and Mexico creates North American regional integration and stability.

Zamora 2011  
 Stephen Zamora Leonard B. Rosenberg Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. Villanova Law Review 2011 Villanova Law Review 56 Vill. L. Rev. 631 RETHINKING NORTH AMERICA: WHY NAFTA'S LAISSEZ FAIRE APPROACH TO INTEGRATION IS FLAWED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT Lexis

As already noted, the NAFTA governments did not stress that there was a geopolitical dimension to the free trade agreement. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that the three NAFTA countries are bound by geography to be concerned about the security and stability of our NAFTA partners. Entry of proven terrorists into the United States from Canada is well-documented. n76 The largest national security concern the region, however, revolves around the increased violence and the growth of organized crime in Mexico. The crime wave in Mexico is closely linked to North American integration, for the reasons that follow. Corporations - Ford, Apple Computers, Walmart, Home Depot - are not the only manufacturing and distribution networks of a trilateral nature that have grown with the increase in NAFTA trade and investment. The wave of organized crime in North America is fueled by illicit drug trafficking carried out through distribution channels between Mexico and the United States, the principal drug market in the world. n77 For many years, the [\*649] United States government has quietly supported the replacement of single-party government in Mexico by a system of free elections with power shared by three principal political parties. Unfortunately, democracy has also brought greater instability, through the lack of a majority party in Congress and a weakening of the Mexican president as a stable (if previously undemocratic) force to govern Mexico. n78 We ignore the geopolitical effects of increased economic integration in North America at our own peril. The United States is not immune from the effects of instability or insecurity in Mexico, any more than Canada is immune from instability or insecurity in the United States. NAFTA has advanced the process of interdependence by demolishing barriers to trade and investment, and North America governments and their citizens must devise ways to manage this interdependence. The architects of the European Union, striving for a continental union of countries with even more widely divergent levels of development than exist in NAFTA, recognized the need to reduce national disparities in poverty and income levels to promote stable development. To that end, the EU has followed a general policy of social cohesion, devoting billions of euros to achieve an approximate convergence of social and economic indicators. n79 As I have proposed elsewhere, the NAFTA parties should follow a similar approach by creating a North American Regional Development Fund that would commit the NAFTA governments to a policy of promoting social convergence in North America. n80 A North American Regional Development Fund would use funding from all three NAFTA governments to promote infrastructure development in economically depressed regions in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Such a proposal runs counter to our history. The United States has historically provided scant foreign aid to Mexico, due in part to Mexican reluctance to adhere to U.S. policies and also to U.S. perceptions that foreign assistance [\*650] was unnecessary because of stability insured by single party rule in Mexico. With Mexico undergoing a period of destabilization (which coincided with the arrival of competitive democracy in 2000), the United States has dramatically increased its foreign aid to Mexico, but most of the funding has been directed to military and national security funding. n81 Such a level of military aid would not be needed, however, if the NAFTA governments invested with foresight in programs designed to forestall the criminality and destabilization that occurs under conditions of poverty and poor education. IV. International Relations in an Era of Disaggregated States and the Role of Civil Society in Mediating Integration The failure of NAFTA's governments to mediate the effects of economic integration and globalization is prejudicial to a stable economy and society in North America. The answer to instability and disruption will not be found in military measures or in the construction of fences along our borders, but rather in multilateral cooperation. Dr. Isabel Studer, a Mexican expert in North American affairs, has clearly identified the shortcomings of laissez faire integration in North America: The three [NAFTA] countries should begin by recognizing how their failure to act collectively is undermining the potential benefits accrued from their complementarities and the already high levels of integration in North America. New forms of cooperation and policy coordination are certainly in the realm of the possible, but the essential ingredients are political leadership and the kind of collaboration and commitment between the public sector and the private sector that brought NAFTA to life in the early 1990s. In the absence of these factors, and of a more institutionalized framework, it is difficult to imagine how the NAFTA countries can resolve common transnational problems in such strategic areas as migration and labor disputes, climate changes, and energy. n82

#### Lack of infrastructure will result in regional trade deterioration – collapses the NAFTA agenda

Peters, 09 – Enrique Dussel, professor at the Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (“Manufacturing Competitiveness: Toward a Regional Development Agenda,” The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Pardee Center, November 2009, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PardeeNAFTACh2PetersManufNov09.pdf)

One of the Mexican government’s goals in signing NAFTA was to expand its manufacturing sector by stimulating exports. In the early years following implementation, Mexico succeeded in attracting foreign investment and increasing manufacturing exports, with notable expansion in automotive, apparel, and electronics, among others. Yet this apparent success masks fundamental weaknesses, as the three NAFTA countries together have been losing their ability to compete in manufacturing in the global market. This suggests the need for a more proactive and long-term regional response. Even before the recent global financial and economic crisis1, the manufacturing sectors in the NAFTA-region were under similarly extreme pressures. The share of manufacturing in terms of GDP and employment has been falling in the three NAFTA countries, particularly since 2000 (See Figure 1). Contrary to the period 1994–2000, which saw increasing regional integration in a highly competitive global market, from 2000–2009 (March) the NAFTA region together lost 6.3 million jobs in manufacturing, or 27 percent of total employment in the sector.2 This suggests that in general, and in particular since 2000, the process of regional integration has deteriorated; in fact, an increasing process of “disintegration” has been taking place since then. These tendencies have only deepened since the second half of 2008 with the global crisis. In recent years, the original NAFTA integration agenda among the NAFTA countries has given way to one focused on security topics, with little sustained attention to socioeconomic, infrastructure, and other regional development issues.

#### Mexico’s economic stability is the crucial factor in determining the success of North America as a trade region.

Rubio 2013  
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Mexico’s stability is crucial for the U.S. Although the alleged spillover of violence has proven to be a myth (some of the safest American cities, like El Paso, lie at the very border), the fact that Mexico experiences instability of any sort constitutes a risk and a challenge for the United States. However, this need not be the case. This does not mean that the U.S. could or should take an active and decisive role in fixing its neighbor’s problems. In fact, as the last several years have proven, there is relatively little, other than support, that the U.S. can do to help Mexico address its security issues. The neighborhood calls for new ideas, new ways of looking at problems. Among these, one possibility that should be considered is that the NAFTA region become a major export powerhouse to compete with Asia, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of its members. Whether and how Mexico succeeds in resolving its current difficulties will have an extraordinary impact upon the U.S. The current wave of violence and insecurity has affected investment (at the very least it has reduced its potential) and lack of investment has impacted economic performance. These constitute powerful incentives for people of all socio economic backgrounds to emigrate. If Mexico were to resolve its challenges, it could turn around to become a formidable partner for economic growth. Either way, the evolution of Mexico’s predicament will affect the United States in fundamental ways. Mexico’s stability is of great import to the U.S. and will affect the latter regardless of what occurs elsewhere in the world. Many of the most serious challenges to the stability of the North American region can be found in Mexico. At the same time, many of the opportunities for a truly competi-tive North America lie in combining American technological might and the progressively more productive and competitive Mexican manufacturing base. Mexico is critical to the U.S. and its dilemmas and issues will strongly influence the way the U.S. evolves.

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#### Growing a strong US-Mexican relationship is a prerequisite to continued US power projection and supremacy.

Pastor 12   
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Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### This is true for the entire globe – Mexico is a key pillar for U.S. hegemony

Smith 13   
Simon Bolivar Professor of Latin American Studies at University of California in San Diego.[1] He has been president of the Latin American Studies Association since 1989, Ph.D. in Comparative Politics, Latin America from Columbia University “Global Scenarios and Bilateral Priorities” Mexico and the United States : the politics of partnership I Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, editors. P. 19-20

A more nuanced interpretation of unipolarity emerges from the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a widely respected academic and former national security adviser. Despite a visible shift of power from the West toward the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Brzezinski asserts that "America's role in the world will continue to be essential in the years to come. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism." "America is still peerless," he says, although it must rise to meet a range of challenges. domestic and international. Like Kagan, he concludes that it is a matter of national will: "The key to America's future is thus in the hands of the American people."12 In contrast to Kagan and others, Brzezinski stresses the importance of geographic location as a major asset for the United States. By this he means not only its "splendid isolation" from turbulence on other continents, but also the presence of a "good neighborhood"-marked by peaceful and cooperative relations with Canada and Mexico. Tranquility within the neighborhood thus enables the United States to project and sustain its power in other parts of the world.1.'.I This insight provokes an extended meditation by Brzezinski on US relations with Mexico. With evident concern, he focuses on the likely consequences for Mexico of a serious decline in US power: A waning partnership between America and Mexico could precipitate regional and even international realignments. A reduction in Mexico's democratic values, its economic power, and its political stability coupled with the dangers of drug cartel expansion would limit Mexico's ability to become a regional leader with a productive and positive agenda. This, in the end, could be the ultimate impact of American decline: a weaker. less stable. less economically viable and more anti-American Mexico unable to constructively compete with Brazil for cooperative regional leadership or to help promote stability in Central America. 14 Alternatively, one might have speculated on reverse cause and effect: the impact on the United States of Mexican decline, especially a descent into state failure. Even so, Brzezinski makes a fundamental point: Mexico provides a significant pillar for US power and it therefore deserves concomitant attention from policymakers.

#### Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### AND, statistics prove – Collapse of US leadership causes great power war and extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, CMR)

Events in Libya are a further reminder forAmericans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the** greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century**, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But **the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires,** an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from** state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a** 99 percent **relative** drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, **we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms**, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### North American integration key to solve democracy, disease, and the environment

Céspedes ‘8 – Diplomat in Residence, School of International Service and Senior Fellow,Center for North American Studies

Ernesto, North America, Security, and the Next US¶ National Security Strategy:¶ A Reflection, April 29, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/0804Cespedes_Reflection.pdf>, CMR

Under the topic “Working with others in defusing regional conflicts”, Mexico and¶ Canada, along with Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, were mentioned as part of a group of¶ countries with which the US had “…formed flexible coalitions… Together we will¶ promote a truly democratic hemisphere where our integration advances security,¶ prosperity, opportunity, and hope.”¶ 19¶ Not even bilateral cooperation with Mexico against drug trafficking was in the minds of¶ the post-9/11 security strategists: “Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict,¶ especially arising from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict¶ and unrestrained narcoticstrafficking could imperil the health and security of the United¶ States. Therefore we have developed an active strategy to help the Andean nations adjust¶ their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply¶ of drugs, while—as important—we work to reduce the demand for drugs in our own ¶ country.”¶ 20¶ An expanded and updated version of the NSS, published in March of 2006, restored¶ modest mentions of Canada and Mexico. The first one was implicit, not obviously¶ referring to North American countries exclusively, but certainly using reconciliatory¶ language: “America’s relations with other nations have been strong enough to withstand ¶ differences and candid exchanges of views… Some of our oldest and closest friends¶ disagreed with U.S. policy in Iraq. There are ongoing and serious debates with our allies¶ about how best to addressthe unique and evolving nature ofthe global terrorist threat.”¶ 21¶ As part of the regional sections of the 2006 NSS, the already well-established bilateral¶ and trilateral cooperative efforts with Mexico and Canada, especially through the¶ Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America, were modestly reflected: “…Our¶ strategy for the Hemisphere begins with deepening key relationships with Canada and¶ Mexico, a foundation of shared values and cooperative policies that can be extended¶ throughout the region. We must continue to work with our neighbors in the Hemisphere¶ to reduce illegal immigration and promote expanded economic opportunity for¶ marginalized populations.”¶ 22¶ The 2006 NSS reflects also –and only-- as “challenges of globalization” issues like¶ “Public health challengeslike pandemics(HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no¶ borders…illicit trade, whether in drugs, human beings, or sex, that exploits the modern¶ era’s greater ease of transport and exchange…Environmental destruction, whether caused¶ by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes,¶ earthquakes, or tsunamis…These challenges are not traditional national security¶ concerns, such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left unaddressed they can ¶ threaten national security.”¶ It is very indicative that these “global challenges,” whose importance as threats is far¶ lower than terrorism-based US security concerns, are high up on the list of security¶ threats of Canada and, especially, Mexico. In fact, they are threats to a¶ “multidimensional” concept of hemispheric security, promoted by Mexico, and formally ¶ adopted by the OAS membership in Mexico City in October 2003. At the time, the US¶ reluctantly joined the consensus on a text where defense issues and terrorism shared the¶ spectrum of security threats with the “non traditional” issues mentioned above.¶ 23¶ Not¶ surprisingly, all of those issues are either directly or tangentially addressed by the¶ trilateral agendas of the Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America from 2005¶ and on.

#### Democracy solves extinction

Diamond, prof of pol sci, 95—prof of political science and sociology, Stanford. Senior research fellow at Hoover. (Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.html)

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that ­govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

#### Pandemic disease causes extinction

**Yu 9—**Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science (Victoria, Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate, 22 May 2009, http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate, AMiles)

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

#### Environmental collapse causes extinction

CASBRC 1 (California Academy of Sciences Biodiversity Resource Center, “Threats To Biodiversity”, http://researcharchive.calacademy.org/research/library/biodiv/biodiversity\_defined.html)

Currently, more than 10,000 species become extinct each year and while precise calculation is difficult, it is certain that this rate has increased alarmingly in recent years. The central cause of species extinction is destruction of natural habitats by human beings. Human survival itself may depend upon reversing this accelerating threat to species diversity. Among the millions of undescribed species are important new sources of food, medicine and other products. When a species vanishes, we lose access to the survival strategies encoded in its genes through millions of years of evolution. We lose the opportunity to understand those strategies which may hold absolutely essential options for our own future survival as a species. And we lose not only this unique evolutionary experience, but emotionally, we lose the unique beauty, and the unique spirit, which mankind has associated with that life form. Many indigenous human cultures have also been driven to extinction by the same forces which have destroyed and continue to threaten non-human species. It is estimated that since 1900 more than 90 tribes of aboriginal peoples have gone extinct in the Amazon Basin. Nearly every habitat on earth is at risk: the rainforests and coral reefs of the tropics, the salt marshes and estuaries of our coastal regions, the tundra of the circumpolar north, the deserts of Asia and Australia, the temperate forests of North America and Europe, the savannahs of Africa and South America. Tropical rainforests, for example, are among the most diverse of all terrestrial ecosystems. Covering only 7% of the planet's surface, these forests comprise 50-80% of the world's species. 40 million to 50 million acres of tropical forest vanish each year -- about 1.5 acres per second -- as trees are cut for lumber or land is cleared for agriculture or other development. It is estimated that perhaps a quarter of the Earth's total biological diversity is threatened with extinction within 20 to 30 years. The Academy's Commitment The California Academy of Sciences is a leader among the world's institutions for research in evolutionary biology. Staff researchers study biodiversity worldwide, describing more than 100 new species every year. Current projects include work in La Amistad Biosphere Reserve, Costa Rica; the Impenetrable Forest, Uganda; the coral reefs of New Guinea and Madagascar; the deserts of southwestern Asia; and Socorro Island off the west coast of Mexico. Approximately 1.4 million species of plants and animals have been described by scientists. Conservative estimates suggest that at least 5 million remain to be identified -- the vast majority of them in the tropics. Fewer than 1,500 biologists worldwide are now qualified to identify tropical species. If ever there was an urgent requirement for this expertise, it is now, in this time of rapid environmental erosion.

### 1AC - Global Supply Chains Adv

#### We on the verge of a perfect storm due to border congestion that will choke North American supply chains and devastate manufacturing.

Blank & Lee 2009  
 Transportation infrastructure and competitiveness (revision July 1, 2009) Report prepared for the Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico Institute and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte research project, “The U.S.-Mexico Border: A Discussion on Sub-National Policy Options” By Stephen Blank and Erik Lee

The North American economy can best be visualized in the early 21st century as a deeply integrated continental system of supply chains structured by networks linking production centers and distribution hubs across the continent. These supply chains depend on an efficient and secure physical infrastructure of rails, roads and bridges, pipelines and wires, ports and border crossings and on a coherent and consistent system of regulations that affect individuals, machines, firms and goods. This degree of collaboration and complementarity between countries is unprecedented. It suggests that we are not so much trade partners as partners in production. Envisioning North America as a trade bloc is not a productive way of imaging the substance of the North American economic system. What flows across our borders are not mainly finished goods. We collaborate in complex, cross-border production systems. For example, a quarter of the more than a billion and a quarter dollars of goods cross the US-Canada-Mexico borders daily is automotive. But we don’t sell cars to each other. We build them together. During the 1980s and ‘90s – because of excess capacity, technological advances (such as double stacking containers) and government policies of privatization and deregulation – the supply of freight transportation matched the demand. The Particular Problem of Mexico The North American system remained incomplete, however. Partly due to Mexico’s failure to develop adequate communications, transportation and education infrastructure, and partly to the new allure of Asia, many companies did not develop true “North American” strategies. Hopes that Mexico would become the major supplier for U.S. and Canadian firms—as in the auto industry—were disappointed. Moreover, Mexican industrial growth continued to cluster in the border regions, aggravating internal migration problems. A report on transportation and logistics in Mexico concluded that “Among Mexico’s overarching transportation related challenges are competitiveness, deregulation, and decentralization. If Mexican enterprises are to compete effectively and profit from open trade, particularly within NAFTA, they will increasingly require higher quality infrastructure services, particularly in ports, highways and railroads.” 1 The report cites research by AT Kearney México which identified critical factors contributing to high logistics costs in Mexico: 1. High cost of inputs such as diesel, equipment and vehicle maintenance 2. Poor quality of the country’s infrastructure 3. Theft – increased insurance premiums and escort costs 4. Low penetration of technology by carriers 5. General lack of professionalism by the majority of carriers 6. Excessive bureaucracy 7. Corruption 8. Excessive customs paperwork and procedures A Perfect Storm At the close of the 20th century, the balance between demand for transport capacity and supply had deteriorated sharply. North America’s freight transportation infrastructure faced a “perfect storm” of capacity, congestion and deterioration due to the end of excess capacity, the emergence of global-manufacturing value chains with vastly greater demand for freight-transportation capacity because of increasing imports from Asia, the continued failure to harmonize regulations and the accumulated effects of delayed maintenance Many experts now spoke of an emerging crisis in North America’s freight-transportation system. A review of recent research on North America’s freight transport system conducted by the North American Transportation Competitiveness Research Council concluded: “The JIT-lean inventory advanced manufacturing system developed since the 1970s that enables North America to compete successfully with Asian and European manufacturers is now reaching its capacity limits. The supporting transportation infrastructure is now inadequate to handle the projected volume growth of North American supply chains’ freight flows.”2 “The result, observes Professor Mary Brooks, one of Canada’s best known specialists on freight transportation, “has been to boost buffer stocks, and force just-in-time supply chain managers to re-examine their sourcing options; it is of concern to Canada that many U.S. companies will source domestically rather than within NAFTA due to border uncertainty.” Even before 9/11, the physical infrastructure at critical Canadian and Mexican border crossings was nearly overwhelmed. Border infrastructure, even before 9/11, had fallen behind the increase in volume of goods crossing North American borders: "While trade has nearly tripled across both borders since the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA were implemented, border customs facilities and crossing infrastructure have not kept pace with this increased demand. Even if 9/11 had not occurred, trade would be choked at the border."

#### The plan is a key model for facilitating border efficiency and reducing supply chain costs.

Ed Gerwin 2013 Senior Fellow for Trade and Global Economic Policy for the Third Way Economic Program | MARCH 2013 Rooting for Canada and Mexico in the TPP <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/672/Third_Way_Policy_Memo_-_Rooting_for_Canada_and_Mexico_in_the_TPP_.pdf>

North America’s shared production is deep and extensive. Cars co-produced by Canada and the United States, for example, contain parts and subassemblies that have crossed the border an average of six times. One-third of all U.S.-Canada trade is intra-company trade–Ford selling to Ford or GE selling to GE.16 And over 40% of U.S.-Mexico trade is between companies in the same industry.17 But the flow of North American commerce is hardly seamless. Even under NAFTA, border barriers18 and regulatory differences19 still cause serious “chokepoints” that raise the cost and reduce the efficiency of trade in the region. And the highly integrated nature of North America’s economy only magnifies the negative impacts of these chokepoints. For instance, frequent border crossings impose an estimated $700 per vehicle penalty on the integrated co-production of cars in North America.20 In recent years, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have significantly boosted joint efforts to reduce border and regulatory barriers.23 The United States and Canada, for example, are pursuing 29 initiatives that would eliminate unnecessary differences in rules and ensure that regulators are on the same page as they develop new standards in areas like nanotechnology.24 This shared experience makes Canada and Mexico natural partners with the United States in negotiations to facilitate the flow of trade among the TPP’s eleven partner countries–economies that have a combined GDP of almost $21 trillion. And the TPP’s strong emphasis on “holistic” approaches to efficient supply chains will not only help expedite trade at our common borders, but will better link North America’s integrated economies to business opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region. 25

#### **US-Mexico border policy is the model for the world – the status quo push for hard borders will spread and fail without the plan.**

Papademetriou , Meissner, & Sohnen May 2013   
Demetrios G. Papademetriou is President and Co-Founder of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), a Washington-based think tank dedicated exclusively to the study of international migration ; Doris Meissner, former Commissioner of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), is a Senior Fellow at MPI, where she directs the Institute’s US immigration policy work. Eleanor Sohnen is a Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, where she works for the Regional Migration Study Group. Ms. Sohnen previously served as a consultant to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) “Thinking Regionally to Compete Globally: Leveraging Migration and Human Capital in the U.S., Mexico, and Central America” Migration Policy Institute and the Wilson Center. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/rmsg_final_report>

14. Border security between and among Mexico and the Northern Triangle of Central America must avoid simply exporting the US Southern border model to the rest of the region. Some think that this may be already in place along parts of the Mexico-Guatemala border. Pushing borders out has become a policy tool that states, from the Member States of the European Union to the United States and many other high-income countries, are using ever more systematically. Yet, the Study Group believes that there is still time to consult with neighbors about the border control and security systems they want and can afford. Study Group Members are confident that dialogue, patience, and cooperative solutions still have a chance and that the true choice for the region is not between “harder” or “softer” borders; it is about borders that are “smarter” because they are supported by a shared strategic vision about the region’s economic and security future; and identify and invest in border security strategies that also include efforts away from the border itself. In the absence of such a vision and a cooperatively developed strategy that is implemented faithfully by all parties to it, hard borders may well become the policy default option — in no small part because pressure from the United States will push the policy envelope toward ever harder borders.

#### Reducing supply chain barriers globally is the most important and effective way to stimulate the global economy.

World Economic Forum February 13, 2013. Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth Opportunities A World Economic Forum report in collaboration with Bain & Company and the World Bank http://www.weforum.org/ reports/enabling-trade-valuing-growth-opportunities.

Reducing supply chain barriers to trade could increase GDP by nearly 5% and trade by 15% If every country improved just two key supply chain barriers – border administration and transport and communications infrastructure and related services – even halfway to the world’s best practices, global GDP could increase by US$ 2.6 trillion (4.7%) and exports by US$ 1.6 trillion (14.5%). For comparison, completely eliminating tariffs could increase global GDP by US$ 0.4 trillion (0.7%) and exports by US$ 1.1 trillion (10.1%). The estimates of the impact of barrier reduction are conservative; they reflect improvements in only two of four major supply chain categories. Why is lowering barriers so effective? The reason is that it eliminates resource waste, whereas abolishing tariffs mainly reallocates resources. Moreover, the gains from reducing barriers are more evenly distributed among nations than the gains from eliminating tariffs. Of course, reducing supply chain barriers requires investment, while tariff reductions require only the stroke of a pen. However, many barriers can be traced to regulation. Detailed analysis can enable policymakers to prioritize the investments that are most critical and cost-efficient. Reducing barriers benefits households by lowering prices and improving employment prospects The welfare gains from a trade increase would be substantial, though not every individual or company would benefit. Reducing supply chain barriers lowers costs and hence lowers prices, both to consumers and to firms that import production inputs. Consumers gain access to a wider variety of goods. Workers benefit as well, as the boost to GDP is likely to stimulate employment growth. In the long run, trade facilitation promotes a shift in resources to more productive industries and firms, thereby increasing productivity and wages.

### 1AC – Economy

#### Growing bottlenecks at US-Mexico points of entry will cause a debilitating slowdown in North American trade - even current levels of trade across the border can’t be sustained.

Ramos 2013   
Kristian Ramos is New Democracy Network’s Policy Director of the 21st Century Border Initiative, “Realizing the Strategic National Value of our Trade, Tourism and Ports of Entry with Mexico” The New Policy Institute is the educational affiliate of the NDN, a think tank based in Washington, DC. May 2013 http://ndn.org/sites/default/files/blog\_files/NPI%20U%20S%20-Mexico%20Trade%20Tourism%20POE%20Report\_0.pdf

Investment in ports of entry is key Key policies and infrastructure can either help or hinder this enormous economic exchange. Forty-seven U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry facilitate several hundreds of billions dollars in U.S.-Mexico trade every year. Ideally, ports of entry should act as membranes, facilitating healthy interactions (such as legitimate trade and travel) and preventing unhealthy ones (such as illicit drugs, firearms and human smuggling). And ideally much of the actual inspection and clearance should occur “upstream” from the ports. Broad bipartisan agreement has developed on the need to improve our land ports of entry with Mexico. This is because over seventy percent of NAFTA trade flows through these ports of entry as well as an enormous flow of visitors who have a major economic impact on the United States. Twenty-three states have Mexico as their number one or number two trading partner, multiplying jobs in both countries. Significant investments of various types are badly needed for our shared land ports of entry with Mexico. Greatly increased security at the ports of entry since September 11, 2001 coupled with inadequate staffing and infrastructure have significantly increased border wait times. And with continued Congressional gridlock on funding and U.S. Customs and Border Protection projecting a $6 billion shortfall in infrastructure investment on both our southern and northern borders, we may be headed for a debilitating slowdown in North American trade. The regional border infrastructure master planning process is a step in the right direction of formally recognizing the vast bottom-up nature of interaction at the border by thousands of key stakeholders. But this more inclusive infrastructure planning system has not been met with increased funding for ports of entry staffing or infrastructure. The North American Development Bank may offer a model for funding border infrastructure projects.

#### Continued blockages at the border will suffocate both the US and Mexican economies.

Farnsworth, 2013  
Eric Farnsworth heads the Washington office of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, “Obama’s Mexico Trip Yielded Progress, Missed Opportunities,” Briefing, World Politics Review http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12934/obama-s-mexico-trip-yielded-progress-missed-opportunities

The two presidents should also have had more to say about the border, particularly regarding updating and expanding the infrastructure there that is creaking under the weight of increased trade and tightened security. The border is the windpipe of U.S.-Mexico trade. If it is blocked, both nations will choke. If it is cleared and expanded, both nations’ economies can breathe. The U.S.-Mexico energy relationship should also have received much more attention than it did, especially the export of newly plentiful natural gas from the United States, though this might have opened up both leaders to criticism about a lack of progress, whether on the transboundary agreement or the pace and scale of energy reform in Mexico. Meanwhile, bilateral security and drug-trafficking issues have not gone away. The Pena Nieto government is working to reformulate policies it inherited from the administration of former President Felipe Calderon. Only time will tell if Pena Nieto’s new, more centralized approach is more or less effective. But no matter how much Obama and Pena Nieto attempt to shift perceptions of the relationship from security to economic ties, the security issues will continue to grab headlines until they are effectively addressed. And that will hurt the economic agenda, because perceptions of insecurity in Mexico are a drag on both investment and the willingness of entrepreneurs to bet on Mexico, despite some promising steps toward innovation and building an entrepreneurial spirit in Mexico. Of course, the failure of the United States to control the export of weapons to Mexico directly contributes to Mexico’s persistent security problems. So we have a scenario in which the United States, in working to redefine the relationship from security to trade and economics, is reluctant to export natural gas but unable to prevent the export of assault weapons to Mexico. At the same time, Obama and Pena Nieto met during a time of real political crisis in Venezuela, even as the quality of democracy is deteriorating in a number of countries across the region. As the increasingly untenable concept of a regional democratic consensus comes unglued, the Summit of the Americas process becomes less and less relevant. It would have been electrifying in this context for the two presidents to call for a North American leaders meeting, to which could then be invited the leaders of the nations of the Pacific Alliance, a Mexico-inspired grouping of economically like-minded nations in the Americas, to regenerate a broader hemispheric agenda based on the reality, not just the rhetoric, of shared values and common interests. The president’s visit to Mexico was timely and symbolically important. It was designed to shift the narrative about U.S.-Mexico relations, and several concrete initiatives were announced. But the trip seemingly did little to promote or capture a larger ambition for the relationship. Both sides will need to think bigger to take the relationship to the next level.

#### Effective and efficient border crossings are key to US exports to Mexico – these are a crucial lynchpin to stimulate renewed US job growth.

O’Neil 2013  
Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/01/11/u-s-exports-depend-on-mexico/>

Surprising to many Americans is the importance of the United States’ trade with Mexico. While Asia captures the headlines, U.S. exports to Mexico are double those to China, and second only to Canada. And while many of these goods come from border states—Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California—Mexico matters for much more of the union. Seventeen states send more than 10 percent of their exports to Mexico , and it is the number one or two destination for U.S. goods for nearly half the country. The graph below shows those states most economically dependent on our southern neighbor–notice that South Dakota and Nebraska outpace New Mexico and California. These flows are only accelerating. During the first ten months of 2012 exports heading south grew by $17 billion dollars (or 10 percent) compared to 2011, reaching a total of $181 billion. They include petroleum products (some $17 billion worth) and intermediate goods such as vehicle parts, electrical apparatuses, industrial supplies, metals, and chemicals (over $40 billion combined). Spurred on by deep supply chains, these pieces and parts move fluidly back and forth across the border (often quite a few times) before ending up as finished goods on store shelves in both countries. The uptick should be seen as a good thing. According to economic studies, these exports support some six million American jobs (directly and indirectly). But to continue this dynamism, the United States and Mexico need to improve border infrastructure and facilitate flows. This means expanding border crossings and highways, and harmonizing regulations and customs to make the process easier and faster. Prioritizing and investing in bilateral trade will provide greater opportunity and security–for U.S. companies and workers alike.

#### US-Mexico economic cooperation is the only hope for sustaining the global economic recovery – growth in Europe, China, and Japan are too soft to keep the world economy afloat

Schiffer 2013   
Michael Schiffer President of the Inter-American Dialogue “A More Ambitious Agenda: A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue’s commission on Mexico-US relations.” February http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9042\_USMexicoReportEnglishFinal.pdf

The first is to reinforce and deepen economic cooperation. That includes increasing the productivity and international competitiveness of both nations, opening opportunities for longterm growth and job creation, and setting the stage for further economic integration. In a world of persistent, widespread economic insecurity, the more the United States and Mexico coordinate and integrate their economies, the more ably they can compete for global markets. Their economic cooperation is more vital than ever as drivers of the global economy falter—as the European financial crisis persists, as China enters a period of slower growth, as Japan remains stalled, and as many emerging markets appear increasingly vulnerable. Among the concrete objectives the two countries should consider are development of a framework to make their shared labor markets more efficient and equitable; formation of a coherent North American energy market (which could help meet the needs of energy-poor Central America); and coordination among the United States, Mexico, and Canada in negotiations toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

#### Global economic collapse causes war.

Harris and Burrows, 9 –   
\*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, \*\*member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf>)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East**.** Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.¶ Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 1AC– US Mexico Relations

#### First, despite the growing importance of US-Mexico relations, new BILATERAL initiatives are necessary to jump start improvements – improving the movement of people and goods is the key location for dialogue.

O’Neil 2013  
Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/01/11/u-s-exports-depend-on-mexico/>

Hidden behind the troubling headlines, however, is another, more hopeful Mexico — one undergoing rapid and widespread social, political, and economic transformation. Yes, Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, but it is also fostering a globally competitive marketplace, a growing middle class, and an increasingly influential pro-democracy voter base. In addition, Mexico’s ties with the United States are changing. Common interests in energy, manufacturing, and security, as well as an overlapping community formed by millions of binational families, have made Mexico’s path forward increasingly important to its northern neighbor. For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm’s length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico’s democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem.

#### Successful cooperation on border crossing for goods spills over into other areas of relations – it’s the best opportunity to improve relations.

Bonner & Rozental 2009   
Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges “ Report of the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30

The 1,952-mile land boundary between the United States and Mexico is the place where the most contentious and difficult issues in the bilateral relationship play out – from undocumented migration and contraband trafficking to the allocation of water in a thirsty region. Nevertheless, the border region remains poorly understood – both by policymakers in distant federal capitals and by the public at large. Most people who do not live along the border or cross it frequently are unaware of the challenges of border management or of the ways in which Mexico and the United States are attempting to meet those challenges. Changes on the ground – and local responses to them – frequently outpace both national policies and public perceptions. The conjunction of a technologically advanced, capital-rich society and a modernizing, labor-exporting country creates the potential for both synergy and strife. The challenge confronting Mexico and the United States is to mitigate the conflicts that inevitably arise from this dichotomy while seizing all potential opportunities the differences generate. We envision a system of border management that moves people and goods between the United States and Mexico far more quickly and efficiently than the present arrangement but that also enhances the security of both nations. This new system would facilitate trade, encourage the emergence of regional economic clusters, promote wise stewardship of shared natural resources, and enhance efforts to preserve ecosystems that cross the national boundary. Perhaps most importantly, it would invite communities that dot and span the frontier to exploit opportunities for mutual benefit. Ultimately, the border should be as “thin” and transparent as technologically and politically possible for those engaged in legitimate travel or commerce but difficult to penetrate for those engaged in criminal activity or unauthorized transit. Management of this shared boundary should serve as a model for binational collaboration in confronting shared challenges.

#### Plan solves pressures on broader relations questions – it would create the opportunity for a significant increase in US-Mexico relations.

Olson & Lee 2012   
Eric L Olson serves as Associate Director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Erik Lee serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University. “The State of Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region” Working Paper Series on the State of the U.S.-Mexico Border August 2012 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Border_Security_Olson_Lee.pdf>

Lasting progress in U.S.-Mexico border security can only come from increased bilateral collaboration and independent domestic progress on key issues affecting security in the United States and Mexico. Significant progress has been made in increasing and improving bilateral security collaboration between federal agencies on both sides of the border. While a welcome development, these advances can, in some cases, weakened the long-standing cooperation between local U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies. While it is important to continue strong federal coordination, encouraging local collaboration can also yield significant and important dividends in fighting crime affecting cross-border cities. Improved border management, a challenge during normal fiscal times, is particularly difficult in the United States’ constrained fiscal environment and thus requires increased attention and creative solutions. For example, the two governments—in close collaboration with border communities—should focus their efforts on making the land ports of entry from San Diego to Brownsville as safe and efficient as possible to enhance both our physical and economic security. One such effort has been the highly controversial experimental deployment of the SBInet system on the Arizona-Sonora border. While this technology has been deployed on the border between the ports of entry, the governments have not deployed technology in a game-changing way that could convert the ports of entry themselves into true platforms for economic security rather than highly congested and bureaucratized nodes in our North American commercial network.

#### Growing a strong US-Mexican relationship is a prerequisite to continued US power projection and supremacy.

Pastor 2012   
Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of The American Interest http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### 1AC - Border Security

#### Economic growth in Mexico is necessary to combat growing cartel violence and border insecurity. The plan solves.

Fischler, 2013  
Jacob Fischler covers law enforcement, courts and general assignments for The Monitor The Monitor, May 28, 2013 “Mexican trade — and tourists — are boon for U.S. businesses” http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/article\_3bf218a2-c734-11e2-b19a-001a4bcf6878.html

A study released earlier this month by NDN, a center-left think-tank based in Washington, D.C., shows trade and tourism between the two countries is at an all-time high. Trade between the two nations in 2012 was estimated at $535 billion. That number is up from $300 billion in 2009, a number that’s projected to double by this year, said Simon Rosenberg, the president of NDN. Texas leads all states with almost $200 billion in imports and exports with Mexico. Trade with Mexico sustains almost 6 million U.S. jobs, the NDN study said. In the Rio Grande Valley, tourists provide the biggest Mexican boost to the economy. “We really rely heavily on the Mexican market,” said Nancy Millar, the director of the McAllen Chamber of Commerce’s Convention and Visitors Bureau. The economic downturn in 2008 — which coincided with a spike in cartel violence — hurt Mexican tourism to the Valley, Millar said. Prior to those phenomena, 35 percent of income to McAllen’s tourism industry came from Mexico, she said, and it remains a vital part of McAllen’s economy. “There’s no doubt we have a much stronger economy than we would without them — 35 percent stronger,” she said. The NDN report called on lawmakers to use the immigration reform bill to increase the number of ports of entry and staffing of Customs and Border Protection officers at the border to expedite travel from Mexico to the U.S. “The customs department of (the Department of Homeland Security) is going to have to grow with trade and legal tourism,” Rosenberg said. “We’ve got to invest more in border infrastructure. We’ve got to cut down on wait times.” Doing so would also help eliminate barriers to further trade between the two countries, said Shannon O’Neil, a senior policy fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. And further trade means growing economies on both sides of border, particularly in areas near the border. “When a Ford plant opens in Mexico, it increases employment in the U.S.,” O’Neil said. That is because manufacturing companies take advantage of the free-trade laws that allow easy passage between North American nations to produce different parts in different places for the same finished product. “Up to 40 percent of a product that’s ‘made in Mexico’ actually comes from here originally,” she said. That’s a departure from just 10 to 20 years ago when most Mexican exports to the U.S. were natural resources like gas, she added. But reducing waiting times for Mexican tourists to enter the country is only one part of a formula to further improve trade. Border violence has to be controlled. “What’s been interesting is you’ve seen economic growth in Mexico even as security has worsened,” O’Neil said. But she doesn’t see that trend continuing. “In the long term, I don’t see how prosperity and growth that people hope for can continue if you can’t guarantee safety,” she said. “Economic growth and security have to go hand in hand.” Rosenberg believes economic growth can help bring security. “Improving the economy on both sides of the border has to be seen as part of the strategy to weaken transnational criminal organizations,” he said. “One of the ways to attack the cartels is to show that Mexicans have good jobs.”

#### Specifically, economic effects of alleviating border congestion would decrease illegal immigration to the US.

Bloomberg News May 2013  
“Border Delays Cost U.S. $7.8 Billion as Fence Is Focus” By Amanda J. Crawford 5/14/13 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-15/border-delays-cost-u-s-7-8-billion-as-fence-is-focus.html

Delays at U.S.-Mexico border crossings cost the U.S. economy $7.8 billion in 2011, as improvements have lagged behind traffic growth and the political focus has been on securing the rest of the border. The toll could balloon to $14.7 billion annually if the value of U.S.-Mexico truck trade reaches $463 billion by 2020 as predicted, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. As the U.S. Senate debates an overhaul of the nation’s immigration system, the focus on fencing and securing remote stretches of the southern border has overshadowed long-needed improvements in technology, infrastructure and staffing at the land ports, said Matthew Hummer, a senior transportation analyst for Bloomberg Government. “I think the most important issue here is stabilizing the two economies, and the ports of entry do that: They facilitate trade and create job opportunities,” said Hummer, the author of a Bloomberg Government report on the border. “If Mexicans have jobs in Mexico they are less likely to come to the U.S.” Net Mexican migration dropped to zero from 2005 to 2010, amid strengthening economic conditions in Mexico, heightened border enforcement and other factors, according to a Pew Research Center study last year. The Mexican economy has grown at about twice the pace of the U.S. since the end of 2009.

#### Independently, infrastructure development at Mexican border POEs would increase security and decrease illegal immigration by allowing more effective tracking of visa overstays

Roberts, Alden & Whitley 2013   
Bryan Roberts is a senior economist at Econometrica, Inc, an adjunct lecturer at George Washington University. Edward Alden is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. John Whitley is an economist, an adjunct lecturer at George Washington University, previously the director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) at DHS, “Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States How Effective Is Enforcement?” May 2013 http://www.cfr.org/immigration/managing-illegal-immigration-united-states/p30658

The land borders remain the biggest challenge in identifying overstays. Exits across the northern border are recorded by the Canadian border authority, and the U.S. and Canadian governments have recently agreed to exchange entry and exit data and are doing so through initial pilot projects. The goal is to share entry and exit data for all border crossings, for Americans and Canadians as well as third-country nationals.60 The southwest land border will soon constitute the sole major issue in visa overstay estimation. The United States and Mexico may be able to negotiate information-sharing arrangements regarding third-country nationals and visa travelers, though infrastructure and data systems remain inadequate at many Mexican ports of entry. This would leave entries and exits on Border Crossing Cards (BCCs), which are used by citizens of Mexico for short-term stays in the border region, as the one remaining challenge for visa overstay estimation. The recording of BCC entries is done electronically, using cards with biometric identifiers, but a huge number of entries is made every year and exits are not tracked.61 Estimates of the total flow of visa overstayers may thus be sensitive to the estimate of BCC overstayers, and some way of verifying exit of BCC entries needs to be developed, most likely through information-sharing.62

#### Inefficient and ineffective POEs create an open door for a nuclear terrorist attack via a dirty bomb.

McCaul 2012  
Michael Thomas McCaul, Sr., U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, serving since 2005. Since the beginning of the 113th Congress, he has been the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security. “A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER A MAJORITY REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL T. McCAUL, CHAIRMAN ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION NOVEMBER 2012” http://mccaul.house.gov/uploads/Final%20PDF%20Line%20in%20the%20Sand.pdf

Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. n May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations.3 The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. As this report explains, the United States tightened security at airports and land ports of entry in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down this path of least resistance, and with them the terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to enter.

#### A dirty bomb smuggled through the border would create a massive border crackdown …

Andreas 2003   
Peter Andreas is professor of international studies at the Institute and professor in Brown's Department of Political Science. PhD Cornell, “A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada Lines After 9-11” THE CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION STUDIES Working Paper No. 77 May, 2003

The particular direction taken will obviously depend to a great extent on the location, method, timing, intensity, and frequency of any future terrorist incidents. It is important to note that while the hijackings on 9-11 were not directly linked to the U.S.-Mexico or U.S.-Canada borders, they nevertheless had dramatic and long-lasting border ripple effects. A more directly border-related incident, such as terrorists entering the country across the U.S.-Mexico or U.S.-Canada borders, or a bomb exploding that had been smuggled through a border port of entry, would likely generate far more intensive calls for hardening borders. If sustained, a high-intensity border crackdown could potentially stall and even derail the continental economic integration process. There is nothing automatic about the policy reaction to any future attacks, however. The politics of the policy response matter as much as any actual attack. Beyond the actual levels of destruction and disruption that such future terrorist events may cause, U.S. images and perceptions of its NAFTA partners will be crucial. Amongst the many political choices will be whether (and to what extent) American policymakers point an accusatory finger northward and/or southward. Post-9-11 Canadian and Mexican policy initiatives should be viewed as trust- and confidence-building measures designed to inhibit such a response.

#### Nuclear terrorist attack causes retaliation and extinction

Ayson ’10 – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria

University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether **nuclear terrorism should** ever **be regarded as** belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of **nuclear terrorism, could precipitate** a chain of events leading to **a** massive exchange of nuclear weaponsbetween two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) **suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors**. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political **leaders** not be tempted to **assume the worst**? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, **the** U.S. **president might** be expected to **place the country’s** armed forces, including its **nuclear arsenal, on** a **high**er stage of **alert**. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that **Moscow and**/or **China might mistake**nly read **this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use** force (and possibly **nuclear force)** against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) **Washington might** decide to **order a significant** conventional (or **nuclear)** retaliatory or disarming **attack against** the leadership of the **terrorist** group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, **Washington** found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) **might** it also **suspect that they** secretly **were in cahoots with the group, increasing** (again perhaps ever so slightly) **the chances of a** major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

### 1AC – Auto Industry

#### US-Mexico border key to auto industry success

Hendricks 11 (Hendricks, David. "Auto Industry Dominates Texas-Mexico Border Trade." Houston Chronicle. 03 July 2011. <http://www.chron.com/business/article/Auto-industry-dominates-Texas-Mexico-border-trade-2081819.php>.the premier local news provider for the country's 4th largest city. Currently the nation's sixth-largest newspaper, the Houston Chronicle is a multimedia company publishing print and online products in English and Spanish that reach millions of people each month. The Houston Chronicle is owned by the Hearst Corporation.)

Anyone wondering which industrial sector is the most important in U.S.-Mexico border trade only has to see what the double-stacked freight cars are carrying on the rail lines parallel to Interstate 35 between San Antonio and Laredo. Newly assembled cars and car parts, especially stacks of chassis, are the most visible and tell the story, even if they only show a fraction of what occurs along the U.S.-Mexico border. Automotive investments are continuing despite Mexico's widely publicized violence. Border business leaders uniformly said Mexico's drug-cartel turf wars and organized crime have not been barriers to auto industry activities and auto border trade. "We lost a few factories that did not survive the U.S. recession, operations that were purchased or merged. But Reynosa last year added 4,000 jobs, even with the violence, at maquiladoras in all categories," said McAllen Economic Development Corp. President Keith Patridge. "What violence? What organized crime?" asked Roger Creery, in an interview before recently resigning as executive director of the Laredo Development Foundation. "What I can say is this: We've had several announcements of plant expansions. Foreign investments have been made in Nuevo Laredo and in central Mexico. Based on the amount of those foreign investments, business growth has not been negatively impacted by societal issues going on in Mexico," Creery said. A powerful region The Texas-northeast Mexico auto-manufacturing region has emerged over the past decade as the glue connecting automakers with plants in Detroit and the U.S. South to the concentration of assembly plants in central Mexico, such as those in León and Toluca and as far south as Puebla. The auto supply chains run north and south, from Mexico to Canada, like an electric current, day and night. More of the auto industry flow passes through Laredo than any other U.S.-Mexico port. In 2010, about $114 billion in international freight crossed through Laredo. Nearly half of it was auto-related, Creery said. The next-largest category, mainly electronic products and components, amounts only to one-fourth the amount of auto freight, Creery said. In 2008 and 2009, the U.S. recession hit the auto industry particularly hard. Laredo saw annual declines of 15  percent to 18 percent in auto freight processed through its port those years, Creery said. But the auto freight volumes recovered in 2010 and are on pace for a 10 percent increase in 2011. Laredo's vast logistics operations of truck and rail bridges and Union Pacific Corp.'s rail yard handle freight for assembly plants and parts factories from central Mexico to Canada.

Fast and Efficient Supply Chains Critical to Auto Industry – Current Border Times Too Slow

Figueroa, Lee, and Schoik 12-2011 Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst, NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik, Director, NACTS, 12-2011, “Realizing the Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico” http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossborder-trade-with-mexico2.pdf

The close economic ties between the U.S. and Mexico illustrate the dynamics of a 21st century supply chain as inputs cross the border multiple times, accumulating value added to the goods being exported and imported through our shared border. The automotive, electronics and aeronautic industries, among others, are examples of the highly integrated supply chains between U.S. and Mexican industries that have successfully faced global competition. The North American auto industry has become highly integrated since the original Auto Pact between Detroit and Ontario that began cross-border manufacturing in North America. Today, vehicles made in Mexico have a high U.S. content, while at the same time vehicles manufactured in the U.S. use a large number of Mexican-made auto parts. Supply chains are critical to businesses’ underlying value, growth potential, and economic competitiveness. Unfortunately, supply chains often come to a stop due to border delays, security concerns, and infrastructure constraints. These issues create an environment of uncertainty in the business community, which deters investment, job creation and economic prosperity. Exports clearly create jobs, but what is less apparent is that exports rely on imports. When U.S. firms build and produce things together with firms in Mexico, it is imperative for them to get key components across the border as fast as possible back into their facilities. The sooner they are in, the sooner they may continue to move along the supply chain until they reach the consumer and create a profit for the U.S. firm and the economy. In a just-in-time business environment, the company relies on an efficient process at the border in order to get numerous key components shipped rapidly from Mexico. Mexico has increasingly become a strategic supplier to U.S. industry; Mexico’s intermediate exports contribute to both intermediate and finished goods in the U.S. Capital goods traded between the U.S. and Mexico also play an important role in increasing regional competitiveness. Last year, $70 billion worth of machinery, tools and equipment were traded bilaterally to produce other goods that were in turn consumed locally or sold to foreign markets as North American-made products. The highly complementary nature of this trade illustrates the growing importance of incorporating value-added every time a product crosses the border for further processing. The interconnectivity between the supply chains of both countries help U.S. companies remain competitive in the world marketplace by producing goods for worldwide consumption at competitive prices. Mexico’s proximity to the U.S. allows production to have a high degree of U.S. content in the final product which in turn helps create and sustain jobs in both countries.

#### US auto industry collapse leads to economic collapse

Snyder 12 (Snyder, Michael. "17 Facts About The Decline Of The U.S. Auto Industry That Are Almost Too Crazy To Believe." The Economic Collapse. 19 Jan. 2012. <http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/17-facts-about-the-decline-of-the-u-s-auto-industry-that-are-almost-too-crazy-to-believe>. An undergraduate in Commerce from the University of Virginia, and possesses a law degree with an LLM from the University of Florida law school, worked in numerous Washington DC lawfirms)

Very few things illustrate how dramatically America has been deindustrialized than the stunning decline of the U.S. auto industry. Once upon a time, the United States literally taught the rest of the world how to make cars. We were the ones that invented the assembly line. We were the ones that showed the rest of the world what mass production could do for an economy. For decades, we produced more cars than anyone else and we sold more cars than anyone else. Detroit was known as "the Motor City" and our manufacturing prowess dominated the planet. But now all of that has changed. Japan makes far more vehicles than we do today. So does Germany. As you read this, state of the art production facilities are going up all over China. Meanwhile, the U.S. auto industry continues to rot and thousands upon thousands of good automotive jobs continue to leave our shores. The rest of the world is making cars better than we are, they are making them cheaper than we are and they really don't care that many of our formerly great manufacturing cities are turning into rotting, stinking hellholes. The U.S. auto industry was once a symbol of American dominance, but now it is just a symbol of American decline. If we want to remain a great nation, then we need to start becoming great at making things once again. Sadly, it is not just the auto industry in America that is falling apart. In fact, almost everywhere you look in our economy (and in our society as a whole) there is decay and decline. For example, our infrastructure was once the envy of the entire globe. Today, U.S. infrastructure is ranked 23rd. Just because we have had it so good for so long does not mean that it will always be that way. As a nation, our wealth is declining. A decade ago, the United States was ranked number one in average wealth per adult. By 2010, the United States had fallen to seventh. We lived off the wealth created by previous generations for a long time, but that was not enough for us. We always wanted more. Eventually we started going into massive amounts of debt so that we could keep this bubble of "false prosperity" going. Today, when you add up all forms of debt in America, it comes to over 50 trillion dollars. We are a great nation that is in an accelerating state of decline. We have got to quit living off of the past accomplishments of previous generations. We have got to quit being so lazy and decadent and spoiled. There is absolutely no guarantee that America will always be a great nation. In fact, when great nations fall, it usually happens very quickly.

#### Global economic collapse causes war.

Harris and Burrows, 9 –   
\*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, \*\*member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf>)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East**.** Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.¶ Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 1AC – Advanced Manufacturing

#### Efficient US-Mexico Borders are critical to supporting advanced manufacturing.

Wilson 2013   
Christopher E. Wilson Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region” in New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_new_era.pdf>

Technological advances and improvements in the manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider nearshoring in Mexico or reshoring their production back to the United Sates. Robots and the hightech sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers is on the decline, and the need for high-skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex machines and robots of today’s factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing, especially if the complementary nature of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor. The widespread implementation of lean manufacturing principles has improved the efficiency and agility of factories around the world. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in warehousing. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a robust network of nearby suppliers. It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production until the needed parts arrive at their destination.

#### Advanced manufacturing is key to US competitiveness and prevents economic deterioration

Rosselet 2/8 (Suzanne, research fellow at IMD business school in Lausanne, Switzerland, specializes in world competitiveness and holds a degree in economics from Stanford University, previously served as deputy director of IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, "US manufacturing is key to competitiveness," 2013, [www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0208/US-manufacturing-is-key-to-competitiveness], jam)

US competitiveness in the global economy is slipping. According to the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, the United States fell from its number one slot, mainly due to a dramatic slide in its Government Efficiency ranking, where it has fallen from 5th place in 2002 to 22nd today. And the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report puts the US in 7th place, down from 1st in 2007.¶ If this isn’t worrying enough, 71 percent of more than 10,000 Harvard Business School alumni surveyed expect US competitiveness to decline over the next three years. In the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, the US ranks 4th in terms of the ease of doing business, including a dismal 69th place for the ease of paying taxes. And the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation puts the US second-to-last on the rate of progress on innovation-based competitiveness since 2000, ahead of only Italy.¶ OPINION: Five steps to bring back American manufacturing jobs¶ But there is some good news: US manufacturing. Until recently, the industry had been in steady decline, but many signs now indicate that America is now in the midst of a historic manufacturing revival. But manufacturers are also facing a skills-gap, as workers are unprepared for the demands of this growing industry. Preparing tomorrow’s skilled workforce should be one of the Obama administration’s top economic priorities. Developing a long-term plan to train workers for new manufacturing jobs is vital to boosting US competitiveness.¶ There are several reasons for the growth in US manufacturing, but one of the main explanations is that outsourcing to low-cost countries is no longer as tempting as it once was. With labor and transportation costs rising in many of these countries, American companies are bringing work back to the US and foreign companies are more attracted to a cost-competitive US base as well. In addition, a natural gas boon will help make US energy costs some of the lowest in the world. Add to that the benefits of higher quality manufactured goods and state-of-the-art innovation capabilities, and the US has a fair chance of regaining its historical leadership in advanced manufacturing.¶ A recent study by the Boston Consulting Group claims that the US is indeed on course to regain its status as a global industrial powerhouse, suggesting that the manufacturing resurgence combined with boosting US exports could create between 2.5 million and 5 million jobs by the end of the decade. But meeting the challenges of this “manufacturing revival,” means closing the skills gap through more, and better-targeted, investment in education and training.¶ Three recommendations to support advanced manufacturing were proposed in July 2012 by a committee of the president’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. This multi-stakeholder committee, made up of business leaders, academics, and scientists, called on President Obama to make good on his promise to create an “economy built to last” by “enabling innovation,” “securing the talent pipeline,” and “improving the business climate.”¶ To build, attract, and retain talent, their report recommends an advertising campaign to promote manufacturing as an exciting career path. It suggests capitalizing on the skills of returning veterans, investing in community colleges, and creating partnerships between industry and these colleges, as well as promoting manufacturing fellowships and internships.¶ OPINION: 3 views on the best way to create jobs in the US¶ These are all key steps, but policymakers and the manufacturing industry should also encourage workers to re-focus their career choices toward high value-added, knowledge-intensive manufacturing. And America must shore up its educational curriculum in the areas of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Supplement this with more technical training during and after high school. The US must also continue to decrease student drop-out rates and keep working to improve the quality of high school education.¶ Despite the fact that more than half of the world’s 100 leading universities are American (and 8 of the top 10), American high school graduates rank poorly in international test scores: American 15-year-olds ranked 25th in mathematics, 14th in reading, and 17th in science (out of 34 countries) on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) rankings. No American president should sleep well with these results.¶ Since many experts acknowledge that advanced manufacturing is the best bet for creating high-paying jobs, with the additional advantages of contributing to innovation and reducing the US trade deficit, Mr. Obama would do well to heed the advice of his council. Education and training are critical to providing an appropriately skilled workforce that will ensure long-term sustainable growth and restore the US lead in competitiveness indices.¶ OPINION: World's next technology leader will be US, not China – if America can shape up¶ But more important than rankings, investing in the skills of the American people will put struggling lower and middle class Americans back to work. And with the US unemployment rate still hovering just below 8 percent, that’s an objective worth fighting for.

#### Advanced Manufacturing is key to innovation.

Lind & Freedman 12—Policy Director of Economic Growth Program & Policy analyst in the Economic Growth Program @ New America Foundation [Michael Lind & Joshua Freedman “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” New America Foundation, April 2012]

Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs¶ growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries. An “industrial commons” is a base of shared¶ physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a¶ number of firms. The term “commons” comes from communally-¶ shared pastures or fields in premodern Britain. The industrial commons in particular in the manufacturing¶ sector includes not only large companies but also small and¶ medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for¶ 86 percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and more are all interconnected; most of the time, Harvard Business¶ School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih point out,¶ these linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms.18 Examples of¶ industrial commons surrounding manufacturing are evident¶ in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from¶ Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York.19 Modern economic scholarship emphasizes the importance¶ of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location synergies.¶ 20 Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs when manufacturing¶ and R&D are located near each other: the manufacturer¶ benefits from the innovation, and the researchers¶ are better positioned to understand where innovation can be found and to test new ideas. While some forms of¶ knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much¶ “know-how” in industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the¶ erosion of geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation¶ ecosystem. If an advanced manufacturing core is not retained, then¶ the economy stands to lose not only the manufacturing¶ industry itself but also the geographic synergies of the¶ industrial commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing share of R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States.21 In particular, a number of large U.S.¶ manufacturers have opened up or expanded R&D facilities¶ in China over the last few years. 22

#### U.S. economic leadership solves great power war

Zhang and Shi ’11 Yuhan Zhang, Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lin Shi, Professor at Columbia, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,” East Asia Forum, 1/22/2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry

Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, [and] the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

### 1AC - Solvency

#### The plan solves – expanding and improving physical border infrastructure is necessary to facilitate cross-border trade.

Hutchins 2008  
Dwight Hutchins Senior Executive, Global Managing Director, Health Public Service Strategy, Accenture Consulting; M.P.A from the JFK School of Government at Harvard University, M.B.A. Northwestern University, and B.S. in Chemical Engineering from the University of Tennessee. “IMPROVING ECONOMIC OUTCOMES BY REDUCING BORDER DELAYS FACILITATING THE VITAL FLOW OF COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC ACROSS THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER” This study, commissioned by the Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration, was conducted by Accenture in association with HDR Decision Economics and Crossborder Group Inc. http://shapleigh.org/system/reporting\_document/file/487/DRAFT\_Reducing\_Border\_Delays\_Findings\_and\_Options\_vFinal\_03252008.pdf

An expansion of physical border crossing infrastructure is needed to reduce wait time. Expansion options, depending on port-specific needs and available space, include: - Improving Mexican and U.S. local access roads and highways. - Widening the approach to Mexican export facilities and widening border crossings such as bridges. - Constructing new lanes leading to U.S. primary and expanding the number of primary booths. - Lengthening dedicated cargo and FAST lanes. - Enlarging and redesigning secondary inspection facilities to accommodate advanced security technologies (e.g., radiation portal monitors, gamma-ray imaging). Bilateral effort is required to improve infrastructure on both sides of the border. Several infrastructure expansion projects are planned and underway. It is also important to consider the type of capacity needed. The capacity needed at each POE will vary based on the types of incoming trucks, such as FAST, empty, or agricultural. For those POEs with high percentages of FAST trucks, it is recommended to provide longer and additional dedicated lanes to deliver wait time benefits to enrolled members. An additional strategy is to designate “trade-only” transportation corridors that lead to expanded commercial-only POEs. These newly designated cargo-only ports could be limited to low-risk importers and trucks (e.g., FAST, C-TPAT, or other pre-cleared trucks) either full time or during known periods of peak demand.

#### And, the plan facilitates improved US-Mexico cooperation while streamlining ports of entry

Bonner & Rozental 2009   
Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges “ Report of the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30

The solutions ¶ We believe that that the most effective and efficient way to enhance security along ¶ the border is through closer binational cooperation. Achieving greater cooperation will ¶ in turn require not only the investment of greater resources but also the creation of ¶ mirror-image law enforcement agencies on each side of the border. Ultimately, ¶ cooperation should take the form of regular binational operations to interdict illegal ¶ flows, joint investigations, constant communication between Mexican and American ¶ authorities at and between the ports of entry. ¶ The violence in many Mexican border towns makes the security situation particularly ¶ urgent. We urge officials in both governments to demonstrate a “bias for action”, ¶ showing as much flexibility and creativity as they can in order to devise new security ¶ arrangements. ¶ The following steps should be taken immediately: ¶ • Mexico should restructure its federal law enforcement institutions along the border ¶ to create a direct counterpart to U.S. border enforcement authorities, similar to the ¶ approach that Canada took after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. ¶ Initially, new personnel operating between the ports of entry should be deployed ¶ along stretches of the border where traffickers are most active. ¶ • Mexico should begin converting its Customs authority into a multi-functional agency ¶ capable of addressing the threats posed by cross-border trafficking of all sorts. ¶ Mexican Customs and the Office of Field Operations of U.S. Customs and Border¶ Protection (which staffs the ports of entry) should develop joint plans for securing all ¶ land ports of entry along the border. ¶ • Mexico and the United States should deploy new interdiction and inspection ¶ technologies at the ports of entry. The Mexican side needs an array of new ¶ equipment, including license plate scanners and non-intrusive inspection ¶ technologies. ¶ • The United States and Mexico should expand cooperative law enforcement efforts ¶ along the border, such as the OASISS program (through which information collected ¶ by U.S. officials is used by Mexican authorities to prosecute smugglers apprehended ¶ in the United States). ¶ • The United States should deny members of drug trafficking organizations and their ¶ families safe haven north of the border by barring family members and known ¶ associates of Mexican criminal organizations from entry into the country; where ¶ these individuals are already in the United States, their visas should be revoked, and ¶ they should be deported. ¶ • The United States should intensify efforts to curtail the smuggling of firearms and ¶ ammunition into Mexico by better monitoring licensed gun sellers, working with them ¶ identify suspicious purchases, regulating gun shows, reinstituting the Clinton-era ban ¶ on assault weapons, conducting targeted inspections of southbound traffic, and ¶ providing leads to a more robust Mexican Customs authority. There should be at ¶ least one ATF agent in each U.S. consulate in Mexico to assist Mexican authorities ¶ with weapons traces and train Mexican law enforcement officers. If warranted by ¶ intelligence, the U.S. should also consider using Joint Inter-Agency Task Force ( JIATF) ¶ -South resources to interdict international arms smuggling into North America. ¶ • The United States should improve coordination between U.S. law enforcement ¶ agencies to seize bulk cash flowing south to Mexico and conduct targeted, ¶ intelligence-driven inspections of southbound traffic. The Federal Bureau of ¶ Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs ¶ Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have key roles in increasing ¶ the amount of southbound drug cash seized. ¶ • The United States should dramatically expand assistance to Mexico beyond the ¶ Mérida Initiative, in order to help Mexico build up its law enforcement capacity. The ¶ U.S. government should be prepared to spend $300-500 million per year for at least ¶ five years. ¶ • The United States should reduce demand for illegal drugs through enhanced ¶ prevention efforts, increased access to treatment programs, stricter street-level ¶ enforcement, expanded drug testing of a portion of the workforce (e.g., employees ¶ of firms with government contracts), and more careful surveillance of the prison and¶ parolee populations. Mexico should also intensify its own efforts to reduce domestic ¶ drug consumption. ¶ The following steps should be taken within the next three years: ¶ • Mexico should complete the establishment of a federal frontier police, either as a ¶ division of an existing entity or as a new agency dedicated to securing the areas ¶ between the ports of entry on both Mexico’s northern and southern borders. In the ¶ north, zones of operation for the Mexican force should exactly match those of its U.S. ¶ counterpart. ¶ • Mexico should consider bringing the federal frontier police and a transformed ¶ Customs authority together into a single, unified border protection agency. ¶ • Mexico and the United States should reconfigure the zones of operation of their ¶ respective border enforcement agencies so that they mirror each other. ¶ • Cross-deputized Mexican and U.S. agents should conduct joint operations between ¶ the ports of entry. ¶ • Mexico and the United States should reconfigure their ports of entry so that ¶ appropriate officials on both sides have access to real-time data on vehicles and ¶ individuals crossing the border. Customs officers from both sides should meet ¶ regularly to review operations at their ports of entry. ¶ • Professional and trusted law enforcement personnel from both countries should be ¶ able to search for information gathered on perpetrators by officials from the other ¶ country. ¶ • Mexico and the U.S. should build a binational prison on Mexican soil, to house ¶ Mexicans who have been apprehended by U.S. authorities for relatively minor ¶ border-related crimes. Such a facility would allow these individuals to be closer to ¶ their families while they serve their time. ¶ • Both countries should establish workable systems for preventing corruption, including ¶ careful background checks and vetting of applicants, as well as a system for rapidly ¶ identifying corrupt overtures and promptly and professionally investigating all ¶ potential corruption allegations. ¶ • Mexico should re-civilianize law enforcement. As civilian authorities become more ¶ capable and professional, it should be possible for the Mexican government to ¶ withdraw military personnel from most places where they have had to assume ¶ police functions. On the U.S. side, better control over the border should obviate the ¶ need for National Guard units currently deployed near the frontier to assist U.S. ¶ Customs and Border Protection.

#### Mexico says yes - Mexico is a ready and willing partner for border infrastructure improvements, but the United States has to be the first mover – plan would catalyze growth in legal trade

O’Neil 2013   
Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “Mexico Makes It: A Transformed Society, Economy, and Government” March/April 2013 Foreign Affairs http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-makes/p30098

BORDER BUDDIES Since NAFTA was passed, U.S.-Mexican trade has more than tripled. Well over $1 billion worth of goods crosses the U.S.-Mexican border every day, as do 3,000 people, 12,000 trucks, and 1,200 railcars. Mexico is second only to Canada as a destination for U.S. goods, and sales to Mexico support an estimated six million American jobs, according to a report published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center's Mexico Institute. The composition of that bilateral trade has also changed in recent decades. Approximately 40 percent of the products made in Mexico today have parts that come from the United States. Many consumer goods, including cars, televisions, and computers, cross the border more than once during their production. Admittedly, this process has sent some U.S. jobs south, but overall, cross-border production is good for U.S. employment. There is evidence that U.S. companies with overseas operations are more likely to create domestic jobs than those based solely in the United States. Using data collected confidentially from thousands of large U.S. manufacturing firms, the scholars Mihir Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James Hines upended the conventional wisdom in a 2008 study, which found that when companies ramp up their investment and employment internationally, they invest more and hire more people at home, too. Overseas operations make companies more productive and competitive, and with improved products, lower prices, and higher sales, they are able to create new jobs everywhere. Washington should welcome the expansion of U.S. companies in Mexico because increasing cross-border production and trade between the two countries would boost U.S. employment and growth. Mexico is a ready, willing, and able economic partner, with which the United States has closer ties than it does with any other emerging-market country. Familial and communal ties also unite the United States and Mexico. The number of Mexican immigrants in the United States doubled in the 1980s and then doubled again in the 1990s. Fleeing poor economic and employment conditions in Mexico and attracted by labor demand and family and community members already in the United States, an estimated ten million Mexicans have come north over the past three decades. This flow has recently slowed, thanks to changing demographics and economic improvements in Mexico and a weakening U.S. economy. Still, some 12 million Mexicans and over 30 million Mexican Americans call the United States home. For all these reasons, the United States should strengthen its relationship with its neighbor, starting with immigration laws that support the binational individuals and communities that already exist in the United States and encourage the legal immigration of Mexican workers and their families. U.S. President Barack Obama has promised to send such legislation to Congress, but a strong anti-immigrant wing within the Republican Party and the slow U.S. economic recovery pose significant barriers to a comprehensive and far-reaching deal. Nevertheless, the United States and Mexico urgently need to invest in border infrastructure, standardize their customs forms, and work to better facilitate legal trade between them. Furthermore, getting Americans to recognize the benefits of cross-border production will be an uphill battle, but it is one worth fighting in order to boost the United States' exports, jobs, and overall economic growth.

#### Third, expanding border crossing would pose no risk to security – minor investments on expediting flows would reap massive economic returns

Bonner & Rozental 2009   
Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges “ Report of the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30

Congestion at crossing points imposes considerable costs on tourists, commuters, consumers, business owners, and border communities; the financial price alone of delays at the border reaches billions of dollars per year. In some areas along the border, including the San Diego-Tijuana corridor, expediting cross-border commerce is the single most important measure that the governments could take to promote economic development. Although facilitation is often viewed as the flip side of security, there are ways to simultaneously expedite trade and improve security. For instance, new detection technologies and intelligent risk management strategies enhance public safety while facilitating cross-border travel and commerce. One crucial barrier to trade facilitation is the deficit in border infrastructure, which simply has not kept pace with massive increases in trade and transit since ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Federal spending on ports of entry would have a very high rate of return; for this reason, both countries should make a long-term commitment to fund border infrastructure and (in the short run) disproportionately direct stimulus money toward the ports of entry. Even with additional stimulus spending, however, federal funding will remain insufficient to address the infrastructure deficit; both countries must find other sources of financing for border crossing points and the roads that feed into them. This money can come in part from the private sector, with the market rather than the state determining the magnitude of private investment in border infrastructure. Beyond infrastructure, better exploitation of technology, refined risk-based segmentation of traffic, and operational changes at the ports of entry (including staffing) can all reduce transit time. Because the marginal cost of operating an existing port of entry is extremely low compared to both the cost of building a new port of entry and the marginal benefit of more rapid transit, inadequate staffing of the ports of entry should never become a bottleneck So far neither government has articulated a goal for wait times. The Task Force believes that average wait times at the border should not exceed 20 minutes in either direction, at any port of entry, with minimal variation about this average.

#### Finally, plan solves border security – the majority of illegal immigration and illicit trafficking happens at legitimate POEs

Wilson 2013  
Christopher E. Wilson Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “Focus immigration security on official border crossings” Dallas Morning News April 11 http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/latest-columns/20130411-christopher-wilson-focus-immigration-security-on-official-border-crossings.ece?action=reregister

As the senatorial Gang of Eight finalizes its immigration reform bill, it has become clear that border security will be a key, if contentious, part of any viable immigration proposal. In fact, it remains one of the few sticking points with the potential to derail the whole reform process. Yet despite having so much riding on improving border security, there is no clear definition of the term.¶ Statistics about drug smuggling, aspiring terrorists and unauthorized immigrants are naturally difficult to collect. In the absence of clear metrics to guide our border strategy and funding, we have given ever more resources to the Border Patrol, which operates in the areas between official border crossings. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the staffing, infrastructure and technology needs of ports of entry themselves, both leaving them less secure and undermining America’s economic competitiveness in the process.¶ A close reading of the senators’ framework gives the impression that the next round of strengthening border security might look a lot like previous rounds. That would be a mistake. Staffing and budgets for areas between the ports of entry have doubled since 2004 and are now at a level where even major increases would produce only marginal security gains.¶ Instead, greater attention should be placed on improving security and efficiency at official border crossings, where the greatest security risks actually are. Almost half of all unauthorized immigrants in the United States entered through official ports of entry with visas, only to lose legal status when their visas expired. Intelligence reports suggest that most hard drugs, like cocaine and methamphetamine, are trafficked through, rather than around, the official border crossings. While it is hard to predict the future strategies of terrorists, it is worth noting that all of the 9/11 attackers entered the U.S. through official ports of entry — though none at the U.S.-Mexico border.¶ One way to make ports of entry better at blocking dangerous traffic while letting legitimate travelers and commerce through quickly would be to increase participation in trusted traveler and trusted shipper programs. It is a problem of needles and haystacks. With over a half-million people and a billion dollars’ worth of goods crossing the border with Mexico each day, there is a whole lot of haystack in which dangerous individuals and shipments can hide.¶ Trusted programs (SENTRI for individuals, FAST for commercial vehicles) expedite the passage of vetted, low-risk travelers and shippers so that law enforcement can focus its limited resources on the unknown and suspicious traffic. Despite the fact that the vast majority of border crossers do so regularly, only 18 percent of individuals use the express lanes available to vetted trusted travelers, suggesting the potential for such programs is much greater than their current level of use.¶ Investments in port of entry infrastructure and technology are also needed. Strengthening the capacity to identify crossers with certainty using biometrics like fingerprints, iris scans or facial recognition would prevent lookalikes from fraudulently using someone else’s passport or visa. Inadequate infrastructure currently causes long lineups at the border, which encourages officials to rush the screening process and possibly miss suspicious crossers while increasing the risk that drugs or other illegal goods could be planted in idled vehicles.¶ It also makes sense to inspect cargo and target criminal groups long before they get to the border when possible. Intelligence-driven law enforcement is generally much more effective than simply patrolling the border and performing random inspections because it targets resources on the individuals, organizations, geographic areas, travel routes and patterns of behavior that represent the greatest risks. We need strong cooperation and information sharing across borders and among federal, state and local government agencies and law enforcement.

# A2 Case Args/Exts

## Economy Adv

### Economy General

#### US-Mexico border cooperation is key to economic growth

US Chamber of Commerce, 11. "Steps to a 21st Century U.S.-Mexico Border | U.S. Chamber of Commerce." U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Standing Up for American Enterprise | U.S. Chamber of Commerce. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 July 2013. <http://www.uschamber.com/reports/steps-21st-century-us-mexico-border>

The United States and Mexico share a border of nearly 2,000 miles, a cultural heritage, and a desire to grow both our economies through cooperation and hard work. The two nations also share an obligation to address a series of complex issues. Of course, it is immigration and, more recently, drug-related violence that so often dominate any conversation related to the U.S.-Mexico border. However, economic considerations, such as trade facilitation, travel and infrastructure, are equally important. Since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico has become the third-largest U.S. trading partner behind Canada and China. However, it is the second-largest export market for U.S. businesses, and some 22 states depend on Mexico as their No. 1 or No. 2 export market. The trade relationship between our two nations is vast, with $397 billion worth of products being traded last year alone. Eighty percent of it is carried across the border by truck. This means that more than $1 billion in cross-border commerce is taking place every day—$45 million an hour—and virtually all of it tariff free under NAFTA. Mexico purchased $163 billion in U.S. goods in 2010 alone. Mexico is also the United States’ third-largest foreign provider of petroleum and the largest foreign supplier of fresh fruits and vegetables. The trading relationship is strong, and each country has a fundamental stake in the success of the other. Trade between the United States and Mexico creates and supports jobs for millions of Americans and Mexicans. In 2010, 13% of all U.S. exports were destined to Mexican markets. Overall, nearly 31 million American jobs are supported by trade. That translates into more than one in every five U.S. jobs linked to the import and export of goods and services. Furthermore, exports generated nearly half of U.S. economic growth in 2010, adding well over a percentage point to GDP growth. The U.S. manufacturing industry depends on NAFTA, sending more than half of its exports to either Canada or Mexico. Since NAFTA began, U.S. manufacturers have boosted their output by more than 50%. Contrary to popular belief, 97% of all exporters are small and medium-size businesses. Considering that these same companies create the vast majority of job growth, it is imperative to improve their ability to compete in global markets. Despite the significance of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, delays and other inefficiencies at the border erode much of the competitive advantage that was accrued from NAFTA. According to SANDAG, congestion and delays at border crossings between San Diego County and Baja California cost the U.S. and Mexican economies an estimated $7.2 billion in foregone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs in 2007. In President Obama’s 2010 State of the Union address, he expressed a goal to double exports within the next five years. Reaching this goal is going to require action from both the private and public sectors. NAFTA has already removed many of the statutory and regulatory impediments to trade across the U.S.-Mexico border. This means that the border represents a better opportunity for trade between the United States and Mexico, translating to job growth in both countries.

#### Infrastructure related POE delays cause billions of economic losses across all economic sectors

Immigration Policy Center 5/12/13   
“A border fence will hurt the economic relationship of Mexico and U.S.” Posted on VOXXI <http://www.voxxi.com/border-fence-economic-relation-mexico-us/#ixzz2TJmDyq16>

Longer wait times at land ports of entry, due in part to heightened security along the border, can have a number of economic effects. Longer border crossing wait times may deter people from choosing to cross the border in terms of shopping trips or other optional crossings (particularly the case for the busiest crossing areas in bi-national metropolitan regions such as San Ysidro and Otay Mesa, both near San Diego/Tijuana, El Paso/Ciudad Juarez, Laredo/Nuevo Laredo and McAllen/Hidalgo/Reynosa). Longer wait times equate to fewer border crossings, less spending in cross-border communities and potentially fewer job opportunities in service industries in those communities. Manufacturers and production facilities in the United States who rely upon a just-in-time delivery model of inventory management can be significantly impacted by delays their cargo carriers encounter at the border. In some cases, severe delays of needed components can cause production-line shutdowns and a subsequent backlog of orders. Long wait times also lead to more congestion, and more air pollution, at border stations. Such outcomes have significant social, economic and environmental health concerns for border crossers, port of entry employees and border residents. 47 land ports of entry facilitate hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S.-Mexico trade every year. Improved infrastructure at the land ports of entry along the southern border, including additional traffic lanes and processing personnel, would allow more efficient border crossing. These improvements translate into direct economic benefits to border communities and states.

#### Delay related economic impacts are in the billions

Wilson May 2013   
Christopher E. Wilson Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. “A Dividing Line that Unites: The U.S.-Mexico Border” in New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico Institute Print Edition, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_new_era.pdf>

Remarkably, this boom in trade is occurring even though the brake applied to cross-border flows in the wake of 9/11 has never been fully released. What is more, even though trade is five times greater than it was two decades ago, many border ports of entry have not experienced major expansion or renovation since they were built several decades ago. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) believes that “federal appropriations have not kept pace with needs,” noting that $6 billion dollars of infrastructure investment are needed to “fully modernize” the land ports of entry along the United States southern and northern borders, and several studies have found that the U.S. and Mexican economies (not just border states) are missing out on billions of dollars of potential economic growth due to high levels of congestion at the border.1 Since port of entry improvements offer significant monetary benefits to border communities and trade-dependent industries, state, local and private entities are often willing to contribute funding to border infrastructure projects. In a time of tight federal budgets, public-private partnerships and public-public partnerships (involving municipal, state and federal governments) represent a promising opportunity to meet border infrastructure needs. The combination of growing trade and aging infrastructure has led to a seemingly contradictory phenomenon. As shown in the chart below, trade has grown without a corresponding increase in the number of trucks crossing the border. Shippers seem to be finding ways to stuff more value into fewer trucks as a way to minimize their costly trips across the border. With so much growth happening despite the obstacles, imagine the potential for job creation and economic growth fueled by increased trade if strategies to increase efficiency while maintaining or even strengthening security were fully implemented along the border.

### Jobs

#### The impact is significant – six million jobs depend on border infrastructure improvement

O’Neil 2013  
Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/01/11/u-s-exports-depend-on-mexico/>

Surprising to many Americans is the importance of the United States’ trade with Mexico. While Asia captures the headlines, U.S. exports to Mexico are double those to China, and second only to Canada. And while many of these goods come from border states—Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California—Mexico matters for much more of the union. Seventeen states send more than 10 percent of their exports to Mexico , and it is the number one or two destination for U.S. goods for nearly half the country. The graph below shows those states most economically dependent on our southern neighbor–notice that South Dakota and Nebraska outpace New Mexico and California. These flows are only accelerating. During the first ten months of 2012 exports heading south grew by $17 billion dollars (or 10 percent) compared to 2011, reaching a total of $181 billion. They include petroleum products (some $17 billion worth) and intermediate goods such as vehicle parts, electrical apparatuses, industrial supplies, metals, and chemicals (over $40 billion combined). Spurred on by deep supply chains, these pieces and parts move fluidly back and forth across the border (often quite a few times) before ending up as finished goods on store shelves in both countries. The uptick should be seen as a good thing. According to economic studies, these exports support some six million American jobs (directly and indirectly). But to continue this dynamism, the United States and Mexico need to improve border infrastructure and facilitate flows. This means expanding border crossings and highways, and harmonizing regulations and customs to make the process easier and faster. Prioritizing and investing in bilateral trade will provide greater opportunity and security–for U.S. companies and workers alike.

### Delays hurt both Economies

#### Border Delays on Personal Travel Lose the US and Mexico Both Jobs and Money-People Just Don’t Want to go Through it

Elisa Arias 2007, SANDAG and Caltrans, Principal Regional Planner at SANDAG, Past Associate Transportation Planner at San Mateo County Transit District, past Associate Transportation Planner at AMBAG, Educated in San Francisco State University and Universidad de Buenos Aires “Economic Impacts of Border Wait Times at the San Diego-Baja California Border Region” http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?projectid=253&fuseaction=projects.detail

Compiled from more than 3,600 surveys of border crossers at San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Tecate stations - at today’s average wait time of 45 minutes, more than eight million trips into the San Diego region are lost as many simply choose to avoid battling the congestion. This equates to a loss of nearly $1.3 billion in potential revenues – mostly in the retail sector; three million potential working hours; 28,000 to 35,000 jobs; and $42 million in wages annually. Excessive border waits also are affecting overall regional productivity. The total economic impact on the San Diego region is an output loss of between $2 billion and $2.5 billion per year. In Baja California, border waits result in more than 2 million trips lost that may cause the loss of about $120 million in revenues - mostly in the food and lodging sector. The total output loss is estimated at between $100 million and $230 million per year. Results reveal that failing to address delays at the border now will lead to greater problems in the future. If wait times were to increase by just 15 minutes, an additional $1 billion in productivity and 134,000 jobs would be lost in the binational border region.

#### Economic Impacts of Border Delays on Freight Trucks are Devastating-We’re Losing Trucks and Therefore Money

Elisa Arias 2007, SANDAG and Caltrans, Principal Regional Planner at SANDAG, Past Associate Transportation Planner at San Mateo County Transit District, past Associate Transportation Planner at AMBAG, Educated in San Francisco State University and Universidad de Buenos Aires “Economic Impacts of Border Wait Times at the San Diego-Baja California Border Region” http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?projectid=253&fuseaction=projects.detail

Delays in getting trucks carrying freight across the Otay Mesa and Tecate international border crossings cost the U.S. and Mexico binational economy to lose a staggering $6 billion and more than 51,000 jobs during 2005. Two-hour or longer delays in freight movement at the Otay Mesa-Mesa de Otay and Tecate-Tecate ports of entry are significantly impacting productivity, industry competitiveness, and lost business income at the regional, state, and national level. It is estimated that at today’s level of processing time at the border – about two hours per truck – San Diego County loses $455 million in annual revenue from reduced freight activity. This translates into more than 2,400 jobs or $131 million in lost labor income a year. The overall impact at the state level is $716 million in output losses and $204 million in labor income losses (or more than 3,600 jobs). For the United States, total output losses are estimated at $1.3 billion and employment losses at 7,646 jobs. However, the overall economic impacts of delaying trucks at the border are substantially higher on the Mexican side of the border than the American side. For Baja California, total output losses amount to $1.317 billion and 6,929 jobs annually. For Mexico, total impact is estimated at $2.069 billion in lost output and 10,889 fewer jobs.

#### Delay times at the US-Mexico border result in huge economic losses

SANDAG 06 ("Economic Impacts of Wait Times at the San Diego–Baja California Border." Sandag. N.p., 19 Jan. 2006. <http://www.sandag.org/programs/borders/binational/projects/2006\_border\_wait\_impacts\_execsum.pdf>.HDR/HLB Decision Economics Inc.; 'Executive Summary'; San Diego Association of Governments California Department of Transportation, District 11)

The economic impact on the Mexican side of the border is also found to be significant. Baja California loses 1.938 million personal trips a year that may result in about $118 million in net revenues, after adjusting for the revenue gains due to local foregone trips to the U.S. The retail and food and lodging sectors represent 80% of net revenue losses. In addition, over half a million of potential working hours in Mexico are spent in delays at the border, which may result in $10.8 million in productivity loss. The impact at the national level is similar to the regional level as most of the personal trips are regional. At today’s level of delay at the border (about 45 minutes per crossing on average based on the survey respondents), San Diego County loses 8.414 million personal trips a year, resulting in an estimated $1.28 billion in lost business income. This impact is considered a net impact as the estimation adjusts for all the gains made when the expenditures occur in the U.S. rather than in Mexico as people choose not to cross the border due to delays at the border crossings. The retail sector is affected the most as it represents more than 90% of the impacts. In addition, about 3.155 million potential working hours in San Diego County are spent in delays at the border, resulting in an estimated $41.8 million in lost wages. The overall economic impact at the state level, given that 5% of the trips are headed outside the San Diego region, is $1.321 billion in addition to the $44.3 million in income loss for work trips.

#### Border congestion especially hurts the trucking industry

SANDAG 06 ("Economic Impacts of Wait Times at the San Diego–Baja California Border." Sandag. N.p., 19 Jan. 2006. <http://www.sandag.org/programs/borders/binational/projects/2006\_border\_wait\_impacts\_execsum.pdf>.HDR/HLB Decision Economics Inc.; 'Executive Summary'; San Diego Association of Governments California Department of Transportation, District 11)

The economic impact of border congestion on freight reflects the effect of delay on productivity, industry competitiveness, and lost business income. The economic impact, however, can be considered as conservative at best since the estimates are mainly for the time lost by trucks in queues at the border and the impact constitutes the cost of delay and its reduced investment implications. Other long-term impacts such as relocation implications (i.e., industries are forced to move away from their best location and therefore the optimum supply chain configuration) on investment, prices, and demand is not included. The analysis indicates that, at today’s level of processing time and delay at the border (over two hours on average per truck crossing without U.S. secondary inspection), San Diego County loses $271 million in direct net annual revenues from reduced freight activity, after adjusting for the revenue gains from the reduction in local trips to Mexico7 . This translates into 1,409 direct lost jobs or $69 million in lost labor income a year. We estimate that just under 45% of labor income losses occur in the machinery and equipment sector and in firms related to that sector through upstream and downstream inter-industry linkages. From these estimates, we estimate that about 30% of trucks have a final destination outside San Diego County (See Appendix D). The overall impact at the state level, given that 30% of Mexican truck trips are headed outside the San Diego region,9 is $362 million in net revenue losses and $90 million in labor income losses (or 1,725 jobs lost). When accounting for the indirect and induced effects of the estimated revenue losses, the total impact exceeds $455 million in lost output and 2,461 fewer jobs. At the state level, losses exceed $716 million in output and $204 million in labor income (or 3,654 fewer jobs). For the United States, total output losses are estimated at $1,256 million and employment losses at 7,646 jobs. Output losses represent 13% of the value of U.S. exports to Mexico that move across the Otay Mesa and Tecate ports of entry, which in 2004 amounted to $9,382 million.

#### Inadequate Border security at the POEs continues to cost both the US and Mexico

Figueroa, Lee, and Schoik 12-2011 Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst, NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik, Director, NACTS, 12-2011, “Realizing the Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico” http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossborder-trade-with-mexico2.pdf

The U.S. and Mexico will be successful at enhancing a prosperous bilateral relationship to the extent that both federal governments and stakeholders are capable of coordinating the development of their border management and infrastructure. The massive and highly complex U.S. and Mexican economies interact and even create value at our shared border. According to a study conducted by Accenture for the U.S. Department of Commerce, today’s level of demand exceeds the physical infrastructure and operating capacity of our ports of entry. Wait times are projected to increase across the five busiest U.S.-Mexico border crossings if volumes continue to grow as expected and if infrastructure and operations remain the same. By 2017, it is estimated that the average wait time will be nearly 100 minutes —an increase of 60%. Sharing a 2,000-mile long border needs to be recognized as both a challenge and an opportunity. While land ports of entry between the two nations were first envisioned to process the legitimate crossing of people, goods and services across the border, security has taking a dominant role in recent years, hampering the ability of federal agencies to efficiently manage border traffic. Advances in border infrastructure simply did not happen during the last decade, which is astounding given the greatly expanded post-NAFTA binational commercial relationship. Our border’s infrastructure and capacity today reflects the needs of a bygone era. This became evident as never before when on September 14, 2011, the San Ysidro, California port of entry —the busiest land port of entry in the world—had to shut down its 24 northbound lanes due to the collapse of part of its roof, injuring several people and damaging vehicles trying to cross into the U.S. from Tijuana, Mexico. According to a report by the San Diego Association of Governments, inadequate infrastructure capacity just at the border crossings between San Diego County and the state of Baja California creates traffic congestion and delays that cost both the U.S. and Mexican economies on average an estimated $7.2 billion in forgone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs on an annual basis. These border delays could cause $86 billion in output losses over the next ten years. These delays are significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that American firms are constantly attempting to reduce their inventory costs in an attempt to remain competitive. While importing from China to the U.S. may require a company to hold more than 100 days of inventory, if efficiently managed, our proximity to Mexico can provide American firms with a constant and predictable flow of goods that may reduce inventory costs and provide firms the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to sudden market changes. With this fundamental fact in mind, in May of 2010 the U.S. and Mexico signed the 21st Century Border Management Joint Declaration. Recognizing the importance of fostering the commercial relationship, both countries have agreed to coordinate efforts to enhance the economic competitiveness by expediting lawful trade. The idea is that development of modern and secure 16 border infrastructure will give an added boost to our region’s competitiveness in the world and at the same time increase our access to a wider, more affordable and ever improving quality set of goods. Today more than 75,000 trucks (carrying close to 80 % of our two-way trade) cross our border on a daily basis. That this much traffic is able to cross our congested borders is due in part to important advances in border infrastructure in the last couple of years as new ports of entry have been opened. One important policy development is master planning processes for regional border infrastructure, which have been initiated in conjunction with local border communities and state governments. It is hoped that these regional processes will eventually make the overall binational infrastructure-building process more transparent, more robust and ultimately a better fit for two such powerful economies and next door neighbors

### Current tech out of date

#### Increasing Demand for Mexican-grown Foods in the US Means That Current Food Transport and Inspection Technologies are Inadequate

Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2009 William Nganje (Economics Professor at ASU), Timothy Richards, Jesus Bravo, Na Hu(Member of the Safety Committee in Chemistry Department at Michigan), Albert Kagan, Ram Acharya, and Mark Edwards, A publication of the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association, “Food Safety and Defense Risks in U.S.-Mexico Produce Trade” <http://www.choicesmagazine.org/magazine/pdf/article_70.pdf>

The demand for Mexican-grown fruits and vegetables in the United States is increasing because off-season demand is not being met by domestic production. Approximately 6.2 billion pounds of fresh fruits and vegetables were imported from Mexico to the United States in 2005, 6.49 billion pounds in 2006 and 7.24 billion pounds in 2007 (USDA-FAS, 2008). The large volume of fresh produce imports introduces food safety and food defense risks all along the supply chain. Food safety policy has conventionally addressed prevention of unintentional contamination of food and economic adulteration (Acheson, 2007). Food defense policy reduces the likelihood or impact of intentional contamination to cause harm. These could include a wide range of actors from disgruntled employees to international terrorists. In this article, we evaluate the use of intelligent inspection systems to mitigate both types of risks. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspects about 1% of the imported foods it regulates at the border due to resource limitations, down from 8% in 1992 when imports were far less common (U.S. CBP, 2008). Ideally, an inspection procedure should protect food imports from outbreaks of food-borne illnesses that may cause recalls. However, due to limited resources, high volumes and border facility limitations, it is impossible to inspect all produce at the Port of Entry (POE) with a random inspection system, which may require the selection of representative samples. Intelligent systems could alleviate some of these challenges and improve the safety of imported foods. Science-based intelligent inspection systems have been used in a variety of fields in engineering and manufacturing. The general idea is to develop highly adaptive inspection methodologies, which over time can incorporate on-line sensors. For example, the COOLTRAX (http://www.cooltrax.com) system provides real time “journey based” data on temperature, vibration and geographical position linked to an internet data base that can be accessed by multiple entities and agencies. Information on produce shipments can be shared and used to target inspection resources to high risk cargos. If a truck is diverted from its normal route and tampered with, causing temperature changes that may result in higher levels of produce spoilage and pathogen growth, that load can be designated as a high risk cargo and inspected accordingly. This can also address other problems related to drug trafficking with produce shipments. In this article we use a threat, vulnerability and consequence prevention (TVCP) model to evaluate the effectiveness of current inspection procedures and tools. We then discuss how on-going preliminary findings on the use of intelligent systems support their use to improve the safety of imported produce from Mexico. Intelligent systems could address issues related to information sharing, costeffective use of limited resources, and mitigating potential market failure problems in food imports.

### Ground Transportation Key

#### Ground transportation key – opening up transport between US and Mexico can help reverse offshoring and increase manufacturing in the both countries

Hernandez 2012   
Enrique Almanza Hernandez, logistics expert and former central Mexico regional director at Autotransportes de Carga Tresguerras SA de CV “Mexican Logistics Expert Discusses NAFTA Roadblocks and Cross-Border Trucking Restrictions” June 26, http://www.supplychainbrain.com/content/world-regions/latin-america/single-article-page/article/director-of-mexican-carrier-discusses-nafta-roadblocks-and-cross-border-trucking-restrictions/

SLATON: Your company is a Mexican nationwide less-than-truckload and full truckload carrier. You maintain interchange freight agreements with U.S carriers and offer border crossing and full service coverage throughout the United States and Canada. What are your thoughts on how NAFTA or other U.S. or Mexican transportation legislation might affect your long-term opportunities and prospects? HERNANDEZ: Ground transportation is of significant economic and strategic importance to North American trade - especially as reshoring and nearshoring start to take hold. In 1995, NAFTA was set up to liberalize freight transport across Mexico, the United States and Canada; encourage infrastructure investment; and secure speedy, efficient flow of goods across North America. But NAFTA's limited success has led to a partial and inadequate integration of the supply chains between Mexico and the rest of North America, where goods do circulate, but without the necessary speed or efficiency. Today, transporting a product amongst the NAFTA countries can easily involve freight handling or information exchange between three to four different stakeholders (carriers, brokers, custom-house agents, etc.), each of which adds to delays and higher supply chain costs. This ultimately increases overall inventory levels and the final product prices. These repercussions affect both the competitiveness of the products transported between NAFTA regions and the transportation services; impede opportunities to reach new markets; and eliminate the incentives for transport companies to be more efficient, innovative and competitive - a goal any company should strive towards if they want to excel in a larger market with tougher competition.

### Solves Economy

#### Border improvements would have a multiplier effect – they could stimulate economic growth across multiple sectors

Wilson & Lee 2013  
 Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “INTRODUCTION” The State of The Border report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border Border Research Partnership May 2013 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf>

Though far from easy to achieve, success in managing the intense interaction and incredible diversity that make up the border is invaluable. It ripples outward. Of course, the 15 million people that live in the counties and municipalities along the border benefit enormously when the border is working. So do the 91 million residents of the border states who depend on the air, water and commerce that flow across the border. But far beyond the border, the six million people throughout the United States and many millions more in Mexico with jobs supported by bilateral trade depend in a very real way on the border’s ability to safely facilitate binational flows of people and goods. For them, an efficient border means a steady job, and an even more efficient border can lead to greater employment opportunities. Indeed, the competitiveness of the entire North American economy depends on the border. Should major advances in border management take root, the benefits of a better border have the potential to ripple out even further. Cross-border cooperation could send a signal that the complex transnational challenges that characterize the 21st century are better met in a context of mutual respect and shared responsibility than one of conflict and nationalism. Border management is difficult, but it is worth the effort.

### POE’s Key to the Economy

#### Investing in POEs key to the economy

Heinrich 13 (Heinrich, Martin. "Heinrich, Udall Aim To Increase Bilateral Trade And Improve U.S. Ports Of Entry." Martin Heinrich- Senator. N.p., 20 June 2013. <http://www.heinrich.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=344132>.Senator Martin Heinrich is the junior United States Senator for New Mexico. Elected in 2012, Heinrich serves on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources, Intelligence, and Joint Economic Committees.)

"Investing in the Santa Teresa Port of Entry is key to creating jobs and economic opportunities along the border," said Sen. Udall, who has fought to expand trade on the U.S.-Mexico border and capacity at the Santa Teresa Port of Entry. Udall supported Recovery Act funds that made it possible to increase the number of lanes and expand the commercial inspection at the crossing. "Border trade and travel is an essential part of southern New Mexico's economy. This amendment will also strengthen border security by helping the Port manage growth, improve efficiency and increase safety along the border crossing." Heinrich and Udall's amendment seeks to extend the hours of operation at the Santa Teresa Port of Entry, which would maximize the job-creating impact of the recently completed infrastructure expansion at the port. Extending the hours would also enable traffic that currently crosses in El Paso, Texas, to travel through New Mexico, reducing the heavy congestion in El Paso and the strain on Customs and Border Protection in the region.

#### Modernizing the POEs at the border is essential for the economy

Ducheny 13 (Ducheny, Denise Moreno. "Border Security? Billions Could Be Lost If Entry Ports Aren't Improved." Imperial Beach Patch. 27 June 2013 <http://imperialbeach.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/senate-immigration-reform-and-border-security-economy>.of Imperial Beach; former state (CA) senator; an immigration lawyer; editor: Khari Johnson)

Our Customs and Border Patrol agents need the resources to focus on stopping drug traffickers, money launderers, arms traffickers and to build cooperation across borders to stop criminal enterprises and detect those who would seek entry anywhere in North American to endanger our citizens. Underfunding the important work done at every airport, seaport and land Port of Entry by not fully staffing these facilities is counterproductive. Failing to employ the tools of modern technology to secure cargo at the point of origin—and thereby allow billions of dollars worth of goods to flow expeditiously along roads from southern Mexico to Canada—is shortsighted at best. The pending immigration bill includes some improvements in the visa quota system that will encourage more travel across our borders with lawful documentation. It provides the opportunity for many who have worked years in the U.S. to visit family in Mexico again with travel documents that will allow them to use our Ports of Entry and avoid the clutches of smuggling operations. It provides opportunities for short-term work and return, again with full screening of documents at Ports of Entry. All of these measures—combined with a stronger, modernized system for employers to verify the work authorization of employees—will strengthen our economy and greatly reduce the incentives built into the current system that encourage unauthorized entry and visa overstay. Today more than 6 million U.S. jobs depend on our trade relationship with Mexico. More than $38 billion worth of cargo move through the Otay Mesa Port of Entry alone every year—even with the barriers presented by hours long waits and the inadequate single-lane road trucks use to reach the Port. Millions of vehicle passengers and pedestrians are asked to wait in 2- and 3-hour lines at the San Ysidro and Calexico ports of entry just to be able to spend tourist and consumer purchase dollars in California because we have failed to make the modest investments necessary to modernize these facilities and fully staff them. Over the last several years, Border Patrol staff has increased to unprecedented levels, hundreds of miles of expensive fences have been built, sensors and video surveillance cameras have been put in place. Now is the time to move to our next level of true security—creating a strong North American market where goods and consumers can travel easily about the continent, improving prosperity to the entire region, and allowing Customs and Border Protection officers to effectively do their jobs. Modernizing our ports of entry is now an urgent national economic priority, and one of particular importance to Southern Arizona.

### UQ- Mexico Econ

#### Much Opportunity in Mexico

Figueroa, Lee, and Schoik 12-2011 Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst, NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik, Director, NACTS, 12-2011, “Realizing the Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico” http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossborder-trade-with-mexico2.pdf

Total trade between the United States and Mexico has expanded by more than 600% since 1990. Yet we need further commitment and investment in the infrastructure needed to sustain such growth, which is critical for both economies. The question now is whether our current border management system will be able to sustain that growth, and if so, for how much longer. A strong trade/joint production relationship with Mexico can help create high-quality jobs within our borders. For reasons of geography and history, Mexico’s fate is intertwined with that of the United States. And despite the current global economic environment, and transnational organized crime affecting Mexico and the United States, the two countries need to implement a 21st Century border that not only re-invigorates crossborder trade and economic integration but which will also lead to increased safety and quality of life for the residents of both countries. Both countries need to remain committed to promoting the global competitiveness of our region and to ensuring that the benefits of expanding trade flows keep reaching businesses, workers and consumers on both sides of our shared border. We will be able to accomplish this if leaders can explain the critical nature of our commercial relationships in ways that are more concrete and easier for citizens to understand. The poor infrastructure, the inadequate staffing levels and the heavy focus on security that prevails at the U.S. – Mexico border have cost both economies billions of dollars in gross output annually. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet today’s demands, acting as a facilitator and conductor of lawful flows of goods, services and people across our nations so that we may capitalize on the full potential of our partnership. If a billion dollars’ worth of trade crosses the U.S.-Mexico border on a daily basis now while sustaining six million jobs, imagine what could be accomplished with a truly 21st century border .

### UQ- US Economy on brink of collapse

#### US economy on the brink of collapse

Morici 12 (Morici, Peter. "The Coming Economic Collapse." Fox News. FOX News Network, 23 July 2012. <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/07/23/coming-economic-collapse/>.an economist and professor at the Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, and widely published columnist.)

The U.S. economy is teetering on the brink of another recession. The bad news is that if it goes down again, there won’t be much we can do to save ourselves. Like a weary heavyweight, if it hits the mat again, it’s down for good. The expansion has been terribly disappointing—growth is hardly 2 percent and jobs creation barely keeps unemployment steady at 8.2. Manufacturing and exports powered the recovery but are now weakening. Consumer spending and existing home sales are flagging, because policymakers failed to aid underwater homeowners as generously as the banks. President Obama is doubling down on slow growth policies—new restrictions on offshore oil and CO2 emissions, and pushing forward with financial regulations that haven’t stopped Wall Street banks from trading recklessly and rigging markets as indicated by the Libor scandal. Governor Romney has reverted to shop-worn Republican prescriptions—tax cuts, free trade and deregulation. With the federal government spending 50 percent more than it takes in, no sane economist could endorse big rate cuts, beyond renewing the Bush tax cuts. China, by manipulating its currency and shutting out western products, helped cause the Great Recession and is now constraining recovery in the United States and Europe. More free trade agreements won’t fix that. Dodd-Frank may be bureaucratic and ineffective but no sane person could claim banks can regulate themselves—smarter solutions, like breaking up unmanageable and unsuperviserable institutions, is needed. Many analysts ask if another big innovation—like the automobile or computer-- is coming and could save the economy. The problems are many new products are creating more jobs in Asia than in the West, and many technology companies are consolidating or facing extinction—consider the smart phone, Hewlett Packard and Yahoo. A lot of US innovation is starting to look more like French art than American commerce. Icons like Yahoo, Facebook and Twitter have made great contributions to the economy and culture but simply don’t have business models that generate enough revenue and sustainable jobs growth. Google has succeeded by cannibalizing newspapers—the net effect has been to destroy more—and branching into software and media—which merely displaces workers elsewhere. Meanwhile, the profitable core of finance—investment banking—is shrinking. Burdensome regulations are a problem, but many clients—ranging from municipalities to wealth managers to foreign governments burnt by Wall Street schemes and securities—are now less interested in what the likes of Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan have to sell. To save European governments, several trillion dollars in sovereign debt must be written down. Beyond lacking a plan to equitably distribute the loss, Germany and other stronger states have not come to terms with the fact that market reforms are not enough. They cannot continue to pursue export-oriented growth strategies and trade surpluses if southern Europe is to create jobs and grow without running up trillions in new debt. China holds the West and its own future hostage—export-driven growth runs to ground when customers can no longer finance their purchases and trade deficits. Borrowing and printing money in the United States and Europe on the scale necessary to keep the Middle Kingdom producing and exporting is no loner possible. China must slow down because it is too late to reorient its economy toward domestic consumption without wrenching dislocations. When the United States entered the recent crisis, its budget deficit was $161 billion. Now it $1.3 trillion, and the Federal Reserve is already maintaining rock bottom interest rates. Even if Congress and the President manage to extend the Bush tax cuts, any hiccup in Europe or China could easily throw the U.S. economy into a recession—and the world’s biggest economy could hit the skids on its own. Capital markets simply won’t be able to absorb a $2.5 to $3 trillion federal deficit to further stimulate the U.S. economy, without sucking badly needed capital out of struggling European and developing country economies. The Fed could only print money to finance it and set off hyperinflation, but it can’t really lower interest rates much further. Having failed to adequately address what caused the Great Recession—China’s trade surplus and the imbalance in demand between the Middle Kingdom and the United States, the cowboy culture on Wall Street and the plight of underwater homeowners—not much can be done, having squandered the grace created by stimulus spending and easy money. Get ready for a bad ride.

### US Economic Collapse Makes the World Collapse

#### US economic collapse would create global panic

Amadeo 13 (Amadeo, Kimberly. "U.S. Economy Collapse." – ‘If the US Economy collapses, what will happen?’ About.com US Economy. N.p., 12 Feb. 2013. Web. 05 July 2013. <http://useconomy.about.com/od/criticalssues/p/US-Economy-Collapse.htm>.Publisher of "Beyond the Great Recession: What Happened and How to Prosper"; President of WorldMoneyWatch.com; 20 years senior-level experience in economic analysis and business strategy working for major international corporations; M.S., Sloan School of Business, M.I.T. and M.S. Planning, Boston College)

If the U.S. economy collapses, you will not have access to credit. Even cash will be devalued. This means high demand, and low supply, of food, gas and other necessities. If the collapse affects local governments and utilities, then water and electricity is no longer be available. As people panic, self-defense becomes more important. The economy quickly reverts to a traditional economy, where those who grow food barter for other services. A U.S. economic collapse would create global panic. Demand for the dollar, and U.S. Treasuries, would plummet, sending interest rates skyrocketing. Investors would rush to other currencies, such as the yuan, euro, or even gold. This would create not just inflation, but hyperinflation as the dollar became dirt cheap.

### **Economic Growth Helps the Poor**

#### Data shows-economic growth alleviates poverty

Michael Roemer and Mary Kay Gugerty March 1997 Michael Roemer is a film director, producer and writer. He has won several awards for his films. He is the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship. A professor at Yale University, Mary Kay Gugerty is an Associate Professor at the Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs at the University of Washington, where she has taught since 2001. “DOES ECONOMIC GROWTH REDUCE POVERTY?” <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\_docs/PNACA656.pdf>

The study examines the question of whether economic growth tends to reduce poverty, where poverty is measured by the incomes of the poorest 20% and 40% of a population. Using the most recent data available, the paper shows that an increase in the rate of GDP growth translates into a direct one-for-one increase in the rate of growth of average incomes of the poorest 40%. GDP growth of ten percent per year is associated with income growth of ten percent for the poorest 40% of the population. For the poorest 20% the elasticity of response is 0.921; GDP growth of 10% is associated with income growth of 9.21%. These results give strong support to the proposition that growth in per capita GDP can be and usually is a powerful force in reducing poverty. In addition, the paper indicates that sound macroeconomic policies and openness to the world economy may be important in reducing poverty. These policies operate mainly through the effect on economic growth: countries with better macroeconomic policies grow faster, and this growth alleviates poverty.

#### Economic growth is best for decreasing poverty

Michael Roemer and Mary Kay Gugerty March 1997 Michael Roemer is a film director, producer and writer. He has won several awards for his films. He is the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship. A professor at Yale University, Mary Kay Gugerty is an Associate Professor at the Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs at the University of Washington, where she has taught since 2001. “DOES ECONOMIC GROWTH REDUCE POVERTY?” <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\_docs/PNACA656.pdf>

This study demonstrates that economic growth benefits the poor in almost all the countries in which substantial growth has taken place. Indeed, economic growth appears to be one of the best ways to reduce poverty. The poor do better in countries that grow quickly, even if income distribution deteriorates slightly. Countries which experienced rapid economic growth over the last thirty years, such as Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia, saw the per capita incomes of the bottom 20% and 40% of the population grow significantly. Another conclusion of this study is that income distribution changes only very slowly, and that a policy that aims at redistributing income at the expense of economic growth may have very low payoffs in terms of poverty reduction. While the evidence suggests that countries with more equal income distributions grow more quickly, the evidence also indicates that economic policy can compensate for inferior initial income distributions. This study indicates that more outwardly oriented countries grow more quickly, leading to greater poverty alleviation. While it is quite difficult statistically to separate the effects of poverty on openness from those of economic growth, the evidence presented here suggests that the poor fare better in open economies. As noted above, this effect does depend on economic structure, and in those countries with more resource-intensive economies where wealth can be more concentrated, governments will have to make a determined effort to distribute the benefits of growth more widely, and should have the resources to do so. Thus there is every reason to believe that economic growth reduces poverty. There is little evidence to support the contention that economic growth and outward-oriented policies will hurt the poor. Countries with higher rates of economic growth over the last 30 years have achieved greater reductions in poverty.

### Solves Manufacturing

#### Increased border efficiency stimulates manufacturing growth in the US

O’Neil 2013  
Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. She holds a BA from Yale University, an MA in International Relations from Yale University, and a PhD in Government from Harvard University. Latin America’s Moment “Economic Change on Mexico’s Horizon” <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/03/26/economic-change-on-mexicos-horizon/>

And we’ve already seen a lot of investment, particularly with U.S. manufacturers in Mexico, despite many of the country’s problems. Many factories in the United States depend on those in Mexico—there are pieces and parts that are crossing the border every day that allow a company, in the end, to create a globally competitive product. This is already the reality, but the question going forward is: Can the United States make the most of this and make it even easier for these companies to grow by facilitating trade with Mexico? Rather than thinking about cutting back this trade, we should recognize that Mexico helps support U.S. workers because trade grows the overall pie for these companies. A rising tide on both sides of the border lifts all boats.

### Trade Key to Food Markets

#### **US is Mexico’s largest food export market, therefore trade is key to both markets**

Figueroa, Lee, and Schoik 12-2011 Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst, NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik, Director, NACTS, 12-2011, “Realizing the Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico” http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossborder-trade-with-mexico2.pdf

Mexico is among the top ten agricultural producing countries in the world. Moreover, given its geographical proximity to our market and its vast diversity of natural resources, Mexico is the largest foreign supplier of fresh fruits and vegetable to the U.S. and Canada. Key to this accelerated development of commerce under NAFTA is high quality standards, improved production technology, product diversity, and expansion of marketing systems. All of these factors have contributed to substantial growth in the volume and the variety of Mexican counter-seasonal agricultural exports to the U.S. market. In 2010, Mexico exported more than $4.3 billion in vegetables; the U.S. accounted for 90% of this total, becoming Mexico’s largest vegetable export market. Additionally and to the benefit of our region’s competitiveness, on September 27, 2011 the federal agencies with jurisdiction over consumer products in the United States, Canada, and Mexico issued a joint statement promoting greater cooperation and engagement in ensuring the safety of products made and sold across North America. The three countries agreed to explore further opportunities for collaboration, which will result in quality and safety improvements of all goods produced in the region—especially produce—while at the same time boosting confidence from consumers across the world in these products.

### Trade Key to the US economy

#### Trade with Mexico is Key to the US economy

Figueroa, Lee, and Schoik 12-2011 Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst, NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik, Director, NACTS, 12-2011, “Realizing the Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico” http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossborder-trade-with-mexico2.pdf

Although international trade may be a broad, diffuse topic that is not well-understood by the American public at large, it is nevertheless a key component of the U.S. economy. It is no coincidence that the U.S. is simultaneously the world’s largest economy and the largest exporter and importer of goods and services: $2.2 trillion worth of trade move in and out of the U.S. on an annual basis. Furthermore, 60,000 containers enter the U.S. per day from all over the world. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, exports to foreign markets support more than 10.3 million jobs in the U.S., which on average pay 13-18 % more than the national average. Additionally, exports generated half of U.S. economic growth in 2010. The overall U.S. trading pattern holds true with its next door neighbor to the south. The U.S. and Mexican economies are naturally complementary and interdependent with each other as few others in the world may claim to be. Since the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), bilateral trade has grown exponentially, reaching a record high of nearly $400 billion in 2010. Mexico’s GDP growth of 5.4% in 2010 resulted in a $35 billion increase in Mexican purchases from the U.S. The country has become the U.S.’ third-ranked commercial partner and the second most important market for U.S. exports; Mexico spent $163 billion on U.S. goods in 2010. Trade with Mexico sustains six million jobs in the U.S. In spite of these impressive numbers, this is economic value that for too many in the U.S. remains “hidden in plain sight.”To provide an additional perspective toward understanding what this commercial relationship means to our country and the progress it has made since the enactment of NAFTA, exports to Mexico from the U.S. have increased 220%. U.S. sales to Mexico are larger than all U.S. exports to Brazil, Russia, India and China combined, as well as all combined sales to Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Along the same lines, twenty-two states count Mexico as their No. 1 or No. 2 export market and it is a top-five market for 14 other states. Trading with Mexico creates and sustains jobs in our states, including 807,000 jobs in Texas, 249,000 jobs in Nebraska, 13,000 jobs in New Hampshire and 10,000 jobs in Washington, just to name a few examples. On the other hand, Mexican exports to the U.S. provide Americans and import-dependent companies access to affordable and high-quality products and services such as automobiles, produce, and oil, just to name a few. Mexico is our second-ranked supplier of petroleum; interestingly, the U.S. refines most of the oil that Mexico consumes domestically. Still, for every dollar Mexico makes from exporting to the U.S., it will in turn spend 50 cents on U.S. products or services, which is a considerable benefit to our economy out of a real and stable two way trade, especially when compared to 6 cents worth of U.S. goods purchased for every dollar China spends out of their exports to our country. Furthermore, U.S. inputs account for 64% of the content of every Mexican product sold in the United States. China’s relatively low wages—which were the strongest motivation for U.S. and multinational companies to move production to China from Mexico—have risen rapidly in recent months. Today, Mexican manufacturing wages are only 20% higher than in China, which reduces some companies’ incentives to move operations to China. Mexico has leveraged its proximity to the United States stronger than ever, given the high price of crude oil and all other costs associated with global logistics. The resolution in July of a long dispute has allowed Mexican trucks to make deliveries in America. Once in place, the U.S. – Mexico cross-border trucking program is projected to produce savings of up to $675 million annually for binational trading costs, according to the Mexican federal government.

### **POE’s Key to Trade**

#### Investing and modernizing POEs with Mexico is key to trade

Ramos 13 (Ramos, Kristian. "Guest Column: Updating Ports of Entry Will Help Preserve Our Vital Trade with Mexico." Arizona Daily Star. 07 June 2013. <http://azstarnet.com/news/opinion/guest-column-updating-ports-of-entry-will-help-preserve-our/article\_e450a3b6-9aa3-57c5-9c80-966417a5621f.html>.policy director of the Washington-based New Policy Institute's 21st Border Initiative.)

Despite a recession and slow growth on the U.S. side of the border and security challenges on the Mexican side, the trade relationship between our two countries has exploded in recent years. According to a recently released study (co-authored by Arizonan Erik Lee), trade between the U.S. and Mexico has increased from $300 billion in 2009 to a staggering $536 billion last year. Mexico is now the U.S.' third-largest trading partner and second-largest export market. Six million jobs in the U.S. are now dependent on U.S.-Mexico trade. All of these numbers, of course, will increase as trade flows continue to grow in the years ahead. The immigration legislation making its way through Congress addresses legalization, border security, a transition to a more skills-based legal-immigration system and the national adoption of E-Verify. There is a growing bipartisan and bicameral consensus, however, about another key aspect of the emerging legislation as it relates to the border region, which deserves equal attention, if not more - the need to invest in, and modernize, our ports of entry with Mexico. With the addition of a much tougher border-security regime in recent years, this doubling of our trade with Mexico - trade that is creating jobs on both sides of the border - in such a short period of time is putting strain on all 42 ports of entry that 70 percent of this trade flows through. According to a new study, delays at U.S.-Mexico border crossings costs the U.S. $7.8 billion annually, and could cost us more than $20 billion a year by 2020.

#### Efficiency at ports of entry is needed to keep pace with growing bilateral trade.

Erik Lee and Christopher E. Wilson, June 2012 (Erik Lee serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University. He has extensive knowledge of U.S.-Mexico crossborder public policy in the areas of competitiveness, sustainability, security and education.) (Christopher Wilson is an Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. He is the author of Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico (Wilson Center, 2011) and coauthor of the State of the Border Report (Wilson Center, 2013). Chris is regularly consulted by national and international media outlets regarding U.S.-Mexico relations)”The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic

Well-being in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region “<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State\_of\_Border\_Trade\_Economy\_0.pdf>

Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great—yet underappreciated— success stories of the global economy. In fact, in 2011 U.S.-Mexico goods and services trade probably reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with virtually no recognition.1 The United States is Mexico’s top trading partner, and Mexico—which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over the last two decades—is the United States’second largest export market and third largest trading partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where “the rubber hits the road” for bilateral relations. This also means that not only California and Baja California, but also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border management. Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled.

### Border Infrastructure Key to Trade

#### Investing in border infrastructure, eliminates barriers to trade

Jacob Fischler MAY 29, 2013 (Reporter at The Monitor Past: Investigative reporting interen at Medill Watchdog Reporter at Medill News Service Wait Staff at The Green Mill, Too Daily Programs Facilitator at Minnesota Children's Museum Teacher Aide at South High School Tutor at South High School) “Mexican tourists are an underappreciated economic boost to U.S. Southwest” <http://skift.com/2013/05/29/mexican-tourists-are-an-underappreciated-economic-boost-to-u-s-southwest/>

As the Congress debates immigration reform legislation, millions of tourists and billions of dollars continue to cross the U.S.-Mexico border in both directions. A study released earlier this month by NDN, a center-left think-tank based in Washington, D.C., shows trade and tourism between the two countries is at an all-time high (full PDF embedded below). Trade between the two nations in 2012 was estimated at $535 billion. That number is up from $300 billion in 2009, a number that’s projected to double by this year, said Simon Rosenberg, the president of NDN. Texas leads all states with almost $200 billion in imports and exports with Mexico. Trade with Mexico sustains almost 6 million U.S. jobs, the NDN study said. In the Rio Grande Valley, tourists provide the biggest Mexican boost to the economy. “We really rely heavily on the Mexican market,” said Nancy Millar, the director of the McAllen Chamber of Commerce’s Convention and Visitors Bureau. The economic downturn in 2008 — which coincided with a spike in cartel violence — hurt Mexican tourism to the Valley, Millar said. Prior to those phenomena, 35 percent of income to McAllen’s tourism industry came from Mexico, she said, and it remains a vital part of McAllen’s economy. “There’s no doubt we have a much stronger economy than we would without them — 35 percent stronger,” she said. The NDN report called on lawmakers to use the immigration reform bill to increase the number of ports of entry and staffing of Customs and Border Protection officers at the border to expedite travel from Mexico to the U.S. “The customs department of (the Department of Homeland Security) is going to have to grow with trade and legal tourism,” Rosenberg said. “We’ve got to invest more in border infrastructure. We’ve got to cut down on wait times.” Doing so would also help eliminate barriers to further trade between the two countries, said Shannon O’Neil, a senior policy fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. And further trade means growing economies on both sides of border, particularly in areas near the border.

## A2 Maquiladoras

### **Maquiladoras Key to both economies**

#### **Maquiladoras have potential to aid both U.S. and Mexican Economies, but it needs help soon.**

Beck, December 2012 (Allan, Dr.¶ Allan¶ Beck¶ is an international business and maquiladora specialist with over 20 years of experience as an¶ employee or a supplier to maquiladora¶ facilities along the U.S. and Mexico border. He has held many management¶ positions in his career, including supervisor, production manager, engineering manager, operations manager, plant¶ manager, division operations manager, general manager, and vice pre¶ sident. He is teaching undergraduate and¶ graduate level management classes at the University of Phoenix and The University of Texas¶ –¶ Pan American, “Forces Driving Maquiladoras Along The Border Of Mexico And The United States: A Short Communication”, <http://www.cluteonline.com/journals/index.php/IBER/article/view/7415/7483>, date accessed 7/2/13, TMc)

By 1965, the Bracero, or guest worker, program ended in the United States and the Border Industrialization Program was established by Mexico as a means of replacing lost jobs by attracting investments and creating opportunities by setting up a process that allowed temporary import duty free and only taxing the value of added portion of transactions (Eldenberg, Roman, & Teruya, 2007). The Border Industrialization Program laid the groundwork for the maquiladora program, which was legally established in 1971. Many U.S. companies started manufacturing on the northern border of Mexico because the arrangement allowed companies to take advantage of the lower Mexico wage rate.¶ The arrangement worked well and manufacturing became an important part of the Mexican economy. The maquiladoras represent a good source of foreign direct investment and earnings for many Mexican citizens (Truett and Truett, 2007). Recent downturns in maquiladora employment has hurt the economy because the continual growth experienced until 2000 was creating the required one million jobs a year to keep up with the new young worker additions from population growth (Walkkirch, Nunnenkamp, & Alatorre Bremont, 2009). The border area also had an abundance of workers as it attracted laborers from well within the interior (Mendoza, 2010).

### Maquiladoras need renovation

#### Numerous problems hinder the progress of maquiladoras

Beck, December 2012(Allan, Dr.¶ Allan¶ Beck¶ is an international business and maquiladora specialist with over 20 years of experience as an¶ employee or a supplier to maquiladora¶ facilities along the U.S. and Mexico border. He has held many management¶ positions in his career, including supervisor, production manager, engineering manager, operations manager, plant¶ manager, division operations manager, general manager, and vice pre¶ sident. He is teaching undergraduate and¶ graduate level management classes at the University of Phoenix and The University of Texas¶ –¶ Pan American, “Forces Driving Maquiladoras Along The Border Of Mexico And The United States: A Short Communication”, <http://www.cluteonline.com/journals/index.php/IBER/article/view/7415/7483>, date accessed 7/2/13, TMc)

Maquiladora factories hit a peak in 2000, but from 2000 to 2003 they lost 300,000 jobs and the low-wage model that had been so successful for past business was in peril (Sargent & Matthews, 2009). One of the largest competitors was China, who had lower wages and the benefit of a high-tech strategy, which added a level of competition to both the high-tech and low-tech ends of manufacturing (Sargent & Matthews, 2009). The loss of jobs and the lack of an effective strategy to counter the loss of business and jobs to Asia should have sent an alarm to Mexico. The lack of a strategy and the poor education system in Mexico left the country defenseless to the competition. Existing maquiladoras struggled to retain business and by cutting costs, they were able to retain a share of the manufacturing opportunities. In the late 2000s another challenge to manufacturing and other sectors of the economy occurred when security became an issue with infighting from the competitive cartels (del Bosque, 2009). The drug cartels and the open fighting in the streets of the northern cities eliminated some travel across borders for fear of kidnappings and other violence (del Bosque, 2009). One of the most impactful changes the cartel activity has created is a talent-shortage of high-skilled individuals into the interior away from the intense violence seen in northern border cities (Wilson,2009, p.543)

#### **Maquiladoras are in dire need of repair after NAFTA, action needs to be taken**

Beck, December 2012 (Allan, Dr.¶ Allan¶ Beck¶ is an international business and maquiladora specialist with over 20 years of experience as an¶ employee or a supplier to maquiladora¶ facilities along the U.S. and Mexico border. He has held many management¶ positions in his career, including supervisor, production manager, engineering manager, operations manager, plant¶ manager, division operations manager, general manager, and vice pre¶ sident. He is teaching undergraduate and¶ graduate level management classes at the University of Phoenix and The University of Texas¶ –¶ Pan American, “Forces Driving Maquiladoras Along The Border Of Mexico And The United States: A Short Communication”, <http://www.cluteonline.com/journals/index.php/IBER/article/view/7415/7483>, date accessed 7/2/13, TMc)

The North American Free Trade Agreement, ratified in 1994, established a trade agreement between ¶ Mexico, Canada, and the United States. From 1993 ¶ to¶ 2000¶ ,¶ maquiladora exports rose from $21.9 billion¶ to $79.5 ¶ billion (Mendoza, 2010). In 2001¶ ,¶ maquiladora exports dropped to $76.9 billion and have not seen the growth ¶ experienced in the previous decade since (Mendoza, 2010). Although export activity is one of the key features of ¶ maquiladora success, the accelerated expansion and growth experienced by Mexican maquiladoras has shifted to ¶ China in recent years ¶ (Mendoza, 2010). ¶ Before the North American Free Trade Agreement was ratified, proponents argued that the maquiladora ¶ program would enhance job creation, expand the tax base and wages, generate foreign direct investment, and allow ¶ technology transfer to take place (Fiscal incentives, 2010). The individuals against the agreement argued that the ¶ jobs created were low¶ -¶ quality and poorly paid, health a¶ nd safety standards were largely ignored, gender bias ¶ occurred frequently, and maquiladoras fragmented the rest of the economy because of the ties to the U. S. business ¶ cycle (Fiscal incentives, 2010). Significant data ¶ are¶ available after many years of the North American Free Trade ¶ Agreement and the results are mixed. Maquiladora employment under the North American Free Trade Agreement is ¶ not a predictor of any standard of living and maquiladora employment seems to have a negative effect on education, ¶ a s¶ mall negative effect on housing, and real wages have decreased when compared to the cost of living (Fiscal ¶ incentives, 2010).

Maquiladoras are in need of upgrades to specific factors to beat out China. This loss to China hurts there economy.

Beck, December 2012 (Allan, Dr.¶ Allan¶ Beck¶ is an international business and maquiladora specialist with over 20 years of experience as an¶ employee or a supplier to maquiladora¶ facilities along the U.S. and Mexico border. He has held many management¶ positions in his career, including supervisor, production manager, engineering manager, operations manager, plant¶ manager, division operations manager, general manager, and vice pre¶ sident. He is teaching undergraduate and¶ graduate level management classes at the University of Phoenix and The University of Texas¶ –¶ Pan American, “Forces Driving Maquiladoras Along The Border Of Mexico And The United States: A Short Communication”, <http://www.cluteonline.com/journals/index.php/IBER/article/view/7415/7483>, date accessed 7/2/13, TMc)

A broad range of factors affect performance in Mexico’¶ s maquiladoras. Internal factors may include¶ human resources, empowerment, training, teamwork, management empowerment, management training, and¶ environmental performance (Daily & Bishop, 2012). Both managers and employees can be effective in creating the¶ necessary changes to improve performance with the proper level of training and empowerment (Daily & Bishop,¶ 2012).¶ Internally, Mexico has been able to evolve from a largely cheap labor and low value¶ -¶ added formula to a¶ more complex provider, which offer¶ s just¶ -¶ in¶ -¶ time, continuous improvement, job safety, environmental performance,¶ and a reliable source of supply (Carrillo & Zarate, 2009). In other words, Mexico has been able to train its workers¶ and implement some of the best practices in the manufacturi¶ ng sector (Carrillo & Zarate, 2009). Another important¶ factor that affects global sourcing is product quality. quality system with managerial support and employee involvement are important to original equipment ¶ manufacturers because the brand name is¶ on the product regardless of the producing site, and a lack of quality can ¶ affect the reputation, image, and ability to grow the business (Dowlatshahi, 2011). Maquiladora strategies need to ¶ include an effective quality program with ISO certification or other requirements as dictated by the industry served ¶ (Dowlatshahi, 2011). International Standards Organization certification shows a dedication to product quality and a ¶ structured documented standard that is recognized throughout the world for delivering ¶ customer satisfaction ¶ (Dowlatshahi, 2011). International Standards Organization or other quality certifications can lead to supplier ¶ relationships that can lead to new business opportunities (Dowlatshahi, 2011). ¶ A large influence on the external forces¶ affecting Mexican maquiladoras has been the Chinese economy ¶ (Mendoza, 2010). Many U.S. companies have shifted the outsourcing decisions toward China, which offers both a ¶ more technical base and a lower wage structure (Mendoza, 2010). The trend has impac¶ ted maquiladora growth in a ¶ negative direction (Mendoza, 2010). Mexico has yet to find a counter¶ -¶ measure to reduce the market penetration of ¶ Chinese exports, and NAFTA advantages have not been sufficient to give Mexico a trade advantage (Mendoza, ¶ 2010). ¶ China is threatening the cross¶ -¶ border interdependence as technology has allowed China to increase the share ¶ of products entering the United States (Ma & Wooster, 2009).

## Tourism

### Border Key to Tourism Industry

#### Several factors hinder tourism on the border

Bonner and Rozental et al November 13, 2009 Task Force Co-Chairs Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) Task Force Co-Directors Carlos Heredia Research Fellow, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE); Former Member of the Mexican Congress Chappell Lawson Associate Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Adjunct Fellow, Pacific Council on International Policy Full Report 2 Task Force Members Ruben Barrales, President and Chief Executive Officer, San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce, and former Director, White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs Malin Burnham, Vice Chairman, Cushman & Wakefield of San Diego Jorge Chabat, Professor and Research Fellow, (CIDE) Luis de la Calle, Managing Director and founding Partner of De la Calle, Madrazo, Mancera, SC, and former Deputy Secretary of Commerce of Mexico. Lee Cullum, Syndicated Columnist and Television Commentator based at the Dallas Morning News Jeffrey Davidow, President of the Institute of the Americas, former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Carlos Alfonso de la Parra, Professor and Researcher of the Urban and Environmental Studies Department, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), Tijuana Gary L. Gallegos, Executive Director, San Diego Association of Governments Eugenio Elorduy Walther, President, Grupo Autopasión, Former Governor, state of Baja California Antonio Oscar “Tony” Garza, Jr., Partner, ViaNovo LP; Counsel, White & Case, and former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Jerrold D. Green, President and Chief Executive Officer, Pacific Council on International Policy Edwin A. Guiles, former Executive Vice President, Sempra Energy Antonia Hernández, President, California Community Foundation, and former President and General Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund Silvia Hernández, Director-General, Estrategia Pública Consultores SC, and former Senator of Mexico Luis Herrera-Lasso, Director-General, Grupo Coppan SC, and former Mexican Consul General in San Diego Full Report 3 John J. Kelly, Shareholder, Modrall Sperling, former U.S. Attorney for New Mexico and former Special Representative of the U.S. Attorney General for the Southwest Border Region Abraham F. Lowenthal, President Emeritus, Pacific Council on International Policy, and Professor of International Relations, University of Southern California Richard Mallery, Senior Partner, Snell & Wilmer Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute; former Commissioner of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Enrique Mier y Terán, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, SafeMex, Inc. and cofounder of Kaynar de México (Mexico’s first maquiladora) Gustavo Mohar, Secretaría de Gobernación, Government of Mexico Jorge Montaño, President of Asesoría y Análisis SA de CV and former Mexican Ambassador to the United States and to the United Nations Raúl Rodríguez Barocio, Chairman of the Board of Advisors, North American Center for Transborder Studies, Arizona State University, and former Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director, North American Development Bank (NADBank) Fernando Solana, Chairman of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) and former Secretary of Foreign Affairs Roberto Suro, Professor of Journalism, University of Southern California, and former director, Pew Hispanic Center; former senior correspondent for the New York Times and the Washington Post Javier Treviño, Senior Vice President of Corporate Communications and Public Affairs, Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX), and former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico Julie Meier Wright, President and Chief Executive Officer, San Diego Regional Economic Development Corporation, and former Secretary of Trade and Commerce of California “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges” <http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=31>

The border region is a hub for tourism; day trips for shopping are common. Several factors, however tend to suppress tourism. First, as discussed above, delays at the border discourage travel, especially short trips. Second, the amenities for travelers that would encourage longer trips – e.g., information kiosks and rest stops – are inadequate. Third, because interactions with authorities are a significant part of the experience for visitors, unpleasant experiences discourage tourism and travel. On the U.S. side, there is a perceived variation in the degree to which U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers at the ports of entry have embraced the agency’s pledge to treat travelers with courtesy, dignity, and respect. On the Mexican side, the problem is different: both Americans and Mexicans complain of shake-downs by corrupt police officers, often at interior checkpoints proximate to the border. This behavior undermines tourism, tarnishes Mexico’s reputation, and creates the impression that corruption is pervasive. Finally, crime and insecurity on the Mexican side (discussed in Section III) deter many prospective travelers from crossing the border or, when they do, from staying the night.

#### Investing in border infrastructure, eliminates barriers to tourism

Jacob Fischler MAY 29, 2013 (Reporter at The Monitor Past: Investigative reporting interen at Medill Watchdog Reporter at Medill News Service Wait Staff at The Green Mill, Too Daily Programs Facilitator at Minnesota Children's Museum Teacher Aide at South High School Tutor at South High School) “Mexican tourists are an underappreciated economic boost to U.S. Southwest” <http://skift.com/2013/05/29/mexican-tourists-are-an-underappreciated-economic-boost-to-u-s-southwest/>

As the Congress debates immigration reform legislation, millions of tourists and billions of dollars continue to cross the U.S.-Mexico border in both directions. A study released earlier this month by NDN, a center-left think-tank based in Washington, D.C., shows trade and tourism between the two countries is at an all-time high (full PDF embedded below). Trade between the two nations in 2012 was estimated at $535 billion. That number is up from $300 billion in 2009, a number that’s projected to double by this year, said Simon Rosenberg, the president of NDN. Texas leads all states with almost $200 billion in imports and exports with Mexico. Trade with Mexico sustains almost 6 million U.S. jobs, the NDN study said. In the Rio Grande Valley, tourists provide the biggest Mexican boost to the economy. “We really rely heavily on the Mexican market,” said Nancy Millar, the director of the McAllen Chamber of Commerce’s Convention and Visitors Bureau. The economic downturn in 2008 — which coincided with a spike in cartel violence — hurt Mexican tourism to the Valley, Millar said. Prior to those phenomena, 35 percent of income to McAllen’s tourism industry came from Mexico, she said, and it remains a vital part of McAllen’s economy. “There’s no doubt we have a much stronger economy than we would without them — 35 percent stronger,” she said. The NDN report called on lawmakers to use the immigration reform bill to increase the number of ports of entry and staffing of Customs and Border Protection officers at the border to expedite travel from Mexico to the U.S. “The customs department of (the Department of Homeland Security) is going to have to grow with trade and legal tourism,” Rosenberg said. “We’ve got to invest more in border infrastructure. We’ve got to cut down on wait times.” Doing so would also help eliminate barriers to further trade between the two countries, said Shannon O’Neil, a senior policy fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. And further trade means growing economies on both sides of border, particularly in areas near the border.

### Tourism Key to the US Economy

#### US-Mexico tourism is key to US economy

Figueroa, Lee, and Schoik March 20th, 2012 Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst, NACTS; Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS; Rick Van Schoik, Director, NACTS “Realizing the Full Value of Tourism from Mexico to the United States” <http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/realizing-the-full-value-of-mexican-tourism-to-the-us2.pdf>

Despite the heretofore lack of federal-level tourism promotion, to provide a more specific idea of what Mexican tourism means to our country, we begin with the little-appreciated fact that Mexico is the second largest international visitor market for the United States; according to the most recent visitation statistics generated by ITA (see Figure 2 below). In 2010, there were a total of 13.47 million visits to the U.S. from Mexico, a two percent increase from the previous year. Mexican tourists 8 injected $8.7 billion into our economy that same year. More arrivals from Mexico are registered to our country every year than arrivals from the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) combined, as well as all combined arrivals from such European economic powers as Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy. And although Mexico’s per capita income is among the lowest within the G-20 countries, it is impressive to note how well spending by Mexican tourists measures up to that by visitors from other countries. According to ITA’s 2010 statistics, Mexico ranks fourth overall in total tourism spending (see Figure 3 below).Finally, Mexican tourism can be broken down into three large categories: “fly-in,” “drive-in” and pedestrian. By far, the greatest number of Mexican visitors arrives at one of the 45 land ports of entry on our southern border with Mexico on foot, in buses or in privately owned vehicles (POVs). It 9 is no exaggeration to suggest that this borderland tourism is critical to local economies near the border. According to a study by the University of Arizona on Mexican visitors to Arizona, in 2007-08 Mexican visitors spent $2.69 billion in the state of Arizona, generating 23,400 direct jobs and 7,000 indirect jobs in the state.

### Tourism key to the Mexican Economy

#### **Tourism is the largest world industry, gives Mexico a way to strengthen their economy**

Conthran and Conthran, April 1998(Dan and Cheryl, Dan Cothran is Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at Northern Arizona University (Flagstaff AZ 86011, USA). He received his Ph.D. in government from Cornell University and published Political Stability and Democracy in Mexico in 1994.Cheryl Cothran is Senior Research Specialist at the Hospitality Research and Resource Center, School of Hotel and Restaurant Management USA. She earned a Ph. D. in history from the University of California, Davis., “Promise or Political Risk for Tourism in Mexico”, <http://ac.els-cdn.com/S016073839700100X/1-s2.0-S016073839700100X-main.pdf?_tid=1a6f4b02-e415-11e2-9dfd-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1372879186_fbf32bf97aab4b695ed039955ed57b5e>, accessed 7/3/13, TMc)

Tourism, in all of its manifestations, is commonly described today as the world’s largest industry. It is big business and is expected to become even bigger business in the next century. Developing countries, in particular, look to tourism industry to generate foreign exchange, provide jobs, and improve economic growth. Yet, in the excitement generated by the prospects, have investors overlooked the political risk involved in the industry in many emerging markets? Especially concerning Mexico, have investors since the passage of NAFTA become overly sanguine about the prospects for tourism development there?

#### **Tourism is key to Mexican economy; while other industries fall, tourism in Mexico needs to grow**

Conthran and Conthran, April 1998(Dan and Cheryl, Dan Cothran is Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at Northern Arizona University (Flagstaff AZ 86011, USA). He received his Ph.D. in government from Cornell University and published Political Stability and Democracy in Mexico in 1994.Cheryl Cothran is Senior Research Specialist at the Hospitality Research and Resource Center, School of Hotel and Restaurant Management USA. She earned a Ph. D. in history from the University of California, Davis., “Promise or Political Risk for Tourism in Mexico”, <http://ac.els-cdn.com/S016073839700100X/1-s2.0-S016073839700100X-main.pdf?_tid=1a6f4b02-e415-11e2-9dfd-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1372879186_fbf32bf97aab4b695ed039955ed57b5e>, accessed 7/3/13, TMc)

Mexico is already a major tourist power. According to the World Tourism Organization (WTO), Mexico ranks seventh among the world’s leading tourism destinations. With over 21 million inter- national arrivals in 1996-an increase of 8% over 1995 arrivals- Mexico has an impressive 3.7% market share of the world’s total. (France, the world’s number one destination has 10.4% market share; the United States in second place has an 8% market share.) In terms of tourism revenues, Mexico is in 16th place, having fallen from the 10th position it held in 1990. Its market share of earnings fell from 2.05% in 1990 to 1.63% in 1996 (WTO 1997:3-4). Yet, according to WTO,¶ “Tourist flows to Mexico registered the second highest growth of all countries of the Americas (+ 16.1% between 1994 and 1995) after Cuba (+ 19.6%), while receipts were down 3.9%, largely reflecting the peso devaluation against the dollar.” Therefore, despite recent economic setbacks these are impressive figures indeed. In addition, worldwide trends suggest that industrial countries will continue to lose tourism market share and receipts to developing countries such as Mexico (WTO 1996: l-2). Obviously the potential of Mexican tourism is enormous. The industry is already the second largest generator of foreign currency for the country, second only to the oil industry-tourism earned $4 billion and oil $8 billion in 1991 (International Tourism Reports 1993:5). The industry already employs one in ten Mexicans, in both direct and indirect tourism-generated jobs, and tourism employment in Mexico is expected to increase by 50% from 1996 to 2006, providing 1.1 million new jobs. Thus Mexico leads all 25 OECD countries in the predicted percentage growth of new jobs in tourism; Finland is second, Australia third, Turkey fourth, and the United States fifth with 24% growth or 3.4 million new jobs (World Travel and Tourism Council 1996: 17).

#### Tourism industry boosts Mexico’s economic growth, empirics

**Serrato, Valenzuela, and Rayas, 13** (Marco, Karla, and Victor, Macrothink Institute Business and Economic Research, Business and Economic Research (BER) is an internationally refereed journal, published online by Macrothink Institute, United States. The journal publishes research papers, reviews and short communications in all fields of economics and business., Vol. 3, No. 1, June 2013, “Improving Tourism Competitiveness: The Case of Mexico”,http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/2574/3075, accessed 7/3/13, TMc)

Tourism is one of the largest generators of wealth and employment in the world (Enright &¶ Newton, 2004). The tourism industry constitutes 11% of global Gross Domestic Product,¶ supports two hundred million jobs worldwide and 8% of total employment. In the last three¶ years, some 8.5 million jobs have been created as a result of growth in tourism. Even more,¶ tourism is expected to continue to grow more rapidly than the world’s economic output¶ (Taleghani, 2010), because of factors such as population growth, rising incomes and¶ employment, shorter working weeks in many parts of the world,¶ and the increasing¶ integration of the world's economies and societies. Because of these reasons, a tremendous¶ growth of tourism as a field of study, coupled with increasing demand for tourism education,¶ has led to a heightened focus on research and public¶ actions related to this economic sector¶ (Barros, 2005; Jogaratnam, Chon, McCleary, Mena & Yoo, 2005; Reid & Bojanic, 2005).¶ Based on these facts and analyses, tourism can be positioned as a mechanism for promoting¶ economic growth and development (Matarrita¶ -¶ Cascante, 2010; Meyer, 2002). As an¶ economic growth strategy, tourism is sought for generation of foreign exchange, increased¶ employment, attraction of foreign capital, and promotion of economic independence (Ren,¶ et¶ al.¶ , 2010). In the context of developing countries, the most important economic feature of¶ activities related to the tourism sector is that they contribute to three high¶ -¶ priority goals: the¶ generation of income, employment, and foreign¶ -¶ exchange earnings (Taleghani, 2010).¶ In the particular case of Mexico, tourism is one of the economy sectors with the largest¶ capacity to generate benefits and positive effects on the social, economic and environmental¶ spheres (INEGI, 2010). As stated by the World Travel and Tourism Council (2010), the¶ contribution of the travel and tourism industry to Mexico’s Gross Domestic Product is¶ expected to rise from 12.7% (US$121.5bn or MXN$1,601.4bn) in 2010, to 14.2%¶ (US$243.2bn or MXN$3,649.0bn) by 2020. Even more, the number of jobs is expected to¶ rise from 5,881,000¶ in 2010 (13.7% of total employment or one in every 7.3 jobs) to¶ 7,105,000 jobs (14.7% of total employment or one in every 6.8 jobs) by 2020. Because of the¶ reasons mentioned above, the development of new initiatives and projects to promote tourism¶ competitiveness among the different states of Mexico has been defined as a priority topic at¶ the nationwide level (Carral, 2007; Ibáñez & García, 2009; Propin & Sánchez, 2010;¶ Viktorovna, 2010). Through this research, an initiative to promote tourism competitiveness¶ among the states of Mexico is developed. Such initiative is achieved through a categorization¶ and analysis of resources and actions taken by each Mexican state that contribute towards¶ tourism competitiveness. One hundred and twelve variables is selected and grouped into ten¶ categories, defined as dimensions, by a group of experts consulted by the researchers in¶ charge of this project. The variables selected describe: 1) the existence of resources and infrastructure that is relevant to the tourism activity in its different branches; 2) the actions¶ taken at each Mexican state to consolidate this sector; and 3) the results obtained in this vein.¶ Based on this set of variables and the ten dimensions under which they are grouped, an¶ overall competitiveness index (Raya, 2004) is developed for each state, as well as an index¶ for each state under these ten dimensions. A detailed analysis of the current status for each of¶ the Mexican states is also outlined, by identifying the strengths, opportunity areas and¶ priority projects to be developed in each of such states.

#### Tourism is becoming more vitally important for the Mexican economy

Arrioja, June 24, 2013 (Jose Enrique, Arrioja is a reporter for Bloomberg News, “Tourism Seen Jumping to No.3 Mexico Cash Source by 2018, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/tourism-seen-jumping-to-mexico-s-3rd-biggest-cash-source-by-2018.html>, accessed 7/3/13, TMc)

Tourism Seen Jumping to No. 3 Mexico Cash Source by 2018¶ By Jose Enrique Arrioja - Jun 24, 2013 11:00 PM CT¶ Mexico’s tourism industry, already the nation’s fifth-biggest source of revenue, is seen taking on more economic importance by the end of 2018 as international visits rise and new infrastructure is built, according to a cabinet official.¶ Tourism’s participation in Mexican gross domestic product will climb 100 basis points to 9.4 percent by the end President’s Enrique Pena Nieto’s administration, Tourism Minister Claudia Ruiz Massieu said in an interview at Bloomberg’s New York offices on June 21. The “upward trend” for the industry, which employs about 7 million people, will be driven by more visitors from countries outside of North America and better tourism facilities, she said.¶ “Tourism is already one of the most important economic sectors for Mexico,” Ruiz Massieu said. “We are confident that it can represent at least one point more of GDP at the end of the administration and that we can become the third source of revenue at least.”¶ Last year, tourism generated $12.7 billion in foreign exchange inflows, according to a report by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), a 10.5 percent increased versus 2011. Tourism trails manufacturing, oil, remittances and foreign direct investment as the nation’s biggest source of revenue, according to Citigroup Inc.’s Banamex unit.¶ Ruiz Massieu said Latin America’s second-biggest economy received a record 24 million international visitors last year, or 2.6 percent more than the 23.4 million tourists it received in 2011, according to World Bank figures. Global international arrivals grew by 4 percent in 2012, according to a report from a World Tourism Organization report, and reached 1 billion tourists worldwide for the first time.¶ International visits abroad to the so-called emerging economies rose 4.1 percent, while arrivals to advanced economies climbed 3.6 percent, the WTO report shows.¶ Mexico’s Share¶ “We want to keep growing the market share in our traditional markets,” such as the U.S. and Canada, the biggest source of international travelers to Mexico, Ruiz Massieu said. At the same time, Ruiz Massieu is focusing on emerging markets such as Brazil, Argentina, Russia and China. She declined to offer a projection for the total international visitors expected for this year.¶ The increase of international travelers to Mexico comes even as more than 6,200 people have been killed in drug-related violence since Pena Nieto took office Dec. 1, according to Milenio, a Mexico City-based newspaper.¶ Eduardo Medina Mora, Mexico’s ambassador to the U.S., said in a June 6 interview that the government’s efforts to fight organized crime “are going to take more time and be long-term driven, because they’re based on institutional buildup,” and that the number of casualties is already dropping.¶ Economic Initiatives¶ Pena Nieto has said that legal changes he’s pushing for by year-end to open up the state-controlled energy industry and to increase tax collection may boost growth to as much 6 percent a year, versus 3.9 percent in 2012. Ruiz Massieu said Mexico seeks to increase private investment in the tourism industry.¶ The Mexican government is finishing its infrastructure strategy which will be unveiled in the coming weeks and the plan will for the first time include tourism development, Ruiz Massieu said.¶ Mexico wants to build new airports, cargo and commercial ports, railways and highways to link well-known transportation hubs with lesser-known tourism destinations, she said without specifying how much investment will go into the projects.¶ 2013 Spending¶ This year Mexico is investing 310 billion pesos ($23.3 billion) in infrastructure, Pena Nieto said June 20. Speaking at a construction industry event in Merida, Mexico, the president said that about 187 billion pesos will be invested in the second half of the year.¶ Ruiz Massieu said the Communications and Transportation Ministry will announce “in a couple of weeks” a final decision regarding potential measures to alleviate congestion at the Mexico City airport, the busiest hub in Latin America. “What I favor is getting more planes to an area where I can distribute more tourists to different destinations,” she said.

## Auto Adv

### **Uniq: Auto Industry strong**

#### Mexico’s auto industry is booming

Alvarez 13 (Alvarez, Jose Oscar. "MEXICO STEEL SET TO TAKE OFF." JOAlvarez Inc. 18 Apr. 2013. <https://www.joalvarez.com/wordpress/?p=840>.the office manager of American Brokers; Mexican Customs Brokers and transportation executives; WWII Active Infantry man; Mr. John Spindel’s U.S. Customs brokerage house; J.O. Alvarez Inc. Co.; Laredo border; with General Motors, American Motors, and PEMEX; The University of Houston)

MEXICO CITY — Mexico’s auto production has almost doubled since 2009. Now its steel industry is trying to catch up by spending almost $3 billion on new and improved factories. “Auto exports are going to be the new oil for the Mexican economy,” Marco Oviedo, chief economist of Barclays in Mexico, said in a telephone interview from Mexico City. Steelmaker Altos Hornos de Mexico, known as Ahmsa, has almost completed a $2.3 billion expansion designed partly to supply automakers. Ternium and Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal are teaming up on a $330 million investment to finish rust-resistant steel, and South Korea’s Posco is spending $300 million to more than double capacity for similar products. Further growth is likely: The Mexican Automobile Industry Association predicts output will climb almost 40 percent to 4 million vehicles in 2017 as Nissan Motor Co., Honda Motor Co., Mazda Motor Corp. and Volkswagen AG’s Audi unit build factories that join long-standing plants for U.S. carmakers General Motors Co. and Ford Motor Co. Mexico has become a magnet for automakers seeking low labor-cost output with access to North and South American markets and other regions through the nation’s trade agreements with more than 40 countries. In some cases, Japanese automakers were taking advantage of the yen’s strength against the dollar at the time they announced their investments. “The automotive sector in Mexico is one of the stronger ones around the world,” Paul Robinson, senior economist at researcher IHS, said in a telephone interview from Washington. “Because the expansion on the automotive side has come so fast and so recently, the steel industry is a little behind.” While Mexico is the world’s 13th-largest maker of steel overall, its production of automotive-grade metal that has been galvanized, or coated in zinc to prevent rust, remains low, said Oscar Albin, president of the National Autoparts Industry in Mexico City. That has been largely imported from the U.S. and other countries, Albin said. Mexico’s steel imports climbed 36 percent to a record 9.6 million tons last year, according to trade group National Iron and Steel Industry Chamber. Among the larger exporters of steel to Mexico are the U.S. plants of ArcelorMittal, AK Steel Holding and U.S. Steel, said Kenneth Hoffman, head of metals and mining research at Bloomberg Industries. Local producers will be able to compete with those imports by offering a shorter supply line and lower transportation costs. “Carmakers often demand that the suppliers be nearby with the promise of big demand,” Hoffman said. “We saw the same thing when a number of German and Japanese carmakers moved into the American South and steel producers followed.” Ford would consider buying more Mexican-made steel for its factories in Hermosillo and Cuautitlan as long as it met the automaker’s quality standards, said Leo Torres, supply chain director for the company’s Mexico unit. “If I have a ton of steel I can import to my plants in Hermosillo or Cuautitlan and I can buy the same ton in Mexico for the same price, my logistics costs are going to benefit and my inventory costs are going to benefit,” he said in a telephone interview from Mexico City on Tuesday. The Mexican steel industry will invest $11 billion in the next four years, Alonso Ancira, president of the iron and steel chamber and chairman of Ahmsa, said last month. The industry directly employed 53,000 workers at the end of 2011, according to the trade group. There are potential challenges, too. A global glut of the metal may undermine investment in Mexico, Ancira warned, calling on the Mexican government to crack down on “unfair competition.” At the same time, demand may drop as manufacturers replace some parts traditionally made of steel with aluminum to reduce vehicle weight and comply with stricter fuel-economy standards. Mexican vehicle output has jumped 91 percent since 2009, the Mexican Automobile Industry Association said. Japanese automakers shifted production outside their home market to maintain competitive pricing in the U.S. as the yen strengthened for two straight years before declining against both the dollar and the peso in 2012. Their new assembly lines will boost Mexico’s automotive production capacity even further. Nissan is scheduled to open a $2 billion factory by the end of the year next to an existing plant in the central state of Aguascalientes. The Yokohama, Japan-based company is the largest automaker in Mexico with 24 percent of 2012 vehicle output, followed by Volkswagen, GM, Fiat, Chrysler and Ford. About 150 miles away in the state of Guanajuato, Tokyo- based Honda plans to open an $800 million factory next year with capacity for 200,000 Fit small cars. Mazda’s new factory in the same state, slated to open in 2014, will make Mazda2 and Mazda3 small cars. Annual capacity in the $650 million plant will be 230,000 vehicles by 2016, Mazda said in January. That’s 21 percent more than the Hiroshima, Japan-based company discussed as recently as November, when it added 50,000 small cars per year for Toyota Motor Corp. to its capacity of 140,000 vehicles. Volkswagen’s Audi chose the state of Puebla, east of Mexico City, for a $1.3 billion plant to assemble its Q5 sport-utility vehicle starting in 2016. Mexico accounted for 19 percent of North American car and light truck production last year, up from 11 percent in 2000 and 6 percent in 1990, the Federal Reserve Bank in Chicago said in a newsletter dated May 2013. The nation surpassed Canada in auto output in 2008 and the gap has widened every year since, they said. Labor costs in the Mexican automobile industry are about 20 percent of what they are in the U.S. and Canada, according to Luis Lozano, the lead automotive partner at PriceWaterhouseCoopers in Mexico City. “Auto exports have gone from 4 percent of the gross domestic product to close to 6 percent,” said Oviedo of Barclays. “With all the investments that have been announced, they’re going to rise to 8 to 9 percent very soon. That’s almost twice oil exports last year as a percentage of GDP.” Steelmakers have followed. Ternium, based in Luxembourg, is completing a $1.1 billion plant near Monterrey, Mexico, with an annual capacity of 1.5 million tons to supply automakers, home- appliance manufacturers and others. The project includes the joint venture with Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal, which will be able to finish 400,000 tons of rust-resistant steel a year, starting in July. Posco, based in Pohang, South Korea, said in 2011 that it would more than double the capacity of its continuous galvanizing line in Altamira, Mexico, by adding 500,000 tons. Posco’s American depositary receipts have fallen 13 percent this year to $71.86, while Ternium’s have dropped 17 percent to $19.64 as steelmakers globally struggle with excess production capacity and lower demand. Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal climbed 4.5 percent to $25.76. Posco signed a letter of intent with Ahmsa last year to form a joint venture in which the Mexican company would send its Korean counterpart iron ore while tapping its expertise in producing automotive steel. Ahmsa, an integrated steelmaker that has been in bankruptcy proceedings since 1999, is finishing a $2.3 billion investment this year in its so-called “Fenix” project to add 1.7 million tons of annual capacity. The project includes steel for automotive applications, Christopher Plummer, managing director of consulting firm Metal Strategies, said in a telephone interview from West Chester, Penn. Mexico is “significantly short of domestic capacity for the high-quality steel coils that are needed,” Plummer said. “With these lines, they’ll make major steps in becoming self- sufficient.”

### Border key to auto industry

#### US-Mexico border key to auto industry success

Hendricks 11 (Hendricks, David. "Auto Industry Dominates Texas-Mexico Border Trade." Houston Chronicle. 03 July 2011. <http://www.chron.com/business/article/Auto-industry-dominates-Texas-Mexico-border-trade-2081819.php>.the premier local news provider for the country's 4th largest city. Currently the nation's sixth-largest newspaper, the Houston Chronicle is a multimedia company publishing print and online products in English and Spanish that reach millions of people each month. The Houston Chronicle is owned by the Hearst Corporation.)

Anyone wondering which industrial sector is the most important in U.S.-Mexico border trade only has to see what the double-stacked freight cars are carrying on the rail lines parallel to Interstate 35 between San Antonio and Laredo. Newly assembled cars and car parts, especially stacks of chassis, are the most visible and tell the story, even if they only show a fraction of what occurs along the U.S.-Mexico border. Automotive investments are continuing despite Mexico's widely publicized violence. Border business leaders uniformly said Mexico's drug-cartel turf wars and organized crime have not been barriers to auto industry activities and auto border trade. "We lost a few factories that did not survive the U.S. recession, operations that were purchased or merged. But Reynosa last year added 4,000 jobs, even with the violence, at maquiladoras in all categories," said McAllen Economic Development Corp. President Keith Patridge. "What violence? What organized crime?" asked Roger Creery, in an interview before recently resigning as executive director of the Laredo Development Foundation. "What I can say is this: We've had several announcements of plant expansions. Foreign investments have been made in Nuevo Laredo and in central Mexico. Based on the amount of those foreign investments, business growth has not been negatively impacted by societal issues going on in Mexico," Creery said. A powerful region The Texas-northeast Mexico auto-manufacturing region has emerged over the past decade as the glue connecting automakers with plants in Detroit and the U.S. South to the concentration of assembly plants in central Mexico, such as those in León and Toluca and as far south as Puebla. The auto supply chains run north and south, from Mexico to Canada, like an electric current, day and night. More of the auto industry flow passes through Laredo than any other U.S.-Mexico port. In 2010, about $114 billion in international freight crossed through Laredo. Nearly half of it was auto-related, Creery said. The next-largest category, mainly electronic products and components, amounts only to one-fourth the amount of auto freight, Creery said. In 2008 and 2009, the U.S. recession hit the auto industry particularly hard. Laredo saw annual declines of 15  percent to 18 percent in auto freight processed through its port those years, Creery said. But the auto freight volumes recovered in 2010 and are on pace for a 10 percent increase in 2011. Laredo's vast logistics operations of truck and rail bridges and Union Pacific Corp.'s rail yard handle freight for assembly plants and parts factories from central Mexico to Canada.

### Border Delays hurt Auto Industry

Fast and Efficient Supply Chains Critical to Auto Industry – Current Border Times Too Slow

Figueroa, Lee, and Schoik 12-2011 Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst, NACTS Erik Lee, Associate Director, NACTS Rick Van Schoik, Director, NACTS, 12-2011, “Realizing the Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico” http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossborder-trade-with-mexico2.pdf

The close economic ties between the U.S. and Mexico illustrate the dynamics of a 21st century supply chain as inputs cross the border multiple times, accumulating value added to the goods being exported and imported through our shared border. The automotive, electronics and aeronautic industries, among others, are examples of the highly integrated supply chains between U.S. and Mexican industries that have successfully faced global competition. The North American auto industry has become highly integrated since the original Auto Pact between Detroit and Ontario that began cross-border manufacturing in North America. Today, vehicles made in Mexico have a high U.S. content, while at the same time vehicles manufactured in the U.S. use a large number of Mexican-made auto parts. Supply chains are critical to businesses’ underlying value, growth potential, and economic competitiveness. Unfortunately, supply chains often come to a stop due to border delays, security concerns, and infrastructure constraints. These issues create an environment of uncertainty in the business community, which deters investment, job creation and economic prosperity. Exports clearly create jobs, but what is less apparent is that exports rely on imports. When U.S. firms build and produce things together with firms in Mexico, it is imperative for them to get key components across the border as fast as possible back into their facilities. The sooner they are in, the sooner they may continue to move along the supply chain until they reach the consumer and create a profit for the U.S. firm and the economy. In a just-in-time business environment, the company relies on an efficient process at the border in order to get numerous key components shipped rapidly from Mexico. Mexico has increasingly become a strategic supplier to U.S. industry; Mexico’s intermediate exports contribute to both intermediate and finished goods in the U.S. Capital goods traded between the U.S. and Mexico also play an important role in increasing regional competitiveness. Last year, $70 billion worth of machinery, tools and equipment were traded bilaterally to produce other goods that were in turn consumed locally or sold to foreign markets as North American-made products. The highly complementary nature of this trade illustrates the growing importance of incorporating value-added every time a product crosses the border for further processing. The interconnectivity between the supply chains of both countries help U.S. companies remain competitive in the world marketplace by producing goods for worldwide consumption at competitive prices. Mexico’s proximity to the U.S. allows production to have a high degree of U.S. content in the final product which in turn helps create and sustain jobs in both countries.

#### Automobile companies are hurt by border crossing delays

Andreas Vol. 28, No. 2 (Fall 2003), pp. 93–94 Peter Andreas is Associate Director and Professor of Political Science and International Studies “Redrawing the Borders and Security in the Twenty-rst Century” <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political\_Science/documents/Redrawing\_the\_Line.pdf>

As a result of the post–September 11 border enforcement crackdown, security has become a new kind of trade barrier. The North American economic integration process suddenly experienced a law enforcement squeeze on the transportation arteries that provide its lifeblood. After the terrorist hijackings, U.S. border inspectors were put on a level-one alert, ofcially dened as a “sustained, intensive, anti-terrorism operation.” The result was a dramatic slowdown of cross-border trafc at enormous economic cost. The United States and Canada conduct $1.3 billion worth of two-way trade a day, most of which is moved by trucks across the border.52 Forty thousand commercial shipments and 300,000 people cross the U.S.-Canada border every day. In the days following the September 11 attacks, border waits for trucks hauling cargo increased from about one or two minutes to ten to fteen hours, delaying ship- ments of parts and perishable goods. There was a thirty-six-kilometer-long line of trucks backed up at the Ambassador Bridge linking Windsor, Ontario, and Detroit, Michigan. Before September 11, trucks with preclearance could often cross the border in a few minutes.53 The automobile industry was hit especially hard by the tightening of border security. Ford closed an engine plant in Wind- sor and a vehicle plant in Michigan due to parts shortages.54 The repercussions of tighter border checks were equally visible on the U.S.-Mexico border. For ex- ample, in Laredo, Texas, during peak crossing times prior to the terrorist attacks, it took about ve minutes for a pedestrian to cross a bridge checkpoint and half an hour for a motorist. After the attacks, the wait jumped to as much as ve hours. Wait times elsewhere along the border, such as at the bridges connecting El Paso and Juarez, also increased substantially. Most negatively affected by the delays were electronics, textiles, chemicals, and Mexican factories supplying just-in-time parts to U.S. automobile companies.

### Impact: Auto industry collapse leads to economic collapse

#### US auto industry collapse leads to economic collapse

Snyder 12 (Snyder, Michael. "17 Facts About The Decline Of The U.S. Auto Industry That Are Almost Too Crazy To Believe." The Economic Collapse. 19 Jan. 2012. <http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/17-facts-about-the-decline-of-the-u-s-auto-industry-that-are-almost-too-crazy-to-believe>. An undergraduate in Commerce from the University of Virginia, and possesses a law degree with an LLM from the University of Florida law school, worked in numerous Washington DC lawfirms)

Very few things illustrate how dramatically America has been deindustrialized than the stunning decline of the U.S. auto industry. Once upon a time, the United States literally taught the rest of the world how to make cars. We were the ones that invented the assembly line. We were the ones that showed the rest of the world what mass production could do for an economy. For decades, we produced more cars than anyone else and we sold more cars than anyone else. Detroit was known as "the Motor City" and our manufacturing prowess dominated the planet. But now all of that has changed. Japan makes far more vehicles than we do today. So does Germany. As you read this, state of the art production facilities are going up all over China. Meanwhile, the U.S. auto industry continues to rot and thousands upon thousands of good automotive jobs continue to leave our shores. The rest of the world is making cars better than we are, they are making them cheaper than we are and they really don't care that many of our formerly great manufacturing cities are turning into rotting, stinking hellholes. The U.S. auto industry was once a symbol of American dominance, but now it is just a symbol of American decline. If we want to remain a great nation, then we need to start becoming great at making things once again. Sadly, it is not just the auto industry in America that is falling apart. In fact, almost everywhere you look in our economy (and in our society as a whole) there is decay and decline. For example, our infrastructure was once the envy of the entire globe. Today, U.S. infrastructure is ranked 23rd. Just because we have had it so good for so long does not mean that it will always be that way. As a nation, our wealth is declining. A decade ago, the United States was ranked number one in average wealth per adult. By 2010, the United States had fallen to seventh. We lived off the wealth created by previous generations for a long time, but that was not enough for us. We always wanted more. Eventually we started going into massive amounts of debt so that we could keep this bubble of "false prosperity" going. Today, when you add up all forms of debt in America, it comes to over 50 trillion dollars. We are a great nation that is in an accelerating state of decline. We have got to quit living off of the past accomplishments of previous generations. We have got to quit being so lazy and decadent and spoiled. There is absolutely no guarantee that America will always be a great nation. In fact, when great nations fall, it usually happens very quickly.

Automotive Industry Key to Economy

Papatheodorou and Harris Jan. 5, 2007 Yorgos Papatheodoru is a senior project manager, CH2M HILL, and Michelle Harris, Project Consultant, P.E., CH2MHILL, “The Automotive Industry: Economic Impact and Location Issues” http://www.industryweek.com/global-economy/automotive-industry-economic-impact-and-location-issues

The automotive industry is a major industrial and economic force worldwide. It makes 60 million cars and trucks a year, and they are responsible for almost half the world's consumption of oil. The industry employs 4 million people directly, and many more indirectly. Despite the fact that many large companies have problems with overcapacity and low profitability, the automotive industry retains a very strong influence and importance. The industry also provides well-paying jobs with good benefits, has heavy linkages with supplier industries (which gives it an oversized role in economic development), and has a strong political influence.

### Auto Industry key to US-Mexico Trade

#### Auto parts and automobiles are huge imports and exports of US-Mexico trade

Villarreal August 9, 2012 M. Angeles Villarreal Analyst in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf>

The leading U.S. import from Mexico in 2011 was crude petroleum oil.9 Crude petroleum oil imports amounted to $39.8 billion, or 15%, of total U.S. imports from Mexico in 2011 (see Table 2). After sharp decreases in 2009 caused by the global economic downturn, all leading imports from Mexico increased in 2010 and 2011. The next leading U.S. import items in 2011 from Mexico were passenger automobiles ($15.5 billion); television receivers ($14.9 billion); automatic data processing machines ($13.8 billion); and auto parts ($13.7 billion). Mexico is the third-leading supplier of total U.S. energy imports, after Canada and Saudi Arabia. Crude oil imports from Mexico totaled $39.8 billion in 2011, accounting for 12% of total U.S. crude oil imports. The leading U.S. export item to Mexico in 2011 was refined petroleum oil10 (10% of total U.S. exports), as shown in Table 3. After a 31% decrease in 2009 due to a decline in oil prices and the economic downturn, U.S. exports in refined petroleum oil products to Mexico increased by 81% in 2010 and 70% in 2011. The next leading U.S. export items in 2011 were auto parts ($13.2 billion); telephone apparatus (including cellular telephones) ($5.4 billion); electronic circuits ($4.9 billion); and automatic data processing machines ($4.1 billion). Total U.S. exports to Mexico increased by 21% in 2011. Mexico ranks first among export markets for U.S. refined oil. In 2011, U.S. refined oil exports to Mexico amounted to 21% of total U.S. refined oil exports.

### Auto Industry Key to Military

#### Auto industry key to not only economy but military

Clark 08 (Clark, Welsey K. "What’s Good for G.M. Is Good for the Army." The New York Times. 17 Nov. 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/opinion/16clark.html?\_r=0>.a retired Army general and former supreme allied commander of NATO, is a senior fellow at the Burkle Center for International Relations at the University of California at Los Angeles.)

AMERICA’S automobile industry is in desperate trouble. Financial instability, the credit squeeze and closed capital markets are hurting domestic automakers, while decades of competition from foreign producers have eroded market share and consumer loyalty. Some economists question the wisdom of Washington’s intervening to help the Big Three, arguing that the automakers should pay the price for their own mistakes or that the market will correct itself. But we must act: aiding the American automobile industry is not only an economic imperative, but also a national security imperative. When President Dwight Eisenhower observed that America’s greatest strength wasn’t its military, but its economy, he must have had companies like General Motors and Ford in mind. Sitting atop a vast pyramid of tool makers, steel producers, fabricators and component manufacturers, these companies not only produced the tanks and trucks that helped win World War II, but also lent their technology to aircraft and ship manufacturing. The United States truly became the arsenal of democracy. During the 1950s, advances in aviation, missiles, satellites and electronics made Detroit seem a little old-fashioned in dealing with the threat of the Soviet Union. The Army’s requests for new trucks and other basic transportation usually came out a loser in budget battles against missile technology and new modifications for the latest supersonic jet fighter. Not only were airplanes far sexier but they also counted as part of our military “tooth,” while much of the land forces’ needs were “tail.” And in those days, “more teeth, less tail” had become a key concept in military spending. But in 1991, the Persian Gulf war demonstrated the awesome utility of American land power, and the Humvee (and its civilian version, the Hummer) became a star. Likewise, the ubiquitous homemade bombs of the current Iraq insurgency have led to the development of innovative armor-protected wheeled vehicles for American forces, as well as improvements in our fleets of Humvees, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, trucks and cargo carriers. In a little more than a year, the Army has procured and fielded in Iraq more than a thousand so-called mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles. The lives of hundreds of soldiers and marines have been saved, and their tasks made more achievable, by the efforts of the American automotive industry. And unlike in World War II, America didn’t have to divert much civilian capacity to meet these military needs. Without a vigorous automotive sector, those needs could not have been quickly met. More challenges lie ahead for our military, and to meet them we need a strong industrial base. For years the military has sought better sources of electric power in its vehicles — necessary to allow troops to monitor their radios with diesel engines off, to support increasingly high-powered communications technology, and eventually to support electric propulsion and innovative armaments like directed-energy weapons. In sum, this greater use of electricity will increase combat power while reducing our footprint. Much research and development spending has gone into these programs over the years, but nothing on the manufacturing scale we really need. Now, though, as Detroit moves to plug-in hybrids and electric-drive technology, the scale problem can be remedied. Automakers are developing innovative electric motors, many with permanent magnet technology that will have immediate military use. And only the auto industry, with its vast purchasing power, is able to establish a domestic advanced battery industry. Likewise, domestic fuel cell production — which will undoubtedly have many critical military applications — depends on a vibrant car industry. To be sure, the public should demand transformation and new standards in the auto industry before paying to keep it alive. And we should insist that Detroit’s goals include putting America in first place in hybrid and electric automotive technology, reducing the emissions of the country’s transportation fleet, and strengthening our competitiveness abroad. This should be no giveaway. Instead, it is a historic opportunity to get it right in Detroit for the good of the country. But Americans must bear in mind that any federal assistance plan would not be just an economic measure. This is, fundamentally, about national security.

## Relations Adv

### US-Mexico Relations needed for better border control

#### Close Relations Between the US and Mexico Necessitate Better Border Policies

Regan, Kondratowicz, Luke 28-10-2011 Sean Regan, Commander United States Coast Guard paper Advisors, Professor Ivan Luke and Captain John Kondratowicz, “U.S. – MEXICO POLICY COORDINATION

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY BORDER POLICY COORDINATION EFFORT” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA555536

Mexico and the United States are bound by close ties in economic, social, and security policies that transcend the physical border. Mexico’s Ambassador to the United States has called this relationship “intermestic,” meaning that policies, events, issues, etc. on either side of the international demarcation line have both domestic and bi-national/ international impacts.1 It is in the co-interest of the United States and Government of Mexico (GoM) to develop and implement supportive cross border economic and security policies but this requires a change in context from the border priority policies of the past decade. 2 In addition, there are questions concerning the ability of the Mexican government to address border policy priorities, especially in the face of rising drug violence. Since September 11, 2001 the United States-Mexico relationship has been focused on potential terrorist threats, drug violence, and immigration issues. Though important topics, such emphasis has failed to build upon areas of mutual benefit and progress; areas where the United States might support the foundations of governance within Mexico and not just its police and military capacity. Mutually beneficial topics such as border infrastructure, information sharing, and law enforcement coordination have not been effectively coordinated at the national levels of both governments leading to significant inefficiency on issues related to the border.3 Considered in the context of the just-in-time nature of business and the competitiveness of the global economy, an effective and efficient border requires security, customs, and infrastructure policies that are streamlined, balanced, and coordinated

### A2 Relations Resilient

#### Relations with Mexico are not inevitable, the US needs to shift to cooperation to solve.

Carlsen 2013  
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There is no doubt that recasting Mexico from a national security threat to a partner would be a positive and long-overdue step forward. The way in which Mexico has been portrayed as a threat—as a source of spillover drug violence, a failed state, a home to terrorist migrants, etc.—has distorted reality and devastated the bi-national relationship. On his trip Obama stated that the U.S.-Mexico relationship “must be defined not by the threats that we face but by the prosperity and the opportunity that we can create together.” It’s just not clear that the shift is genuine. Aid to both Mexico and Central America continues to be heavily skewed to the drug war, including military and police aid, and training programs and “institution-building” among judiciary and penal institutions to support U.S. counternarcotics objectives. While State Department aid to Mexico may decrease somewhat, Department of Defense aid is growing and in Central America security aid is slated to rise 20% over already rising 2012 levels, as noted at the first SICA-North American Security dialogue held in Washington days before Obama’s visit.

### A2 Relations Resilient

#### Even if integration is inevitable, it’s a question of whether or not it’s smooth and rapid – creating a win-win balance is key

Hakim & Litan 2002  
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Even if the three governments take no further steps, the economies, societies, cultures, and institutions of three countries should continue to integrate on their own accord. The three countries now face a decision of whether and how they should seek to accelerate, smooth, and institutionalize this integration process. This will not be a simple challenge. Much more dialogue between the three governments and their citizens will be required to reach consensus on the broad goals and specific policies that any such further integration may entail. The major objective of this volume and of the North American project is to begin this dialogue and the search for ways to develop “win-win-win” strategies for all three countries and their citizens.

#### Mexico will retaliate if necessary

Kirk, Ron 2011 . "USTR Kirk on Reduction of Tariffs on U.S. Exports, Resolution of U.S.-Mexico Cross-Border Trucking Dispute | Office of the United States Trade Representative." *Office of the United States Trade Representative*. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 July 2013. <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/july/statement-ambassador-ron-kirk-reduction-tariffs-us-ex>.

In March 2009, Mexico applied a first round of retaliatory tariffs on 89 products exported from the United States as a result of a cross-border trucking dispute between the two countries. Following a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cross-Border Motor Trucking signed by U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood and Mexican Secretary of Communication and Transportation Dionisio Arturo Pérez-Jácome Friscione this week, the Government of Mexico posted official notice that beginning today it reduced those duties by fifty percent. In response, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk today issued the following statement: “At President Obama’s direction, the cross-border trucking dispute between the U.S. and Mexico has been resolved in a way that addresses safety concerns and upholds our trade obligations. With Mexico’s announcement that it has cut tariffs on products exported from the U.S. by half, American manufacturers, farmers, ranchers, and companies will be able to better compete for customers in Mexico. Many of our workers build, grow and produce products that are then sold to our neighbors in Mexico, and this Administration is committed to expanding their opportunities to support well-paying jobs here at home and to continue rebuilding the U.S. economy.”

### Border Key

#### Developing Border POEs good for US-Mexico relations

Wilson Center, 12, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, located in Washington, D.C., is a United States Presidential Memorial that was established as part of the Smithsonian Institution by an act of Congress in 1968.Nonprofit category: International Studies

Develop border ports of entry that ensure safety and strengthen trade by employing risk-management techniques and the latest technology. Indeed, one of the greatest opportunities for binational cooperation on security, which would help address both Mexican concerns about transnational organized crime and U.S. concerns about terrorism, would be to develop more sophisticated approaches to managing ports of entry at the border. By using risk management techniques and the latest technology, the two countries could develop more effective ways of detecting potential threats, ranging from drugs to firearms to bombs, and simultaneously facilitate commerce and the exchange of people across the border. While much attention has been focused on beefing up security between ports of entry, the reality is that most of the real threats to the two countries are at the ports of entry rather than between them. A new focus on these could be a win-win for both countries and for both security and trade. Cooperation on Global Issues and Foreign Policy For the United States, Mexico is a key partner in international affairs. Mexico works hard to protect the United States from terrorist threats and to weaken transnational organized crime groups. It is a middle income country, currently holds the presidency of the G-20, and is expected to grow steadily for many years to come. Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs, for example, expects Mexico to have the seventh largest economy in the world by 2020. Mexico has long served as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, and the U.S. can take advantage of this fact by working closely with Mexico on issues of common interest.

## A2 NAFTA Bad

#### NAFTA has had a positive impact on both economies

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The bilateral economic and trade relationship with Mexico is of interest to U.S. policymakers because of Mexico’s proximity to the United States, the high level of bilateral trade, and the strong cultural and economic ties that connect the two countries. Also, it is of national interest for the United States to have a prosperous and democratic Mexico as a neighboring country. Mexico is the United States’ third-largest trading partner, while the United States is, by far, Mexico’s largest trading partner. Mexico ranks third as a source of U.S. imports, after China and Canada, and second, after Canada, as an export market for U.S. goods and services. The United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico. The United States and Mexico have strong economic ties through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has been in effect since 1994. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico had followed a strong protectionist policy for decades until it began to unilaterally liberalize its trade regime in the late 1980s. Not all trade-related job gains and losses since NAFTA can be entirely attributed to the agreement because of the numerous factors that affect trade, such as Mexico’s trade liberalization efforts, economic conditions, and currency fluctuations. NAFTA may have accelerated the ongoing trade and investment trends that were already taking place at the time. Most studies show that the net economic effects of NAFTA on both countries have been small but positive, though there have been adjustment costs to some sectors within both countries. The Mexican economy grew by 3.9% in 2011 and is expected to grow by 3.7% in 2012 and 3.8% in 2013. The economy has recovered since 2009, when the global financial crisis, and the subsequent downturn in the U.S. economy, resulted in the sharpest economic contraction in the Mexican economy in 20 years. Mexico’s economy is estimated to have contracted by 6.6% in 2009, while the Mexican peso depreciated against the dollar by 25%. Trends in Mexico’s GDP growth generally follow U.S. economic trends, as shown in Figure 2. Mexico experienced the deepest recession in the Latin America region following the crisis. This is largely due to its high dependence on manufacturing exports to the United States, though other factors have also contributed. Other Latin American countries experienced negative economic consequences from the global financial crisis, but to a lesser extent. Mexico outperformed Brazil in economic growth in 2011 (3.9% compared to 2.7%) and is forecast to do the same in 2012. The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that Mexico’s sound macroeconomic fundamentals, solid banking sector, and competitive export sector are helping Mexico’s economy and its ability to weather external conditions. However, Mexico’s economic growth has been limited by a need for structural reforms in the labor, education, energy, and fiscal sectors.

#### NAFTA is awesome – your evidence is hype

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Has NAFTA failed? The short answer is no. Though it will take many more years before a meaningful assessment of the agreement can be made, NAFTA's expected benefits are beginning to materialize. Trade among the three NAFTA countries has been expanding to record levels, and the number of U.S.-Mexican business partnerships is on the rise. Moreover, despite the 45 percent real devaluation of the peso, the 7 percent drop in Mexican output, and Mexico's 22 percent fall in real wages during 1995, U.S. exports to Mexico were much less affected than Japanese or European exports, largely due to NAFTA. Indeed, while exports to Mexico from the rest of the world (notably Japan and the European Union) fell by about 25 percent, U.S. exports contracted by less than 2 percent. Despite these positive trends, many Americans within Congress and outside it are proclaiming that NAFTA was a mistake. To a large extent, the statements against NAFTA are based on erroneous beliefs or egregious distortions. NAFTA is blamed for U.S. job losses or declining living standards of workers, particularly among unskilled persons. In reality, the impact of NAFTA on gross job displacement in the United States has been negligible. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the net employment effect (the difference between jobs displaced and jobs created) has been positive. Another argument used against NAFTA is the fact that following the Mexican peso crisis the United States is running a trade deficit with Mexico. However, unless it is the result of restrictions in market access, a deficit with any one country is by no means a cause of distress in the country running the deficit. NAFTA's success must be measured by the total amount of trade it creates, regardless of which country is in deficit. Finally, though some of NAFTA's critics argue that the agreement was a cause of the Mexican peso crisis, in reality the crisis was caused by factors unrelated to NAFTA. In fact, NAFTA is an important contributing factor to Mexico's economic recovery because of its impact on export performance and foreign direct investment flows.

#### Their indicts are wrong and more integration solves

Pastor, 04– Robert A., Robert A., Professor at and Founding Director of the Center for North American Studies at American University (“North America's Second Decade,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2004)

A FIRST DRAFT The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect on January 1, 1994, amid fears of job loss in the United States and cries of revolution in the south of Mexico. Yet, in a single decade, the three nations of North America have built a market larger than, and almost as integrated as, the 15-nation European Union. Trade and investment have nearly tripled, and the United States, Mexico, and Canada have experienced an unprecedented degree of social and economic integration. For the first time, "North America" is more than just a geographical expression. In 2000, the election victories of George W. Bush, Vicente Fox, and Jean Chretien raised hopes still further that the promise of a trilateral partnership might be fulfilled. Four years later, however, relations among the three governments have deteriorated. No leader refers to "North America" in the way that Europeans speak of their continent. Indeed, anti-NAFTA name-calling has surfaced again in debates among U.S. presidential candidates. After ten years, it is time to evaluate what NAFTA has accomplished and where it has failed and to determine where it should go from here. What should be the goals for North America's second decade, and what must North American leaders do to achieve them? NAFTA was merely the first draft of an economic constitution for North America. It was a deliberately lean document, intended only to dismantle barriers to trade and investment. Its architects planned neither for its success nor for the crises that would confront it. Although NAFTA fueled the train of continental integration, it did not provide conductors to guide it. As a result, two setbacks -- the Mexican peso crisis of 1995 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 -- have threatened to derail the integration experiment. The peso crisis was a blow to the Mexican economy and to U.S. and Canadian faith in integration. NAFTA's authors had assumed that eliminating restrictions on the movement of capital and goods would, by dint of the market's magic, lead to unalloyed prosperity. No clause in the agreement established a mechanism to anticipate or respond to market failures. Whereas the EU had created too many intrusive institutions, North America made the opposite mistake: it created almost none. The second shock to the North American body politic occurred on September 11, 2001. If a true partnership had existed, the leaders of the United States, Mexico, and Canada would have met in Washington in the days after the tragedy to declare that the attack was aimed at all of North America and that they would respond as one. Instead, in the absence of common institutions, the governments reverted to old habits. Acting unilaterally, Washington virtually closed its borders; Mexican and Canadian leaders responded ambivalently, afraid of how the angry superpower would react. Both events signify missed opportunities. The establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security places North America once again at a crossroads. One course -- the more likely one -- would strengthen border enforcement and impede movement, even by friends. Trade and investment would decline, tensions would rise, and the myriad benefits of integration would begin to recede. In an alternative course, however, security fears would serve as a catalyst for deeper integration. That would require new structures to assure mutual security, promote trade, and bring Mexico closer to the First World economies of its neighbors. Progress can occur only with true leadership, new cooperative institutions, and a redefinition of security that puts the United States, Mexico, and Canada inside a continental perimeter, working together as partners. EVALUATING NAFTA From its outset, NAFTA was subjected to blistering criticism, often based on outlandish predictions. U.S. presidential candidate Ross Perot warned of a "giant sucking sound" -- jobs leaving the United States for Mexico. Mexicans and Canadians, meanwhile, feared that their economies would be taken over by U.S. companies. Opponents predicted that free trade would erode environmental and labor standards in the United States and Canada. Few of these prophecies have been borne out. The United States experienced the largest job expansion in its history in the 1990s. Although both Mexico and Canada attracted considerable new U.S. investment (since NAFTA gave them privileged access to the U.S. market), the percentage of U.S.-owned companies in each country did not increase. (In fact, Canadian investment in the United States grew even faster than did U.S. investment in Canada.) In Mexico, income disparity did worsen, but only because those regions that do not trade with the United States grew much more slowly than those that do; the problem was not NAFTA, but its absence. Environmental standards in Mexico have actually improved faster than those in Canada and the United States, and Mexico's 2000 election was universally hailed as free and fair. And although Mexico and Canada became more dependent on the U.S. market, as opponents of integration warned, the reverse also happened: U.S. trade with its neighbors grew roughly twice as fast as did its trade with the rest of the world. By 2000, in fact, the United States imported 36 percent of its energy from its most important trading partners -- Canada and Mexico -- and exports to its neighbors were 350 percent greater than exports to Japan and China and 75 percent greater than exports to the EU. So much has been attributed to NAFTA that it is easy to forget that it was simply an agreement to dismantle most restrictions on trade and investment over the course of ten years. With a few notable exceptions -- such as trucking, softwood, lumber, and sugar -- where U.S. economic interests have prevented compliance, the agreement largely succeeded in what it was intended to do: barriers were eliminated, and trade and investment soared. In the 1990s, U.S. exports to Mexico grew fourfold, from $28 billion to $111 billion, and exports to Canada more than doubled, increasing from $84 billion to $179 billion. Annual flows of U.S. direct investment to Mexico, meanwhile, went from $1.3 billion in 1992 to $15 billion in 2001. U.S. investment in Canada increased from $2 billion in 1994 to $16 billion in 2000; Canadian investment flows to the United States grew from $4.6 billion to $27 billion over the same period. Travel and immigration among the three countries also increased dramatically. In 2000 alone, people crossed the two borders 500 million times. The most profound impact came from those people who crossed and stayed. The 2000 census estimated that there were 22 million people of Mexican origin in the United States, about 5 million of whom were undocumented workers. Nearly two-thirds of these have arrived in the last two decades. North America is larger than Europe in population and territory, and its gross product of $11.4 trillion not only eclipses that of the EU (and will even after the EU expands to 25 nations in May 2004) but also represents one-third of the world's economic output. Intraregional exports as a percentage of total exports climbed from around 30 percent in 1982 to 56 percent in 2001 (compared to 61 percent for the EU). As in the auto industry -- which makes up nearly 40 percent of North American trade -- much of this exchange is either intraindustry or intrafirm. Both industries and companies have become truly North American. But although NAFTA has successfully increased trade and investment, it has failed to confront some of the major challenges of integration. This failure has not only harmed the three countries, it has also seriously undermined support for the agreement, thus preventing North America from seizing opportunities for further progress. First, NAFTA was silent on the development gap between Mexico and its two northern neighbors, and that gap has widened. Second, NAFTA did not plan for success: inadequate roads and infrastructure cannot cope with increased traffic. The resulting delays have raised the transaction costs of regional trade more than the elimination of tariffs has lowered them. Third, NAFTA did not address immigration, and the number of undocumented workers in the United States jumped in the 1990s from 3 million to 9 million (55 percent of whom came from Mexico). Fourth, NAFTA did not address energy issues, a failure highlighted by the catastrophic blackout that Canada and the northeastern United States suffered last August. Fifth, NAFTA made no attempt to coordinate macroeconomic policy, leaving North American governments with no way to prevent market catastrophes such as the Mexican peso crisis. Finally, NAFTA did nothing to address security -- and as a result, the fallout from September 11 threatens to cripple North American integration.

### AT: NAFTA Bad – US Jobs

#### The majority of economists conclude aff – job losses are structural not NAFTA

Teslik, 9 - bachelor's degree from Harvard University and an MBA from INSEAD, senior editor and commodities analyst at Roubini Global Economics, associate editor of economics for the Council on Foreign Relations, (Lee Hudson, “NAFTA's Economic Impact”, July 7, 2009 [http://www.cfr.org/economics/naftas-economic-impact/p15790#p3)](http://www.cfr.org/economics/naftas-economic-impact/p15790#p3)//s)

Measuring the impact of a specific trade deal on a country's labor market is not a straightforward exercise, and analysts disagree on how to gauge NAFTA's effects. The USTR claims a broadly positive influence, citing figures that show an increase in overall U.S. employment of 24 percent since NAFTA's inception, as well as declining unemployment rates over the same period. In addition, the USTR cites data showing that inflation-adjusted U.S. wages rose 19.3 percent between 1993 and 2007, as compared to only 11 percent in the fourteen years prior. Many economists agree that NAFTA has had some positive impact on overall U.S. employment. But most also agree that gains have been accompanied by some painful side effects. Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, notes that wages haven't kept pace with labor productivity and that income inequality has risen in recent years, in part due to pressures on the U.S. manufacturing base. To some extent, he says, trade deals have hastened the pace of these changes in that they have "reinforced the globalization of the American economy." Opponents of NAFTA take a starker position. Thea M. Lee is policy director for the AFL-CIO, which opposes NAFTA and lobbies against other free trade agreements as unfair to U.S. workers and corporations unless they include provisions that require signatory countries to raise labor and environmental standards. Lee argues one of the main upshots of the deal has been to "force workers into more direct competition with each other, while assuring them fewer rights and protections." The Economic Policy Institute, a left-leaning research organization, says in a policy paper on NAFTA that the deal's trade agenda has served to widen U.S. trade deficits and has indirectly pushed some U.S. workers into lower-paying jobs. But most economists say it's a stretch to blame these shifts on NAFTA. "The problems in Youngstown, Ohio, and other places like that go back decades before NAFTA," says Daniel T. Griswold, the director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the libertarian Cato Institute. Griswold says job losses are "part of a structural shift of the U.S. economy" away from a focus on heavy manufacturing and toward a focus on light manufacturing and high-end services. "It's a cruel illusion to say if we just go in and tinker with NAFTA there will be some kind of industrial renaissance," he says. Alden echoes this idea and says that broader economic trends affecting U.S. employment--the rise of China and skyrocketing energy prices, for instance--wouldn't be substantially altered by U.S. policy shifts toward NAFTA.

#### Empirics show job creation

Lustig, 12 - PhD in Economics from the University of California at Berkeley, President of the Universidad de las Américas-Puebla, Senior Advisor and Chief of the Poverty and Inequality Unit, Department of Social Programs and Sustainable Development at the Inter-American Development Bank Director of the 2000/2001 World Development Report (Nora C., “NAFTA: Setting the Record Straight” 2012 Updated, [http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ455/lapan/Readings/NAFTA,%20Setting%20the%20Record%20Straight.pdf)](http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ455/lapan/Readings/NAFTA,%20Setting%20the%20Record%20Straight.pdf)%20)

U.S. Employment and Wages Before NAFTA's approval, all opponents claimed the agreement would lead to significant job losses in the United States. Cheap, labor-intensive Mexican imports would outcompete with U.S. goods, and plants would be attracted to Mexico by lower wages. Three years of evidence reveals that such fears were unfounded. One indicator of the gross disemployment effects caused by NAFTA is the Trade Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) certifications for all industries given by the Department of Labor. The cumulative figure between January 1994 and December 1996 equals close to 90,000 certifications. Sixty percent of these are Mexico-related (as opposed to Canada or unspecified country). Forty percent of this amount is due to plant relocation, and the rest to employment displaced by imports. However, this number is the total number of recipients of NAFTA-related assistance, which is not equivalent to the total number of people who may be unemployed as a result of NAFTA. USTR figures indicate that about 6,000 of eligible recipients actually used the benefits, suggesting that the rest have probably been reemployed. Also, an accurate assessment of the net employment effect of NAFTA would need to look at job creation as well. A recent study that attempts to do this analytically found that the overall impact of NAFTA tariff liberalization on U.S. employment has been slightly positive. Job displacement may be causing real hardship for some individuals and families, but it is important to put these figures in context. Since NAFTA, the United States has created about 2.25 million jobs a year. Furthermore, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, total gross job displacements (subsequently reemployed in most cases) during the first nine months of 1996 averaged 2.4 million workers per month. On a monthly basis, the NAFTA-TAA certified workers since the agreement came into effect equal 2,569 a month (82,223 divided by 32 months). NAFTA-certified job displacements were only about one in 1,000 of the average monthly layoffs during the first nine months of 1996.

## TPP Adv

### TPP Solves Asia Stability

#### Now is key – negotiations are reaching a tipping point. Breakdown unravels the entire negotiations – crushes strategic Asia ‘pivot’ and US leadership

Claude Barfield 2013 (former consultant to the office of the US Trade Representative and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute) January 10, 2013 “Crunch time for the TPP” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/10/crunch-time-for-the-tpp/

During President Obama’s recent trip to Asia, TPP nations set a deadline of October 2013 to conclude the negotiations. TPP members have blown past a previous deadline of November 2011: should they fail again at the end of 2013 there is the real danger that the talks will unravel, and East Asian nations will turn to alternatives, pushed strongly by China.¶ On 18 November, as President Obama embarked on the highly symbolic trip to Asia, his top security and economic adviser, Thomas Donilon, asserted that the TPP agreement is ‘the most significant negotiation currently underway in the international trading system’. It is also the central lynchpin of the Obama administration’s much touted diplomatic and security ‘pivot’ to Asia. Thus, should the negotiations falter or fail, the result would be not only a severe economic setback, but also a dramatic symbolic defeat for US leadership in the region.¶ Positively, in an era in which the United States is deeply divided over globalisation and free trade initiatives, the TPP enjoys unusual bipartisan support. Launched under the Bush administration, the agreement has been taken up as a signature accomplishment for President Obama’s second term. During the 2012 presidential campaign, however, Republican Party candidate Mitt Romney also voiced strong support for the pact. Since the election, Texan Republican Kevin Brady, who heads the all-important House trade subcommittee, has urged the president to ‘go big’ on trade during his second term, and complete the TPP in 2013.¶ Just what is the TPP and why is it so significant? The current negotiations grew out of a four-nation agreement concluded in 2006 by Chile, New Zealand, Brunei and Singapore. Subsequently, Australia, Peru, Vietnam and the United States signed on, followed in 2010 by Malaysia, and most recently by Mexico and Canada. Detailed negotiations began in early 2010, and since then there have been 15 formal sessions. The ultimate goal of the TPP is to include all of the nations in the APEC forum.¶ At the present time, should the 11-nation negotiation be successful, the TPP would encompass a free trade area covering some 658 million people, and almost US$21 trillion in economic activity. If South Korea and Japan join the negotiations, as many expect in 2013–14, the free market territory would expand to a combined GDP of US$26 trillion, constituting 30 per cent of world exports.¶ The TPP has been called the first ‘21st-Century Agreement’. If successful, it will put in place international trade rules to lower or eliminate behind-the-border domestic barriers to foreign competition. Among the 29 chapters under negotiation will be rules to open government procurement contracts to foreign competitors; rules to liberalise service sectors, such as telecommunications, banking and accounting; non-discriminatory health and safety regulations; fair competition with state-owned enterprises; and a level playing field for foreign investment.¶ Despite the emphasis on 21st-century regulatory reform, there are also longstanding 20th-century trade issues that will prove difficult to resolve. For the United States, the greatest challenges stem from sugar, dairy and cotton protection and subsidies; textile and so-called rules of origin that hamper clothing supply chains; and, finally, union demands for interference with the labour laws of TPP trading partners. In the end, the key to success will come down to trade-offs between 21st-century liberalisation and old-fashioned 20th-century protectionism.¶ The urgency to successfully conclude TPP negotiations is heightened by the appearance of an alternative path for Asian regionalism that does not include the United States. At the November 2012 East Asia Summit, ASEAN leaders, as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, formally announced that they would begin negotiations in 2013 for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), with the goal of concluding the pact by 2015.¶ Much of the impetus for this launch came from China, which has long pressed for an exclusive, intra-Asian regional economic architecture. Given the diversity of the membership (including still-closed economies, such as India and Indonesia, and less-developed economies, such as Laos and Cambodia) and an uncertain timetable, RCEP is not an immediate challenge to the TPP. But should the US-led pact dissolve into contentious, even intractable, conflicts that defy resolution, China’s preferred option of the RCEP will provide a hard-to-resist alternative.¶ Thus, much is riding on the ability of the Obama administration to advance TPP liberalisation goals, while crafting compromises that are acceptable both to other TPP partners and to the US Congress and business community.

#### Asia pivot key to solve multiple hotspots from escalating to nuclear war

Colby 11 – Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, August 10, 2011, “Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire,” The Diplomat, online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-empire/2/?print=yes

But the pendulum shouldn’t be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment. For our problem hasn’t been overseas commitments and interventions as such, but the kinds of interventions. The US alliance and partnership structure, what the late William Odom called the United States’ ‘liberal empire’ that includes a substantial military presence and a willingness to use it in the defence of US and allied interests, remains a vital component of US security and global stability and prosperity. This system of voluntary and consensual cooperation under US leadership, particularly in the security realm, constitutes a formidable bloc defending the liberal international order.¶ But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this system is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to become the centre of the global economy.¶ A nuclear North Korea’s violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, as well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyang’s development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover, brings into sight the day when North Korea could threaten the United States itself with nuclear attack, a prospect that will further imperil stability in the region.¶ More broadly, the rise of China – and especially its rapid and opaque military build-up – combined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes is troubling to the United States and its allies and partners across the region. Particularly relevant to the US military presence in the western Pacific is the development of Beijing’s anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets.¶ While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities will give China the growing power to deny the United States the ability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to undermine the US-guaranteed security substructure that has defined littoral East Asia since World War II. Even if China says today it won’t exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring?¶ Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must be coupled with efforts to engage Beijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. ¶ In short, the United States must increase its involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply maintaining the military balance in the western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investments to improve US capabilities. It will also require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under the US security umbrella. This won’t be cheap, for these requirements can’t be met simply by incremental additions to the existing posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech capabilities.¶ Yet such efforts are vital, for East Asia represents the economic future, and its strategic developments will determine which country or countries set the international rules that shape that economic future. Conversely, US interventions in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in south-eastern Europe have been driven by far more ambitious and aspirational conceptions of the national interest, encompassing the proposition that failing or illiberally governed peripheral states can contribute to an instability that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true, the effort is rightly seen by the new political tide not to be worth the benefits gained. Moreover, the United States can scale (and has scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests in ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism.¶ The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that the United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather that we must be more discriminating in making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure, leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be counted on to look out for US interests.¶ We need to focus on making the right interventions, not forswearing them completely. In practice, this means a more substantial focus on East Asia and the serious security challenges there, and less emphasis on the Middle East. ¶ This isn’t to say that the United States should be unwilling to intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there should be more tightly connected to concrete objectives such as protecting the free flow of oil from the region, preventing terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, and forestalling or, if necessary, containing nuclear proliferation as opposed to the more idealistic aspirations to transform the region’s societies. ¶ These more concrete objectives can be better met by the more judicious and economical use of our military power. More broadly, however, it means a shift in US emphasis away from the greater Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific region, which dwarfs the former in economic and military potential and in the dynamism of its societies. The Asia-Pacific region, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the global stage, is where the future of the international security and economic system will be set, and it is there that Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of rising regional security challenges. ¶ In light of US budgetary pressures, including the hundreds of billions in ‘security’ related money to be cut as part of the debt ceiling deal, it’s doubly important that US security dollars be allocated to the most pressing tasks – shoring up the US position in the most important region of the world, the Asia-Pacific. It will also require restraint in expenditure on those challenges and regions that don’t touch so directly on the future of US security and prosperity. ¶ As Americans debate the proper US global role in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and Iraq and Afghanistan, they would do well to direct their ire not at overseas commitments and intervention as such, but rather at those not tied to core US interests and the sustainment and adaptation of the ‘liberal empire’ that we have constructed and maintained since World War II.¶ Defenders of our important overseas links and activities should clearly distinguish their cause from the hyperactive and barely restrained approach represented by those who, unsatisfied with seeing the United States tied down in three Middle Eastern countries, seek intervention in yet more, such as Syria. Indeed, those who refuse to scale back US interventions in the Middle East or call for still more are directly contributing to the weakening of US commitments in East Asia, given strategic developments in the region and a sharply constrained budgetary environment in Washington.¶ We can no longer afford, either strategically or financially, to squander our power in unnecessary and ill-advised interventions and nation-building efforts. The ability and will to intervene is too important to be so wasted.

### TPP key to Asia

#### **TPP key to US leadership in Asia.**

Solís, (2012), Mireya Solís is the Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies and senior fellow at the Brookings Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and associate professor at American University. An expert in Japan’s foreign economic policies, Dr. Solís earned a PhD in government and an MA in East Asian Studies from Harvard University, and a BA in international relations from El Colegio de México. The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Can the United States Lead the Way in Asia–Pacific Integration?. Pacific Focus, 27: 319–341. doi: 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2012.01086.x

The TPP, therefore, represents the economic component of a broader strategy to re-engage Asia which aims fundamentally to avoid marginalization from the world's fastest growing region and to hedge against possible externalities from China's rise. Identifying the Asia–Pacific as the key arena for global politics in the next century, State Secretary Clinton offered a succinct analysis of key goals in the economic agenda as the United States moves to implement its new “forward deployed” diplomacy: to harness Asia's economic dynamism and partake in the construction of the region's economic architecture to secure a level playing field for US workers and firms through trade agreements that promote open and fair competition.16 The TPP has become the main vehicle in the economic front to ensure America's staying power in Asia.

### China In Good

#### Incorporating China into the TPP is critical to stability in Asia.

Ming-Te & Liu 2012 Ming-Te, Hung, and Tony Tai-Ting Liu. "The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership and its Implications for China’s Role in East Asia Regional Integration." Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia 11.2: 1-12.

Second, realization of the TPP would not only bring U.S. influence back into East Asia, but also a stronger U.S. presence in the region would inevitably reinforce the confidence of Washington’s regional allies and change the balance of power in East Asia. With the U.S. serving as the driver of the TPP, the plan essentially corresponds with and reinforces Washington’s traditional hub-and-spoke strategy in East Asia. In contrast to the multilateral characteristic that regional integration entails, the Trans-Pacific Partnership suggests bilateralism between the U.S. and Asia Pacific. Based on firmer ties with the U.S., Japan and Korea may be encouraged to make stronger responses on security matters concerning China (maritime island disputes; Cross Strait relations) and advance their respective economic interests by engaging Southeast Asia while balancing China with U.S. support. In addition, ASEAN may continue to adopt a balance of power strategy that maximizes its benefits while playing off the main regional powers.45 Transformations to the East Asian power structure potentially generated by the TPP suggest a strategic environment that may isolate China’s influence inland and challenge the country’s continued economic development. Clearly, realization of the TPP would have an important impact on East Asia and China’s strategic calculus. Despite much debate on the “most suitable form” of integration in East Asia between ASEAN, with China or Japan as the center, and APEC, with the U.S. as the center, which has grown to resemble an extension of Sino-U.S. competition, China confronts a conundrum with the introduction of the TPP. Washington’s TPP proposal aims at shaping a multilateral atmosphere in the Asia-Pacific that does not exclude the participation of Beijing. In other words, besides ASEAN plus new members, China is now offered an alternative choice for shaping the regional environment. Both the choices of joining or remaining outside the TPP entail serious challenges for China.

If China expresses its interest in participating in the TPP, the move essentially implies China’s recognition of a stronger U.S. role in the region and Washington’s potential leadership in regional integration. Although participation in the TPP would no doubt reduce some suspicion against Beijing’s revisionist sentiment, such a gesture may also suggest China’s admitted weakness in the face of the U.S. and cause other East Asian countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, to gradually shift more support toward Washington. The gravitation of support away from China would inevitably cut short Beijing’s earlier attempts to establish a regional sphere of interest, which is a symbol of power that consolidates great power status. On the other hand, if China remains outside the TPP, neighboring countries would have more reasons to suspect Beijing’s intentions and hedge their support. Even though Beijing would appear dignified on the international stage, symbolizing its increased power, the move may be a signal for Washington to remain vigilant against Beijing and possibly further strengthen its relationship with East Asia. Beijing and Washington may ultimately be engaged in a strategic game, perhaps a new Cold War, in which both powers try to consolidate their status in the international system by attracting the support of other states. As the Cold War experience suggests, ideological and political competition eventually boiled down to a war of economic attrition between the competing powers. History probes China to consider the TPP carefully. The key question is whether China is ready.

## Border Security

### POEs Key to Border Security

#### Land POEs are the key weak link in border enforcement – long wait times cause inspectors to flush traffic, ignoring inspections

Meissner, et al 2013  
 Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow and Director, MPI US Immigration Policy Program Muzaffar Chishti, Director, MPI Office at NYU School of Law Donald M. Kerwin, Executive Director, Center for Migration Studies Claire Bergeron Research Assistant with the US Immigration Policy Program at MPI, “Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery” Migration Policy Institute http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf

Meeting the physical infrastructure needs at POEs has not kept pace with advances in documentation and screening developments. Communities such as Nogales, AZ, for example, have two ports that typically handle 15,000 pedestrian and 20,000 vehicle crossings daily (3.5 million pedestrians and 4.7 million vehicles annually). The POEs are equipped with technology that permits 100 percent license plate reading and document scanning. However, when traffic wait times exceed 60 minutes, inspectors typically “flush” traffic through, pulling aside only obvious high-risk crossers, in an effort to reconcile their facilitation and enforcement missions under trying conditions. Despite significant advances, land ports have not experienced improvements on par with those realized between ports. As a result, the potential for land POE inspections to be a weak link remains a critical enforcement challenge.

#### POEs are the weak point in border security – illegal crossings are twice as likely to happen at POEs than between them

Meissner, et al 2013  
 Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow and Director, MPI US Immigration Policy Program Muzaffar Chishti, Director, MPI Office at NYU School of Law Donald M. Kerwin, Executive Director, Center for Migration Studies Claire Bergeron Research Assistant with the US Immigration Policy Program at MPI, “Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery” Migration Policy Institute http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf

The POE mission is arguably the most difficult and complex element of border security. CIW’s immigration inspectors question, under oath, persons seeking entry in order to determine their admissibility. POEs are responsible for both facilitation of legitimate trade and travel — which are vital for the economies and social well-being of the United States and most countries around the world — and for preventing the entry of a small but potentially deadly number of dangerous people as well as lethal goods, illicit drugs, and contraband. As border security improves and border enforcement makes illegal crossing between ports ever more difficult, the potential for misuse of legal crossing procedures builds and can be expected to steadily increase. CBP estimates that it processed more than 340 million travelers in FY 2011.172 With such volumes, inspectors have very little time on average to determine whether a traveler is authorized to enter. Covert testing by GAO at land, sea, and airport entry points from 2003-07 found that inspectors routinely failed to detect counterfeit documents or did not request documents at all.” A separate study found that the probability of an unauthorized migrant being apprehended while passing illegally through a POE was about one-half as high as the probability of being apprehended while crossing between ports of entry.”4 Persons seeking to cross illegally have growing incentives to try to enter at a POE, rather than risk their lives crossing illegally between ports.

### POEs Key to Narcotic Trafficking

#### Increased focus on POEs solves narcotics trafficking

Wilson, May 2013   
Christopher E. Wilson Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “A Dividing Line that Unites: The U.S.-Mexico Border” in New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico Institute Print Edition, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_new_era.pdf>

The lack of attention that has been focused on prioritizing border security efforts on the areas between the ports of entry as opposed to on the ports of entry, as described above in the section on migration, has important security policy implications. Recent U.S. National Drug Threat Assessments have suggested that most hard drugs—like cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin—are more likely to be smuggled through ports of entry rather than around them.3 Increased attention by policymakers is needed to identify and implement strategies that simultaneously strengthen security and efficiency at the ports of entry. Like everything else in border management, border security is best achieved through cooperation. There are preliminary indications that the gendarmerie of 10,000 officers planned to be created by the Peña Nieto government could be, in part, used to combat the criminal groups that prey on migrants in the border region. Such an initiative would open opportunities for increased collaboration with U.S. border and other law enforcement agencies.

### Dirty Bomb shuts down trade

#### A Dirty bomb attack would shut down world trade.

Barnes 2013   
Diane Barnes Global Security Newswire staff writer. Barnes has contributed to publications including the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, the Palm Beach Post and the London Daily Telegraph. She is a graduate of George Washington University. "Dirty Bomb" Strike Seen Freezing Global Trade” Global Security Newswire May 29, 2013 <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/nuclear-security-cargo-threat/?utm_source=feedly>

WASHINGTON -- Last month's manhunt for the surviving Boston Marathon bombing suspect highlights the possible economic devastation that could result if authorities launch a similarly overwhelming response to a radiological "dirty bomb" strike to mitigate the threat of follow-up attacks, one issue expert said on Wednesday. Authorities brought Boston to a standstill for much of one day -- asking residents to stay indoors -- as they searched for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the wake of a gun battle that killed his brother and second suspect, Tamerlan. Police did not know how much more damage the alleged bomber was poised to inflict, Northeastern University political science professor Stephen Flynn said. He said a radiological attack would similarly force officials to ask, "If this container could get in, and there are others that are out there, what would we do to handle it?" A dirty bomb would use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials that are used widely in industry, medicine and other sectors. The United States is nearly certain to freeze all inbound U.S. sea cargo if such a weapon were smuggled into the country and then detonated, he asserted, adding that work-arounds exist that could enable terrorists to skirt nearly all security measures instituted since the Sept. 11 attacks. Such a freeze would "gridlock" land- and sea-based commerce around the world in two weeks, and shipping would likely require at least a month to restart, Flynn said.

### UQ- Border Security Promises are False

#### False security- there are miles of the US-Mexico Border that need to be protected, from the Mexico army and drug smugglers alike

Stoddard, March 2003(Dave, Dave Stoddard is a twenty-seven year veteran of the United States Border Patrol. His last eight years of service were spent in southern Arizona on the Cochise Strip and works for the Idaho Reporter as a reporter, “Mexican Military Presence at the US Border, <http://www.proliberty.com/observer/20030414.htm>, accessed 7/5/13, TMc)

Mexican military presence on the U.S. border ¶ by Dave Stoddard ¶ The story from the L.A. Times, “Mexico Increases Security Amid Threat of Terrorism” (Reuters - 3/19/03) gives the impression that Mexico is helping to secure the United States during the Iraq conflict by sending troops to the U.S.-Mexico border. ¶ What “The Times” does not report (and what the U.S. government chooses to ignore) is that Mexican troops have been operating on the U.S.-Mexico border for several decades now. Within the last 10 years, the Mexican military presence on the U.S. border has increased exponentially over what it was during the 1980s. ¶ During this time, the Mexican Army has frequently entered the United States and fired upon U.S. Officers. Mexican helicopters, protected by ground forces in HumVees, have entered the U.S. and delivered narcotics to points unknown. ¶ Additionally, Mexican troops have been observed guiding Mexican citizens (and probably citizens from other countries) to locations used by illegal aliens to cross into the United States. U.S. border residents have filmed this. ¶ I live roughly five miles from the U.S.-Mexico border. There is a Mexican Army garrison due south of my home. ¶ These troops lay up during the day and come out at dusk to: ¶ A. Protect potential illegal aliens from border bandits; ¶ B. Guide those potential illegal aliens to “safe” crossing points where they may enter the United States illegally; ¶ C. Facilitate the crossing of narcotics into the United States by assuring that potential illegal aliens and patrolling U.S. officers don't interfere with those movements of narcotics, and; ¶ D. Move narcotics themselves across the border at the direction of corrupt Mexican officers and politicians and; ¶ E. Assure that violence does not erupt along the border between competing drug cartels thereby creating “bad press” for Mexico during its push for “regularization” of its illegal aliens in the United States. ¶ The fact that USBP Agents are being taken off the line to “beef up” the Ports of Entry along the U.S.-Mexico Border is egregiously problematic and treasonous, to say the least. ¶ The security problem along the US.-Mexico Border is not at the Ports of Entry where people try to enter the United States LEGALLY. Sure, smugglers try to evade authorities at the Ports of Entry by presenting people and merchandise for inspection. But, the real danger are those people who don't bother with standing in line at a Port of Entry and simply drive or walk across at any point in the hundreds of miles of “open border”. These people and traffickers are not inspected at all. ¶ There is less risk, more opportunity, and less wait to enter the United States surreptitiously along our unguarded border. ¶ Our politicians are giving the American public a false and dangerous sense of security by putting dozens of officers at ports of entry sucking their thumbs or inspecting tomatoes and products from maquiladoras (foreign-owned factories in Mexico at which imported parts are assembled by lower-paid workers into products for export). ¶ These officers can be seen by the public, and the traffic at ports of entry can be held up for hours alluding to “intense security,” but the real, clear and present danger is along our unguarded border. Removing USPB agents from areas between ports of entry where the real threat lies may be politically correct, but is misguided and treasonous at best. ¶ The American public is too smart to believe that a 24-hour “dog and pony show” at ports of entry makes them more secure and are too smart to believe that the Mexican military is on our borders for any purpose other than to further the interests of our corrupt neighbor to the south who is doing everything in its power to destroy the United States through pushing drugs, draining our economy, and eroding our national sovereignty. ¶

### Better Economy = Better Security

#### Improving the economy leads to greater security

Ducheny 13 (Ducheny, Denise Moreno. "Border Security? Billions Could Be Lost If Entry Ports Aren't Improved." Imperial Beach Patch. 27 June 2013 <http://imperialbeach.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/senate-immigration-reform-and-border-security-economy>.of Imperial Beach; former state (CA) senator; an immigration lawyer; editor: Khari Johnson)

Proposed amendments seek to move it further from strategic investment to wasteful spending. The broadest, and ultimately most realistic view of our security, would acknowledge what those of us who live in places like San Diego, El Paso, Buffalo and Seattle recognize instinctively that we are not secure unless our neighbors are secure. Realistic concerns in these days of renegade terrorists, drug cartel wars and new strains of disease (remember SARS and swine flu pandemics?) cannot be confronted with fences and constricted border crossings. It depends, rather, on an increasingly integrated economic system that provides prosperity, improved quality of life, sustainable development of shared watersheds, air sheds and communities whose children grow up with the education that provides opportunities for advancement not tied to drug trafficking and other criminal enterprises. What will make us most secure is improved economic prosperity throughout North America—in the United States and for our neighbors in Canada and Mexico. The best long-term deterrent to the many who have sought employment in the U.S. by skirting the current strict quota system is to improve the economy of the North American region. We must continue to support the substantial economic growth Mexico has experienced over recent years by enhancing the trade and tourism relationship we already share. The billions of dollars proposed for so-called border Security in the legislation that received a majority vote Thursday in the Senate would be best spent to enhance the trade relationship with Mexico and Canada by investing in modernizing and building new infrastructure to facilitate the 99 percent of cross-border traffic which is legitimate, so law enforcement can focus their attention on blocking access to criminals, smugglers and those who would do us harm. Our Customs and Border Patrol agents need the resources to focus on stopping drug traffickers, money launderers, arms traffickers and to build cooperation across borders to stop criminal enterprises and detect those who would seek entry anywhere in North American to endanger our citizens.

## Solvency

### Increased Resources Solve

#### Increasing resources for border infrastructure will allow effective transit and security

Pacheco 2012  
Jerry Pacheco is the executive director of the International Business Accelerator, a nonprofit trade counseling program of the New Mexico Small Business Development Centers Network. “Efficient border crossings crucial to trade” ABQ Journal http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/08/06/biz/outlook/efficient-border-crossings-crucial-to-trade.html

The U.S., Mexico and Canada are trade partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has helped create a trade bloc of 460 million people with a combined output of more than $17 trillion. Since its implementation in 1994, trade among the NAFTA partners has grown by 460 percent, making North America one of the most successful and dynamic trade blocs in the world. However, wait times to cross the U.S.-Mexico border result in billions of dollars of lost revenues and time every year, impinging on our region’s competitiveness. This happens both at the commercial and retail level, as millions of Mexicans cross the border into the U.S. for shopping, entertainment and visiting family. Excessive crossing delays dissuade these trips. The Port of Santa Teresa has traditionally been a port known for rapid crossings, but as trade volume and the number of people crossing increases, it is becoming as congested as other busy ports along the U.S.-Mexico border. A renovation is currently taking place at this port to add two more private vehicle lanes and one more commercial crossing lane, which should help alleviate waits in the future. Expediting trade and border crossings is an issue discussed by politicians less than the hot-button issue of security. However, for the economic future of all three NAFTA countries this is an issue that merits more focus. It behooves the U.S. government to provide CBP with the tools, personnel and infrastructure it needs to continue guarding our nation’s borders, while working with this group to develop quicker ways of moving people and merchandise.

### Solves Immigration

#### Plan would slow illegal immigration flows into the US

Graybeal 2011  
 Michael Graybeal is the program coordinator for the Americas Program. He joined CSIS in May 2010 after receiving his M.A. in Latin American studies from Georgetown University. “Mexico’s Economic Prospects Key to Passing Immigration Reform” MAY 18, 2011 America’s Program Blog http://csis.org/blog/mexicos-economic-prospects-key-passing-immigration-reform

There is an often neglected facet of this issue, which is the economy of Mexico—the largest source of legal and illegal migrants to the United States. As immigration expert Philip Martin, chairman of the Comparative Immigration and Integration Program at the University of California Davis, stated at a recent CSIS conference on the Mexican economy, that there needs to be “a light at the end of the tunnel.” In other words, if Mexico is able to expand employment for its citizens and stem the flow of migrants it may boost chances to enact reforms in the United States. While Mexico’s economy has rebounded strongly from the global financial crisis, it has yet to enact the reforms necessary to actually increase the job pool. There are signs that this may be changing. Mexico’s Federal Competition Commission (Cofeco) recently announced a $1 billion fine against telecommunications giant Telcel for alleged monopolistic practices – lack of competition in Mexico has long hindered growth prospects. Telcel is just one company in one industry, however. Until Mexico is able to improve competitive practices across its commercial sector to spur job growth, it is doubtful U.S. lawmakers will feel compelled to enact immigration reform.

### Solves Security

#### Infrastructure improvement is a key component of border security – it’s the vital internal link to stopping narco-trafficking into the US

McCaul 2012   
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul (R-TX) Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management Field Hearing “Using Technology to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Security at Our Ports of Entry” May 1, 2012 Remarks as Prepared <http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/05-01-12%20McCaul%20Open.pdf>

The free flow of trade and commerce through our ports of entry is vital to our nation’s economy. Yet today, those ports of entry have also become a route for Mexican cartels to funnel their drugs into the United States. Our federal agents have a never ending job of preventing this onslaught. Unfortunately the search for these illegal drugs has slowed down the flow of commerce, and threatens to further weaken our already fragile economy. How much is at stake? Last year alone, $83.4 billion of commerce came through the Laredo border crossing. The city has lived up to its distinction as “the Gateway City”, boasting the busiest commercial truck crossing in the United States. However, America’s free flow of trade is threatened, because our ports of entry remain a battleground in our fight to protect the homeland. The same ports of entry that serve as a pipeline for economic growth are inundated by illegal drug shipments. According to the Department of Justice, more than 90% of all illicit narcotics come into the United States through official ports of entry hidden among cargo and travelers. Last year in Laredo, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers seized 21 and a half kilos of Cocaine and more than 33 kilos of Methamphetamines. And where there are drugs flowing north, you can be sure to find guns and money flowing south. Make no mistake; the cartels running drugs across the southwest border are highly sophisticated criminal organizations with one goal – to make as much money as possible. They will use any means necessary to ensure their poison reaches the interior of our nation. The men and women of CBP are the last line of defense in our fight to stop the drugs from entering the United States. These officers have a difficult task: separate illicit cargo and travelers from the legitimate ones with minimal interruption to the flow of legal trade. After September 11th, traffic across some ports of entry came to a standstill due to more detailed questioning of travelers and inspection of cargo. This resulted in long truck delays and caused plant closures, threatening companies which rely on such shipments. In the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, this may have been a reasonable response, but consistent delays at the border costs time and money, driving up business costs. We do not want to experience this again. Balancing trade and security requires the smart application of technology, personnel, and infrastructure. We must adequately secure the border in order to facilitate trade. Over the last few years the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has increased the number of CBP officers. While these men and women may be needed to address specific gaps, it is clear that we cannot secure the ports of entry only with boots on the ground. A key to security is the maintenance and expansion of infrastructure. Our nation’s ports of entry need modernization. We cannot increase capacity if there are not enough truck lanes, passenger lanes, and facilities to conduct secondary screening. Especially in these difficult budget times it is important that funds be targeted to maximize both trade and security.

# A2 Off Case

## A2 Topicality

### 2AC POEs Aff – Economic Engagement

#### 1. We Meet - Border infrastructure improvements are economic engagement – they should be considered alongside trade, aid, and development policies

Gephardt 2002,   
Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo) was the House Democratic Leader. CENTER FOR Latin AmericanStudies UC Berkeley “Progressive Economic Engagement with Mexico and the World” Winter http://clas.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/pdf/newswinter02.pdf

Everybody agrees that as we enter the 21st century, the global economy requires the United States to seek greater export opportunities. In addition, I believe that a new trade consensus must be rooted in our values. Not only is enhanced trade vital to U.S. economic growth and security, but it can also promote values fundamental to our democratic future: worker rights, environmental protection, and human rights. Working to open global markets and doing more to enhance global living standards will expand U.S., Mexican and global prosperity in the 21st century. Some have called the progressive approach to trade “protectionist.” That is an erroneous label. In fact, progressives are for expanded trade and for the United States meeting its leadership obligations in the international economic arena. However, we believe a broader approach is needed based on three pillars of economic policy: free and fair trade, enhanced development assistance, and debt relief for the poorest nations. Such a program could create more markets for U.S. exports, strengthen the middle class at home and abroad, and maximize our national security through a comprehensive program of engagement in all parts of the world. We need to forge a progressive approach to trade and development and create a new consensus on global economic engagement. At home in North America, we need to do more to promote trade and development with Mexico. NAFTA has been a real success in increasing trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, but it has done little to generate real development in Mexico. Despite the increases in trade, and enhanced Mexican productivity since 1993, a broad Mexican middle class has failed to emerge. Today Mexico is facing a serious recession and maquiladora jobs are leaving as companies move to nations, such as China, where wage rates are lower. Mexico is facing a race to the bottom and America needs to do more to combat this trend. We need to assist the government of President Vicente Fox with enhanced trade, aid and development. America has a great opportunity in the bilateral meetings at the Monterrey summit in March 2002 to work with Mexico on a progressive development plan. As a first step the resources of the North American Development Bank must be freed up to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of new environmental infrastructure along the border. Housing, health, and transportation infrastructure must also be improved at the border.

#### 2. Counter- interpretation – Economic Engagement can be tactical or structural linkage of economic benefits.

Mastanduno 2008, Michael – Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth. “Economic Statecraft” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors & Cases ed Smith, Hadfield, Dunne. p. 182-3

Positive economic statecraft may be defined as the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. 1 It is important to distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots', or 'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and which others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement', involves an effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour.

#### 3. We meet the counter-interpretation.

#### 4. Prefer our interpretation – (More Real World) Mastanduno’s definition considers the end of the Cold War and the processes of globalization.

Mastanduno 2008, Michael – Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth. “Economic Statecraft” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors & Cases ed Smith, Hadfield, Dunne. p. 182-3

Tactical linkage and long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic. Tactical linkage operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state calculates that the provision of a particular type of economic reward will be sufficient to convince policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing policies. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the United States offered sizable reconstruction loans to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union- in exchange for political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to accommodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic policies; the Soviets were not. In 1973, European states and Japan offered economic inducements in the form of aid and trade concessions to Arab states during the OPEC crisis in a largely successful attempt to assure that they would receive access to oil supplies at predictable prices. In 1982, the United States offered to increase sa les of coal to its West European allies to discourage them from a gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed. Long-term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most clearly articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1945 [ 1980]). The sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic benefits which gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state. Over time, ' internationalist' coalitions that favour interdependence with the sanctioning state will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy of the weaker state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirschman demonstrated how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to inculcate economic dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part of its weaker central European neighbours during the interwar period. Political scientists have traditionally devoted relatively little attention to positive economic statecraft. There are, for example, no databases of instances of economic inducement, with assessments of success and fai lure, along the lines of what Hufbauer et al. and Jentleson have compiled for negative economic sanctions. Economic sticks have commanded more attention than economic carrots. This was especially true during the Cold War, when the two dominant powers and their respective alliances were largely self-sufficient and economically independent of each other. Since there was so little economic cooperation, the study of superpower and inter-bloc economic interaction emphasized economic warfare, : ::- negative sanctions. The end of the Cold War has brought a changed global situation and a revival of scholarly interest in positive economic statecraft. The major powers of the world are now economically interdependent, as they were during the late nineteenth century. An under' standing of great power politics once again requires an understanding of economic relationships and of the links between economics and foreign policy. During the Cold War, US-Soviet relations focused on arms control and the management of political and ideological competition. Today the focus in foreign relations among the United States, European Union, China, Japan, and Russia is as much on issues of economic reform, trade policy, and currency com~ petition as on the traditional 'high politics' of military competition and alliance cooperation. As economic relations take centre stage in foreign policy, the traditional lines between high politics and low politics become blurred. It is not surprising that scholars have begun to rediscover the agenda of positive economic statecraft. The Cold War endgame and in particular Germany's reunification highlighted the key role of economic inducements. Beginning in 1969, West Germany used economic statecraft to build the political foundation for reconciliation with one of its most distrustful neighbours, Poland. When West Germany finally seized the opportunity to reunify in 1989, a reassured Poland did not stand in the way (Davis, \_000) . Similarly, West German leaders used a steady stream of economic inducements over two decades to inculcate Soviet dependence on German commerce and credits and to signal Germany's benign foreign policy intentions. Soviet leader Gorbachev counted on Germany, more so than any other Western state, to provide much-needed economic support. The German government responded in 1989-1990 with food aid and sizable economic credits. The clinchers, which paved the way for Russian acquiescence to unification on Germany's terms, included a five billion deutschmark credit, a willingness to allow Russia to buy goods from the eastern zone of Germany with roubles rather than hard currency, and a commitment to provide financial support for the post-unification resettlement of the Red Army in Russia (Newnham, 2002). Since the end of the Cold War, economic engagement has proved to be a key foreign policy strategy in relations both among major powers and between stronger and weaker states. The United States and European Union have used economic incentives, with mixed success, in an effort to integrate Russia and Central and Eastern Europe into a Western-centred world political economy. European states view economic engagement as the appropriate strategy to adopt with regard to a potentially revisionist Iran; the United States prefers economic containment. China has sought to deepen economic interdependence with Taiwan as a means to reduce incentives for Taiwanese independence. Most prominently, the United States has adopted economic engagement as the focal point of its strategy toward a rising potential challenger, China. US officials recognize that China's integration into the world economy will increase its economic and potential military power. But they also expect-or hope-that the very process of integration will soften Chinese intentions and encourage China to be a more accommodating, rather than a more revisionist, rising power. A good part of the future of international politics hinges on the outcome of this high stakes experiment in economic statecraft.

#### 5. Their interpretation fails. The negative conflates the *means* and the *ends* of engagement policy – Economic policy has economic means – defining in terms of the ends would include nuclear war as economic policy because it has economic effects.

David Baldwin 1985 Senior Political Scientist, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Economic Statecraft “What is Economic Statecraft?” pp. 29-50

The term "foreign economic policy" is sometimes used in much the¶ same way as "economic statecraft" is used here . Other uses, however,¶ should be noted. Benjamin Cohen and Robert Pastor define it in terms of¶ governmental actions intended to affect the international economic environment.¶ 17 An important drawback to this conception is that it makes it¶ definitionally impossible to consider foreign economic policy as an option¶ when a statesman wants to affect the noneconomic aspects of the international¶ environment, say the international climate of opinion with respect¶ to the legitimacy of the government of Rhodesia . Rational adaptation of¶ means to ends in foreign policy making is not facilitated by defining some¶ policy options in terms of particular ends. Still another objection to this¶ definition is that it says nothing about the means to be used , thus leaving¶ open the possibility that the use of noneconomic techniques, such as threats¶ of violence, could be considered foreign economic policy. Such a possibility¶ strays needlessly from common usage. I. M. Destler offers a definition of "foreign economic policy" in terms¶ of the actual impact of governmental actions on foreign and economic concerns. 18 This definition implies nothing whatever about either the means¶ used or the effect intended; instead it focuses on the actual effects intended¶ or not. Thus, a nuclear war could be labeled as ''foreign economic¶ policy'' if it had important side effects on foreign economic matters. Any¶ conception of foreign economic policy that cannot differentiate between¶ nuclear attack and trade restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common¶ usage. Any conception of "policy" that ignores both means and ends is¶ unlikely to be of much use in assessing the rationality of a given policy.

#### 7. Reasonability – Economic engagement is hard to define – there’s no one analytical way to limit it – reject their arbitrary interpretations…..

Bayne & Woolcock 2011 Sir Nicholas Bayne, KCMG, is a Fellow at the International Trade Policy Unit of the London School of Economics and Political Science. He also teaches at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University. As a British diplomat, he was High Commissioner to Canada from 1992 to 1996, Economic Director at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1988 to 1992, and Ambassador to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development from 1985 to 1988. Stephen Woolcock is Associate Research Fellow at the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme of the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) in Bruges. He is also Programme Director for the Masters in International Political Economy at the London School of Economics, where he teaches international political economy, the political economy of international trade and economic diplomacy. He also heads the LSE’s International Trade Policy Unit, which coordinates research on trade topics, runs training programmes for practitioners and organises seminars that bridge the gap between academic research on trade and policy. The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations

This is a book about how states conduct their international economic relations at the start of the 21st century: how they make decisions domestically; how they negotiate with each other internationally; and how these two processes interact. While states are at the centre of this study, it also includes non-state actors, whose influence on decision-making has grown over the years. This book focuses on the methods and process of decision-making and negotiation, rather than the content of policy. It is not intended to be a manual for negotiators, but rather to explain why governments and other actors in economic diplomacy behave in the way they do. We call this book The New Economic Diplomacy to emphasize how much this activity has changed in the last two decades. For half a century after World War li, economic diplomacy was dominated by permanent officials from the governments of a limited number of countries.’ It was shaped by the constraints of the Cold War. Now, with the advance of globalization since the end of the Cold War, there are far more non-government players, while ministers and heads of government are active alongside their officials. Originally limited to measures taken at the border, economic diplomacy increasingly operates ‘within the frontier’ and influences domestic policy. Above all, a single economic system covers the entire world, with many more countries active in it. New emerging powers, with China in the lead, are growing in influence, while mature economies of North America, Europe and Japan have lost ground after suffering financial collapse and economic recession. All these trends will shape this book. They have gathered pace since its second edition came out in 2007 and we have updated this new version to reflect this. edition came out in 2007 and we have updated this new version to reflect this. There are several reasons to pay attention to the process of international economic decision-making, which we call economic diplomacy. First of all, it fills a gap in current academic studies. The discipline of International Political Economy (IPE) focuses on structural factors, such as the relative power of states or the structures of influence within national economies, rather than on process. But where power relationships are balanced, the process of decision-making and negotiation can determine outcomes, as Professor John Odell has pointed out in his book Negotiating the World Economy (Odell 2000). The examination of economic decision-making also illuminates how governments try to make their policies more efficient and how they respond to pressures for greater democratic accountability. Since the end of the Cold War economic diplomacy, to enhance prosperity, has been the main priority for states in most regions of the world. New security concerns emerged after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and these persist, but the recent financial crisis and ensuing recession have revived the priority given to economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy is not just a subject for academic study. It is an activity pursued by state and non-state actors in the real world of today. In some respects economic diplomacy is like sex: easier to describe if you have practised it yourself. So while much of this book is written by Nicholas Bayne and Steve Woolcock of the LSE, with the help of our colleague Ken Heydon, an integral part of it is contributed by experienced practitioners of economic diplomacy. The practitioner chapters, starting at Chapter 5, provide case studies and illustrations of how economic diplomacy works.

### AT: “Funding = Minor Repair”

#### Funding is the key piece – it’s not a minor repair to US policy

Uribe 2012   
Mónica Ortiz Uribe “NAFTA's promise slowed by lack of border infrastructure “ Marketplace Morning Report for Tuesday, October 30, 2012 http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/naftas-promise-slowed-lack-border-infrastructure

Infrastructure at the border also affects wait times. The biggest obstacle to updating the current ports of entry and building new ones is insufficient federal funding. It’s especially tough now when the country is recovering from an economic recession and Congress has failed to approve the a new budget.

Chris Wilson, who researches binational trade for the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C., says “Customs and Border Protection has identified a $6 billion deficit between where we are now and where we need to be to keep up with all the people and goods that are flowing across the border everyday."

### Yes Economic Engagement

#### Border infrastructure improvements are economic engagement – they should be considered alongside trade, aid, and development policies

Gephardt 2002,   
Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo) was the House Democratic Leader. CENTER FOR Latin AmericanStudies UC Berkeley “Progressive Economic Engagement with Mexico and the World” Winter http://clas.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/pdf/newswinter02.pdf

Everybody agrees that as we enter the 21st century, the global economy requires the United States to seek greater export opportunities. In addition, I believe that a new trade consensus must be rooted in our values. Not only is enhanced trade vital to U.S. economic growth and security, but it can also promote values fundamental to our democratic future: worker rights, environmental protection, and human rights. Working to open global markets and doing more to enhance global living standards will expand U.S., Mexican and global prosperity in the 21st century. Some have called the progressive approach to trade “protectionist.” That is an erroneous label. In fact, progressives are for expanded trade and for the United States meeting its leadership obligations in the international economic arena. However, we believe a broader approach is needed based on three pillars of economic policy: free and fair trade, enhanced development assistance, and debt relief for the poorest nations. Such a program could create more markets for U.S. exports, strengthen the middle class at home and abroad, and maximize our national security through a comprehensive program of engagement in all parts of the world. We need to forge a progressive approach to trade and development and create a new consensus on global economic engagement. At home in North America, we need to do more to promote trade and development with Mexico. NAFTA has been a real success in increasing trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, but it has done little to generate real development in Mexico. Despite the increases in trade, and enhanced Mexican productivity since 1993, a broad Mexican middle class has failed to emerge. Today Mexico is facing a serious recession and maquiladora jobs are leaving as companies move to nations, such as China, where wage rates are lower. Mexico is facing a race to the bottom and America needs to do more to combat this trend. We need to assist the government of President Vicente Fox with enhanced trade, aid and development. America has a great opportunity in the bilateral meetings at the Monterrey summit in March 2002 to work with Mexico on a progressive development plan. As a first step the resources of the North American Development Bank must be freed up to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of new environmental infrastructure along the border. Housing, health, and transportation infrastructure must also be improved at the border.

## A2 States counterplan

### Aff -- No solvency for states

#### The states don’t control the ports of entry.

Combs 2001 Window on State Government - Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2001 State Functions at the Texas-Mexico Border and Cross-Border Transportation http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/border/sfatb2.html

II. Responsibilities of Governmental Agencies and Private Entities at the Texas-Mexico Border Crossings Several U.S. and Mexican federal, state, and local governmental and non-governmental agencies have direct and indirect roles in the Texas-Mexico border crossing process. These agencies regulate the process, enforce laws and regulations, or facilitate the safe movement of cargo and people into the United States. The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) provides and maintains the port of entry facilities used by the federal inspection agencies and state and local agencies. GSA owns all the border stations—except for the Starr-Camargo International Bridge—and is responsible for their design and operation. The federal and state agencies operating in the border station pay rent to GSA based on the amount of space they require.[18] U.S. Federal Agencies The U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Services are the primary federal agencies controlling the northbound, from Mexico into the U.S., border crossing process. They conduct primary and secondary inspections of drivers, passengers, vehicles, and cargo. Inspectors from both agencies have been authorized to perform primary inspections for both customs and immigration purposes. Primary inspections are always conducted at the border crossing. A primary inspection includes quick reviews of personal identification and citizenship, cargo documentation, and vehicle inspection. Secondary inspections are conducted at border crossing lots. Secondary inspections include more detailed reviews of cargo documentation, cargo, and drivers.

### States can’t solve Relations

#### Only a strong federal action solves the aff – the states can’t coordinate with Mexico and the perms solves any reason why state involvement is good.

Wilson & Lee 2013  
 Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “THE STATE OF TRADE, COMPETITIVENESS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING INTHE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER REGION” The State of The Border report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border Border Research Partnership May 2013 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf>

There is no simple answer to the complex challenge of coordinating border planning and management, but a few key ingredients for success can be identified. First, border stakeholders need to be at the table—border experts in Washington and Mexico City are no substitute for those living the implications of policy on a daily basis. Nonetheless, a strong federal role is important. Border communities often work together, but they also compete to attract federal resources and trade flows. The federal agencies are well placed to analyze and balance competing needs, especially in dialogue with border communities. Finally, and hopefully obviously, cross-border collaboration is vital. To strengthen regional competitiveness and security, we need regional coordination.

#### Only federal binational cooperation solves – state action will only make the border less economically efficient and hurt relations.

Wilson & Lee 2013  
 Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “INTRODUCTION” The State of The Border report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border Border Research Partnership May 2013 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf>

For those charged with negotiating the matrix of political and pragmatic challenges that make up the gauntlet of border policy, there are precious few axioms. Even the landmark North American Free Trade Agreement cannot quite frame the entirety of the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Through a historical process of trial and error, the two nations have arrived at, yet not fully implemented, two key concepts that can guide interaction at their shared border: coordination and collaboration. At the border, the United States and Mexico must manage complex transnational problems and remarkable shared opportunities. Watersheds and wildlife pay little attention to national boundaries, and transnational criminal groups actively seek to exploit regulatory and jurisdictional divides. But with a half-trillion dollars in bilateral trade powering the national economies throughout both countries, border management has implications that extend far beyond the border region itself. In such an environment, cooperative binational solutions are often the only solutions. Unfortunately, an institutional void exists that makes managing such complex interaction across the U.S.-Mexico border particularly challenging. While the U.S. State Department and Mexico’s Foreign Ministry formally manage federal government-to-government interaction, a large number of federal agencies, state and local governments also have a significant say in how the border is run. Chief among these is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), formed in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 to better organize U.S. efforts to defend itself from terrorist attacks. The importance of DHS in border interaction cannot be overstated, and its creation represented both a securitization of the border, which made the border thicker for both illicit and legitimate traffic, but also an effort to better coordinate border management. Interagency coordination can also be difficult. Adding to this is the large number of state agencies as well as local governments that must conduct international work with their counterparts in the U.S. or Mexico. While there are formal and de facto agencies that manage our border interactions, no binational organization exists to coordinate efforts across areas such as those examined in this volume: quality of life, trade, security and environment. In a curious way, the border tends to divide east and west as often as north and south. Officials, businesses and civil society in El Paso, for instance, are generally more accustomed to reaching across the border to speak with counterparts in Ciudad Juárez to manage a shared challenge than they are to do so with those in San Diego. While the existence of these north-to-south corridors of activity are natural and beneficial, the relative lack of trans-corridor communication and collaboration can be problematic and work against formulating helpful policies for the entire region. Healthy competition among corridors to attract businesses and federal attention is a sign of a functioning market and democracy, but to the extent that border communities face common issues, they could also benefit by sharing best practices and speaking to their federal governments with a unified voice.

### States can’t solve cooperation

#### Federal action is necessary – coordinated planning is necessary to ensure that there isn’t a mismatch of investment. (Normal means includes state coordination).

Wilson & Lee 2013  
 Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “THE STATE OF TRADE, COMPETITIVENESS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING INTHE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER REGION” The State of The Border report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border Border Research Partnership May 2013 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf>

A key component of how the U.S.-Mexico border functions to facilitate trade has to do with transportation planning. In the absence of strong and coordinated planning, infrastructure investments on one side of the border or in one region can simply feed traffic into a bottleneck in another area. This process is largely managed by the Joint Working Committee on Transportation Planning (JWC), a binational entity chaired by the two countries’ transportation agencies but including representatives from many federal agencies and state departments of transportation. As border communities felt themselves increasingly affected by decisions made in Washington and Mexico City, their insistence on being included in these discussions led to the regional border master plan process, in which state DOTs lead stakeholder discussions on border infrastructure priorities. While this process makes sense from a U.S. perspective (in the absence of a national transportation plan, state DOTs essentially manage and spend federal transportation dollars), this process is somewhat of a mismatch for Mexico’s more centralized political system. The system seems to work better in certain cross-border communities than others, as is seen with California and Baja California’s award-winning master plan.

#### Cooperation key to solve border problems.

Mares & Canovas 2010   
David R. Mares, University of California, San Diego Gustavo Vega Cánovas, El Colegio de México “The U.S.-Mexico Relationship: Towards a New Era?” Mexico and the United States: Confronting the Twenty-First Century http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11646.pdf

In other words, the US and Mexico are in this struggle against crime together. The public in both countries demand that the border be better secured in both directions against the drugs, money, weapons and individuals feeding this crime. Despite the frustrations many on the US side feel as they read sensationalist press accounts, there is no way of ‘fixing’ the border that can provide security for the US without also providing it for Mexico. The expectation by some that the US can ‘seal the border’ against illicit entry of goods and individuals is simply impossible. Even making significant progress toward it would impose economic and social costs on Mexico that would create an even more desperate situation south of the border, thereby producing even greater threats to US national security. The two countries can either address these demands for security in a more effective manner (and that means doing many things differently) or divert significant human and capital resources from meeting the economic challenges of globalization into an ineffective search for security from crime. Although the levels of violence have declined in 2009 their continuation at historically high levels indicates that the level of trans-national cooperation between the Mexican and the United States governments is not optimal in this area. Given the magnitude of the violence issue, professionalizing the police and reforming the judicial system are necessary but insufficient responses. Ultimately the penal system should not simply take criminals off the streets, but deter crime. The US model of dealing with crime after the fact is too expensive (manpower, court time, jail cells and parole infrastructure) and the severely negative underlying social and economic conditions in Mexico can generate a neverending supply of criminals to overwhelm whatever judicial and police reforms the country adopts.

### A2 – States - Perm

#### Coordinated Federal-State efforts solve best – resolves piecemeal problems of the CP

Regan 2011   
Sean Regan Commander, U.S. Coast Guard NAVAL WAR COLLEGE U.S. – MEXICO POLICY COORDINATION AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY BORDER POLICY COORDINATION EFFORT A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations. 2011 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555536.pdf

Each department and agency has distinct purposes and authorities that span issues ranging from law enforcement to commerce management. Sporadic and disjointed efforts result in departments working toward common end-states (i.e. improved POE development) but doing so in an uncoordinated and non-supporting manner. National efforts to synchronize a whole-of-government approach have been haphazard. Across the border, the GoM has its own bureaucratic structure but suffers from the same challenges. These federal-level challenges are both independent of and repeated within, the numerous state and local agencies that have their own policies and processes. Enhancing coordination among the stakeholders involved in the crossing process provides an opportunity to achieve many benefits including increased security, and reduced system costs through a predictable and coordinated policy structure.

## A2 Politics

### Link Turns

#### There is bipartisan agreement on passing the Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act

Cuellar 13 ("Henry Cuellar." Congressmen Cuellar, McCaul, Vela, O'Rourke, Gallego, and Farenthold Introduce the Bipartisan "Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2013" Mar. 2013. <http://cuellar.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=323781>.Congressmen Cuellar, McCaul, Vela, O’Rourke, Gallego, and Farenthold; Press Release; associate’s degree from Laredo Community College, Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., Graduated from Georgetown Cum Laude, master’s degree in International Trade at Texas A&M International University, 1981 law firm, 1983 licensed custom broker, Adjunct Professor for International Commercial Law, TAMIU, Texas State Representative from 1987 until appointed as the Texas Secretary of State in 2001, Laredo’s State Representative, etc. in <http://cuellar.house.gov/biography/>)

Congressmen Henry Cuellar (TX-28), Michael McCaul (TX-10), Filemon Vela (TX-34), Beto O’Rourke (TX-16), Pete Gallego (TX-23), and Blake Farenthold (TX-27) introduced today H.R. 1108, the Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2013. This bipartisan bill gives U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) the authority to enter into public-private partnerships with local governments and private sector entities. As federal resources remain scarce, entering into these partnerships will allow CBP to seek alternate sources of funding to ensure its essential needs are met. Federal law currently prohibits CBP from accepting any non-federal funding. “Every day, over a billion dollars in commerce flows across the U.S.-Mexico border, making Mexico one of our most important trade partners and a crucial partner in supporting the U.S. economy and jobs,” said Congressman Cuellar, Member of the House Appropriations Committee. “Because of the crucial role CBP plays in supporting the efficient and effective flow of goods between our two countries, we must leverage every available resource to make sure that CBP has the tools it needs to do its job well, keep lines short and move goods and people across the border efficiently. I look forward to working with my colleagues, Senator John Cornyn, Congressmen Michael McCaul, Filemon Vela, Beto O’Rourke, Pete Gallego, and Blake Farenthold to respond to the needs of local stakeholders in both the public and private sectors and speed up the flow of traffic at our ports of entry.” “The Border Trade Alliance applauds this bipartisan group of leaders for seeking innovative ways to fund border infrastructure and enhance staffing levels at our ports of entry. In a time of constrained federal budgets, we must acknowledge that the federal government won’t always be able to develop infrastructure along our borders to keep pace with the volumes of trade our country conducts with Canada and Mexico. Engaging the private sector and local communities to seek solutions along our borders is the right move at the right time. The BTA stands at the ready to help advance this needed bill through the legislative process,” said Jesse Hereford, Chairman of the Border Trade Alliance in San Antonio. “Our company owns an international bridge port of entry spanning the border with Mexico. This legislation provides a viable and creative bi-partisan tool to help respond to our country’s fiscal needs by stretching our resources to secure us economically and physically. We look forward to the president signing this legislation,” said Sam F. Vale, President of Starr-Camargo Bridge Company. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) introduced companion legislation, S. 178, the Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2013 on January 30, 2013. “I represent a district that runs 800 miles along the Texas-Mexico border and includes five points of entry,” said Congressman Gallego (TX-23). “I’m happy to support avenues that modernize our ports, improve security, and facilitate trade and commerce. Better infrastructure allows trade and commerce to move more efficiently helping small businesses and local economies flourish.” “With ever increasing demands on our CBP by growing trade traffic, the private sector has stepped up and offered to help alleviate delays and improve border security, and help pay for it,” said Congressman Farenthold. “All we have to do is say yes. The Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act improves service, saves money, and is a yes to a good, cost effective public-private partnership.”

#### **The Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act provides CBP with the needed resources and implements new infrastructure and increased staff at POEs**

Cuellar 13 ("Henry Cuellar." Congressmen Cuellar, McCaul, Vela, O'Rourke, Gallego, and Farenthold Introduce the Bipartisan "Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2013" Mar. 2013. <http://cuellar.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=323781>.Congressmen Cuellar, McCaul, Vela, O’Rourke, Gallego, and Farenthold; Press Release; associate’s degree from Laredo Community College, Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., Graduated from Georgetown Cum Laude, master’s degree in International Trade at Texas A&M International University, 1981 law firm, 1983 licensed custom broker, Adjunct Professor for International Commercial Law, TAMIU, Texas State Representative from 1987 until appointed as the Texas Secretary of State in 2001, Laredo’s State Representative, etc. in <http://cuellar.house.gov/biography/>)

The Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2013 aims to provide alternatives to CBP so restricted federal funding does not prevent them from carrying out their duties efficiently and effectively. This flexibility allows CBP to leverage its limited resources and acquire additional tools and financing to speed up the flow of traffic at border ports of entry. These partnerships will support the construction and maintenance of CBP facilities and infrastructure and provide funding to hire addition staff at ports of entry. “Our land ports of entry must be secure and they must provide for the free flow of commerce. Both are vital to our economic and national security,” said Congressman McCaul, Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee. “Allowing CBP to partner with local governments and private stakeholders will maximize the value of limited taxpayer resources, and it will enable the private sector, which drives our economy and creates jobs, to proactively improve the efficiency of cross-border operations.” “Securing our ports of entry and facilitating trade across the border is critical to our vibrant local economy,” said Congressman Vela. “This bill is a win-win for consumers and taxpayers, allowing CBP to use all the available resources at their disposal to maximize trade between our two nations while improving efficiency.” “Our ports of entry are the foundation of El Paso’s economy. The $80 billion in trade flowing through them each year and the $2 billion Juarenses annually contribute to our local economy help support 100,000 jobs in the region,” said Congressman O’Rourke. “The safe, efficient and predictable movement of goods and people across our borders is central to creating a 21st Century border policy. The Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act will provide effective new tools to CBP to improve infrastructure, expand capacity, and increase staffing at our ports of entry without creating any new costs for the federal government. I am proud to be part of this bi-partisan legislation that will help El Paso and other border communities thrive and I will do everything I can to get it passed.”

#### There is bipartisanship to invest in ports of entry

Ramos 13 (Ramos, Kristian. "Updating Ports of Entry Will Help Preserve Our Vital Trade with Mexico | 21st Century Border." 21st Century Border. 07 June 2013. <http://21border.com/2013/06/07/updating-ports-of-entry-will-help-preserve-our-vital-trade-with-mexico/>.Arizona Daily Star, policy director of the Washington-based New Policy Institute’s 21st Border Initiative; A project of NPI; works on Immigration, Hispanic Demographics and the Southwest Border. Before working at NDN, Kristian worked in the United States Senate for Majority Leader Harry Reid in the Senate Democratic Communications Center. While working for the Democratic Communications Center, Kristian was responsible for helping to coordinate events with the Democratic Caucus, while monitoring national news media for issues affecting Senate Democrats. Prior to working for Senate Majority Leader Reid, Kristian worked for the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the largest Latino civil rights and advocacy groups in the country. He is currently pursuing to a master's degree in Government at Johns Hopkins University.)

The immigration legislation making its way through Congress addresses legalization, border security, a transition to a more skills-based legal-immigration system and the national adoption of E-Verify. There is a growing bipartisan and bicameral consensus, however, about another key aspect of the emerging legislation as it relates to the border region, which deserves equal attention, if not more – the need to invest in, and modernize, our ports of entry with Mexico. With the addition of a much tougher border-security regime in recent years, this doubling of our trade with Mexico – trade that is creating jobs on both sides of the border – in such a short period of time is putting strain on all 42 ports of entry that 70 percent of this trade flows through. According to a new study, delays at U.S.-Mexico border crossings costs the U.S. $7.8 billion annually, and could cost us more than $20 billion a year by 2020. With the help of Arizona Sens. John McCain and Jeff Flake, the Senate border and immigration bill intelligently addresses the new realities of a much more robust U.S.-Mexico trade relationship in two significant ways. Few states would benefit more from these investments than Arizona, and particularly my hometown of Tucson. At a recent forum in Washington, D.C., Tucson Mayor Jonathan Rothschild said: “Our relationship with Mexico is a symbiotic relationship with the potential to yield vast dividends, both financially and culturally. Trade with Mexico generates jobs for Tucson in exports, logistics, supply-chain management, tourism, scientific, technical and professional expertise – but in order for Tucson to be a hub for international trade, we need the right infrastructure at the border.” The stakes for Arizona in this debate are high. Mexico is Arizona’s top foreign-export market, and fully $13 billion a year of trade flows between Arizona and Mexico each year. In Pima County fully 5 percent of all taxable sales revenue comes from visitors from Mexico. So cutting border wait times that discourage trade and tourism from Mexico is clearly one of the most important economic development priorities for those in Tucson and the rest of Arizona. The border and immigration legislation emerging from Congress will do a great deal to improve the economy of Southern Arizona in the years ahead. Smart and strategic investments in our ports of entry will allow increased movement of people and goods across our border with Mexico, helping create jobs and strengthening local businesses. The new immigration and border bill, if passed by Congress, could give a real and significant boost to the region’s economy and help ensure the years ahead are prosperous ones.

#### **Expanding ports of entry will get bipartisan support.**

IMPERIAL VALLEY PRESS STAFF March 29, 2013 Our View: Senators' support could bring funding to port http://www.mcall.com/topic/ivp-our-view-senators-support-could-bring-funding-to-port-20130329,0,5954251.story

The Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act, sponsored by Texas U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, would allow for P3 financing of port of entry projects. The bill was reintroduced to the Senate in January but has no cosponsors. In their letter to the senators, Imperial County officials encourage Boxer and Feinstein to sign on as cosponsors. A House bill on the P3 financing, sponsored by Rep. Henry Cuellar of Texas, has seven cosponsors, including Rep. Juan Vargas, who represents Imperial County. Unfortunately, funding for the Calexico West port expansion project has been frozen for years and likely won’t be unfrozen before 2015, according to those connected with the project. If the Calexico West port is expanded and thereby made more efficient, Imperial County’s safety, economy and air quality would improve. A more efficient port would mean cuts in border wait times, which often top two hours. If cars are idling at the port for shorter amounts of time, air quality in Imperial County (and Mexicali) likely would improve. In a country with a truly functioning Congress, P3 financing to improve our nation’s ports of entry would get bipartisan support and sail through both houses. As Congress works now, though, Imperial County leaders can only do their part and hope for the best. They’ve done that. Now the hoping begins.

#### Improving POE’s has bipartisan agreement

Ramos 2013   
Kristian Ramos is New Democracy Network’s Policy Director of the 21st Century Border Initiative, “Realizing the Strategic National Value of our Trade, Tourism and Ports of Entry with Mexico” The New Policy Institute is the educational affiliate of the NDN, a think tank based in Washington, DC. May 2013 http://ndn.org/sites/default/files/blog\_files/NPI%20U%20S%20-Mexico%20Trade%20Tourism%20POE%20Report\_0.pdf

Key policies and infrastructure can either help or hinder this enormous economic exchange. Forty-seven U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry facilitate several hundreds of billions dollars in U.S.-Mexico trade every year. Ideally, ports of entry should act as membranes, facilitating healthy interactions (such as legitimate trade and travel) and preventing unhealthy ones (such as illicit drugs, firearms and human smuggling). And ideally much of the actual inspection and clearance should occur “upstream” from the ports. Broad bipartisan agreement has developed on the need to improve our land ports of entry with Mexico. This is because over seventy percent of NAFTA trade flows through these ports of entry as well as an enormous flow of visitors who have a major economic impact on the United States. Twenty-three states have Mexico as their number one or number two trading partner, multiplying jobs in both countries.

#### Plan is supported by bipartisan groups- this letter proves

Brownsville Herald Oct 02 2010 “Senators: U.S. Must Invest in Infrastructure, Personnel at International Bridges” <http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=InNews&ContentRecord\_id=8fca6ad8-c12f-4b06-82fe-fad0ccbc76c4>

The state’s members of the U.S. House of Representatives have lobbied unsuccessfully in the past for increased funding at the ports of entry. But the letter supported by a bipartisan group of senators represents the first time that a push has been made in the Senate, where previous legislation stalled. Franz said the United States has invested billions in border security, such as the controversial border fence and an ineffective technology program. But trade between the U.S. and Mexico has increased by 41 percent in the past year, overwhelming federal agents who must combat the illegal flow of drugs, money and weapons at the ports. “In the rush to secure the border, the focus was on areas between the ports of entry,” Franz said. “Everybody thought we were fine at the ports, but that was a false assumption.”

#### There is growing bipartisan for improving US-Mexico POE’s

Kristian Ramos, Arizona Daily Star, June 7, 2013 New Democracy Network’s Policy Director of the 21st Century Border Initiative, “Updating Ports of Entry Will Help Preserve Our Vital Trade with Mexico” <http://kuldrahaks.net/NewMexicoTourism/jobs-in-mexico-tourism>

The immigration legislation making its way through Congress addresses legalization, border security, a transition to a more skills-based legal-immigration system and the national adoption of E-Verify. There is a growing bipartisan and bicameral consensus, however, about another key aspect of the emerging legislation as it relates to the border region, which deserves equal attention, if not more – the need to invest in, and modernize, our ports of entry with Mexico.” Modernizing our ports of entry is now an urgent national economic priority, and one of particular importance to Southern Arizona. Despite a recession and slow growth on the U.S. side of the border and security challenges on the Mexican side, the trade relationship between our two countries has exploded in recent years. According to a recently released study (co-authored by Arizonan Erik Lee), trade between the U.S. and Mexico has increased from $300 billion in 2009 to a staggering $536 billion last year. Mexico is now the U.S.’ third-largest trading partner and second-largest export market. Six million jobs in the U.S. are now dependent on U.S.-Mexico trade. All of these numbers, of course, will increase as trade flows continue to grow in the years ahead.

### A2 – Immigration PTX - Case turns the DA

#### Underinvestment in ports turns the DA – negates the value of visas and migration from Mexico.

Ducheny, 6/27/2013  
 Denise Moreno Duchen is a former state senator & an immigration lawyer. Border Security? Billions Could Be Lost if Entry Ports Aren’t Improved Imperial Beach Patch, http://mexicoinstitute.wordpress.com/2013/06/28/border-security-billions-could-be-lost-if-entry-ports-arent-improved/

Our Customs and Border Patrol agents need the resources to focus on stopping drug traffickers, money launderers, arms traffickers and to build cooperation across borders to stop criminal enterprises and detect those who would seek entry anywhere in North American to endanger our citizens. Underfunding the important work done at every airport, seaport and land Port of Entry by not fully staffing these facilities is counterproductive. Failing to employ the tools of modern technology to secure cargo at the point of origin—and thereby allow billions of dollars worth of goods to flow expeditiously along roads from southern Mexico to Canada—is shortsighted at best. The pending immigration bill includes some improvements in the visa quota system that will encourage more travel across our borders with lawful documentation. It provides the opportunity for many who have worked years in the U.S. to visit family in Mexico again with travel documents that will allow them to use our Ports of Entry and avoid the clutches of smuggling operations. It provides opportunities for short-term work and return, again with full screening of documents at Ports of Entry. All of these measures—combined with a stronger, modernized system for employers to verify the work authorization of employees—will strengthen our economy and greatly reduce the incentives built into the current system that encourage unauthorized entry and visa overstay. Today more than 6 million U.S. jobs depend on our trade relationship with Mexico. More than $38 billion worth of cargo move through the Otay Mesa Port of Entry alone every year—even with the barriers presented by hours long waits and the inadequate single-lane road trucks use to reach the Port. Millions of vehicle passengers and pedestrians are asked to wait in 2- and 3-hour lines at the San Ysidro and Calexico ports of entry just to be able to spend tourist and consumer purchase dollars in California because we have failed to make the modest investments necessary to modernize these facilities and fully staff them. Over the last several years, Border Patrol staff has increased to unprecedented levels, hundreds of miles of expensive fences have been built, sensors and video surveillance cameras have been put in place. Now is the time to move to our next level of true security—creating a strong North American market where goods and consumers can travel easily about the continent, improving prosperity to the entire region, and allowing Customs and Border Protection officers to effectively do their jobs.

#### Immigration Reform fails without the plan.

Hing 2011  
 Bill Ong Hing Professor of Law University of San Francisco University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2011-29 THINKING BROADLY ABOUT IMMIGRATION REFORM BY ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES (also in book chapter in MONA PARSA AND DEBORAH ROBINSON, EDS., LEGAL BRIEFS ON IMMIGRATION REFORM FROM 25 OF THE TOP LEGAL MINDS IN THE COUNTRY, 2011). <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1811022>

Some may find my position contradictory. In addition to legalization for the undocumented, I advocate open labor migration opportunities for nationals of NAFTA countries in the same manner as EU nationals have within the EU. That position is grounded in the rights that I believe workers should hold inherently as well as the fact that U.S. businesses need workers. On the other hand, my call for deep investment in Mexico, if heeded, will result in more employment opportunities in Mexico, encouraging Mexicans to stay home. This is important for Mexico; Mexico‘s loss of able-bodied workers is not a good idea, as Mexico will need workers to build its economy and infrastructure with the investment funds. Is this really a contradiction? I think not. First of all, since there are millions of workers involved, both outcomes can coexist; it will be a matter of balance. But in the long run, I believe that more Mexican workers will stay at home, rather than traveling to work.

### Answers to they say “DA Turns Case – Security”

#### **The DA doesn’t turn our case – the aff alone is preferable because it doesn’t build a border fence and solves the impact to the DA.**

Ducheny, 6/27/2013  
 Denise Moreno Duchen is a former state senator & an immigration lawyer. Border Security? Billions Could Be Lost if Entry Ports Aren’t Improved Imperial Beach Patch, http://mexicoinstitute.wordpress.com/2013/06/28/border-security-billions-could-be-lost-if-entry-ports-arent-improved/

As the national debate over immigration reform moves forward, we are hearing a lot of uninformed rhetoric about border security. The one portion of the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, which has been debated on the floor of the U.S. Senate this month and succumbed to rhetoric and fear over reality and facts are the provisions related to border security. Proposed amendments seek to move it further from strategic investment to wasteful spending. The broadest, and ultimately most realistic view of our security, would acknowledge what those of us who live in places like San Diego, El Paso, Buffalo and Seattle recognize instinctively that we are not secure unless our neighbors are secure. Realistic concerns in these days of renegade terrorists, drug cartel wars and new strains of disease (remember SARS and swine flu pandemics?) cannot be confronted with fences and constricted border crossings. It depends, rather, on an increasingly integrated economic system that provides prosperity, improved quality of life, sustainable development of shared watersheds, air sheds and communities whose children grow up with the education that provides opportunities for advancement not tied to drug trafficking and other criminal enterprises. What will make us most secure is improved economic prosperity throughout North America—in the United States and for our neighbors in Canada and Mexico. The best long-term deterrent to the many who have sought employment in the U.S. by skirting the current strict quota system is to improve the economy of the North American region. We must continue to support the substantial economic growth Mexico has experienced over recent years by enhancing the trade and tourism relationship we already share. The billions of dollars proposed for so-called border Security in the legislation that received a majority vote Thursday in the Senate would be best spent to enhance the trade relationship with Mexico and Canada by investing in modernizing and building new infrastructure to facilitate the 99 percent of cross-border traffic which is legitimate, so law enforcement can focus their attention on blocking access to criminals, smugglers and those who would do us harm.

#### Without adequate border crossing infrastructure- increased border security will just push illicit movement to the ports.

Meissner, et al 2013  
 Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow and Director, MPI US Immigration Policy Program Muzaffar Chishti, Director, MPI Office at NYU School of Law Donald M. Kerwin, Executive Director, Center for Migration Studies Claire Bergeron Research Assistant with the US Immigration Policy Program at MPI, “Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery” Migration Policy Institute http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf

The POE mission is arguably the most difficult and complex element of border security. CIW’s immigration inspectors question, under oath, persons seeking entry in order to determine their admissibility. POEs are responsible for both facilitation of legitimate trade and travel — which are vital for the economies and social well-being of the United States and most countries around the world — and for preventing the entry of a small but potentially deadly number of dangerous people as well as lethal goods, illicit drugs, and contraband. As border security improves and border enforcement makes illegal crossing between ports ever more difficult, the potential for misuse of legal crossing procedures builds and can be expected to steadily increase. CBP estimates that it processed more than 340 million travelers in FY 2011.172 With such volumes, inspectors have very little time on average to determine whether a traveler is authorized to enter. Covert testing by GAO at land, sea, and airport entry points from 2003-07 found that inspectors routinely failed to detect counterfeit documents or did not request documents at all.” A separate study found that the probability of an unau thorized migrant being apprehended while passing illegally through a POE was about one-half as high as the probability of being apprehended while crossing between ports of entry.”4 Persons seeking to cross illegally have growing incentives to try to enter at a POE, rather than risk their lives crossing illegally between ports.

#### Only the aff solves the weak link.

Meissner, et al 2013  
 Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow and Director, MPI US Immigration Policy Program Muzaffar Chishti, Director, MPI Office at NYU School of Law Donald M. Kerwin, Executive Director, Center for Migration Studies Claire Bergeron Research Assistant with the US Immigration Policy Program at MPI, “Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery” Migration Policy Institute http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf

Meeting the physical infrastructure needs at POEs has not kept pace with advances in documentation and screening developments. Communities such as Nogales, AZ, for example, have two ports that typically handle 15,000 pedestrian and 20,000 vehicle crossings daily (3.5 million pedestrians and 4.7 million vehicles annually). The POEs are equipped with technology that permits loo percent license plate reading and document scanning. However, when traffic wait times exceed 60 minutes, inspectors typically “flush” traffic through, pulling aside only obvious high-risk crossers, in an effort to reconcile their facilitation and enforcement missions under trying conditions. Despite significant advances, land ports have not experienced improvements on par with those realized between ports. As a result, the potential for land POE inspections to be a weak link remains a critical enforcement challenge.

### Answers to they say “DA Turns Case – Economy”

#### DA doesn’t turn the case – only adequate infrastructure can address the economic problems that are the root cause.

Fischler, 2013  
Jacob Fischler covers law enforcement, courts and general assignments for The Monitor The Monitor, May 28, 2013 “Mexican trade — and tourists — are boon for U.S. businesses” http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/article\_3bf218a2-c734-11e2-b19a-001a4bcf6878.html

A study released earlier this month by NDN, a center-left think-tank based in Washington, D.C., shows trade and tourism between the two countries is at an all-time high. Trade between the two nations in 2012 was estimated at $535 billion. That number is up from $300 billion in 2009, a number that’s projected to double by this year, said Simon Rosenberg, the president of NDN. Texas leads all states with almost $200 billion in imports and exports with Mexico. Trade with Mexico sustains almost 6 million U.S. jobs, the NDN study said. In the Rio Grande Valley, tourists provide the biggest Mexican boost to the economy. “We really rely heavily on the Mexican market,” said Nancy Millar, the director of the McAllen Chamber of Commerce’s Convention and Visitors Bureau. The economic downturn in 2008 — which coincided with a spike in cartel violence — hurt Mexican tourism to the Valley, Millar said. Prior to those phenomena, 35 percent of income to McAllen’s tourism industry came from Mexico, she said, and it remains a vital part of McAllen’s economy. “There’s no doubt we have a much stronger economy than we would without them — 35 percent stronger,” she said. The NDN report called on lawmakers to use the immigration reform bill to increase the number of ports of entry and staffing of Customs and Border Protection officers at the border to expedite travel from Mexico to the U.S. “The customs department of (the Department of Homeland Security) is going to have to grow with trade and legal tourism,” Rosenberg said. “We’ve got to invest more in border infrastructure. We’ve got to cut down on wait times.” Doing so would also help eliminate barriers to further trade between the two countries, said Shannon O’Neil, a senior policy fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. And further trade means growing economies on both sides of border, particularly in areas near the border. “When a Ford plant opens in Mexico, it increases employment in the U.S.,” O’Neil said. That is because manufacturing companies take advantage of the free-trade laws that allow easy passage between North American nations to produce different parts in different places for the same finished product. “Up to 40 percent of a product that’s ‘made in Mexico’ actually comes from here originally,” she said. That’s a departure from just 10 to 20 years ago when most Mexican exports to the U.S. were natural resources like gas, she added. But reducing waiting times for Mexican tourists to enter the country is only one part of a formula to further improve trade. Border violence has to be controlled. “What’s been interesting is you’ve seen economic growth in Mexico even as security has worsened,” O’Neil said. But she doesn’t see that trend continuing. “In the long term, I don’t see how prosperity and growth that people hope for can continue if you can’t guarantee safety,” she said. “Economic growth and security have to go hand in hand.” Rosenberg believes economic growth can help bring security. “Improving the economy on both sides of the border has to be seen as part of the strategy to weaken transnational criminal organizations,” he said. “One of the ways to attack the cartels is to show that Mexicans have good jobs.”

### Answers to they say “immigration politics is a precondition to the aff”

#### Immigration reform is not a precondition to the case – cooperation with Mexico come first.

Graybeal 2011  
Michael Graybeal is the program coordinator for the Americas Program. He joined CSIS in May 2010 after receiving his M.A. in Latin American studies from Georgetown University. “Mexico's Economic Policy and Migration

Dealing with the Causes” MAY 12, 2011 Center for Strategic and International Studies http://csis.org/files/publication/110509\_Graybeal\_MexicoEconPolicy\_Web.pdf

The United States must reexamine the assumption that immigration reform is the precondition for making progress on other fronts. Doris Meissner, senior fellow at the Migration Policy Institute, argued that immigration reform may or may not happen, but most likely not in the short term. Instead, while continuing to push for immigration reform, advocates must think in new terms, focusing on the interconnectedness of the United States with Mexico and Central America. By increasing the focus on this dynamic, policymakers will increasingly recognize that immigration is a regional issue and best addressed through the lens of long-term competitiveness. By doing so, more effort could be made to address building up the region’s human capital infrastructure.

### Impact turn - Immig Bill Bad – Mexico Relations

#### The Immigration bills damages US Mexico relations because border security provisions treat Mexico as an enemy – only the plan solves.

Washington Post 6/27/13 In Mexico, dismay for the border ‘surge’ proposed in U.S. Senate immigration bill http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the\_americas/in-mexico-dismay-for-the-border-surge-proposed-in-us-senate-immigration-bill/2013/06/27/69677776-df5a-11e2-8cf3-35c1113cfcc5\_story.html

Mexicans have reacted sorely to proposals for a border security “surge” that would put 18,000 additional federal agents and hundreds of miles of new fencing between the two neighbors, measures that were included in a package of immigration legislation approved by the Senate on Thursday. Coming less than two months after President Obama heaped praise on Mexico’s progress and its importance as a top trading partner, the Senate bill debate and the security buildup offered by the amendment, known as Corker-Hoeven, has reminded Mexicans that much of the United States views their country warily. Mexico is the largest source of illegal drugs and unauthorized migrants entering the United States. But Mexicans have bristled at a debate that has focused heavily on building new walls along the border, rather than wider doors for legitimate trade and migration to pass through. Of the estimated 11 million immigrants living unlawfully in the United States, at least 6 million are believed to be from Mexico. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration has kept noticeably quiet on the U.S. debate, saying only that his government supports the reform effort. However, the $46 billion in additional security measures offered by the amendment prompted Mexican officials to break their silence this week, when Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade told reporters here that “fences don't unite.” “Fences are not a solution to the migration phenomenon, and they are not congruent with a safe and modern border,” Meade said. “They don’t contribute to the development of a competitive region that both countries are trying to build.” Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Tex.), whose district includes the busy border crossing of Laredo, said he has heard similar criticisms from Mexican business leaders dismayed by the “negative connotations” of additional barriers between two countries doing more than a billion dollars worth of trade each day. “You tell Mexicans that we need a border ‘surge’ and everyone thinks of the surge in Iraq, as if we’re saying they’re an enemy to overcome,” Cuellar said. “I’m for strong border security, but a fence is a 14th-century solution to a 21st-century problem.”

#### Modernization of border infrastructure is a precondition for Mexico’s cooperation on immigration reform. Only the plan solves.

Christian Science Monitor 6/26/13 Mexico breaks silence on US immigration bill: 'Walls aren't the solution '

<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2013/0626/Mexico-breaks-silence-on-US-immigration-bill-Walls-aren-t-the-solution>

US lawmakers are considering extending the border fence as part of the added security measures that would accompany plans to provide legal status to more than 11 million immigrants, the majority of them Mexican. Foreign Minister José Antonio Meade said the legislation would benefit Mexico’s countrymen in the US. But he also warned that the proposed fence extension could impact commerce, and the enormous legal flow of products and people across the border each day. “Walls aren’t the solution to the migratory phenomenon, and they aren’t congruent with a modern and secure border,” he told media on Tuesday. “They don’t contribute to the development of the competitive region that both countries want to encourage.” Seventy percent of bilateral commerce happens over the border via trucks, and it’s worth $1 million per minute, Mr. Meade said. More than 1 million people cross the US-Mexico border legally every day. Mexico has been publicly quiet in recent years on the US debate over immigration reform after former President Vicente Fox's vocal push for US reform appeared to some to be an overreach. He made specific demands, including wanting to see reform by "year end." That was in early September 2001, days before the 9/11 terrorist attacks that would set the country on a new course and see immigration reform fall by the wayside. During the current US debate, the Mexican government has kept mum – at least publicly – on the legislation, saying the debate is an internal domestic issue. But Meade said that Mexico has sustained a “permanent dialogue” with everyone involved since lawmakers began crafting the bill. “Our country has let the United States government know that measures that could affect links between [border] communities detract from the principles of shared responsibility and neighborliness that both nations agreed upon.” On the issue of shared responsibility: Over the past year, Mexico has found itself in the uncomfortable position of deterring increased illegal immigration through its own territory. Illegal immigration between Mexico and the US fell to net zero last year, meaning that the number of crossers and returnees roughly canceled each other. However, in Texas’ Rio Grande Valley, US authorities saw an increase in apprehensions of migrants – the vast majority from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, according to a report by the Washington Office on Latin America. Mexico recently announced that Marines would take over securing its southern border. As the US debate over the Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 gains steam, Meade noted Mexico’s requests are rooted in its desire for stronger economic development. These include the modernization of the infrastructure and administration of border ports of entry and measures that better facilitate the transit of products and people. During last month’s meeting in Mexico, Presidents Enrique Peña Nieto and Barack Obama promoted the idea of a unified economic region saying they could better compete globally, together.

#### US-Mexico relations are precondition to immigration reform solvency.

Papademetriou , Meissner, & Sohnen May 2013   
Demetrios G. Papademetriou is President and Co-Founder of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), a Washington-based think tank dedicated exclusively to the study of international migration ; Doris Meissner, former Commissioner of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), is a Senior Fellow at MPI, where she directs the Institute’s US immigration policy work. Eleanor Sohnen is a Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, where she works for the Regional Migration Study Group. Ms. Sohnen previously served as a consultant to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) “Thinking Regionally to Compete Globally: Leveraging Migration and Human Capital in the U.S., Mexico, and Central America” Migration Policy Institute and the Wilson Center. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/rmsg_final_report>

Such cooperation will not eliminate the asymmetrical nature of bilateral and regional relationships on migration or the inherent difficulties of coordination on the issue. Nonetheless, most observers see an unambiguous need for exploring the possibility of reaching consensus around shared goals with Mexico and in the region that govern how the pieces fit together. US immigration reform legislation, if it succeeds, will in fact have to rely on far greater cooperation with Mexico (and the other countries of interest to this effort) in the implementation of the earned legalization and “future flows” parts of the legislation. Discussion on these issues must start in earnest if the aims and benefits of the new law for the people of the region, including US citizens and residents, are to be realized. Moreover, without far more organic US-Mexico and regional consultations and cooperation on the implementation of the law, the status quo of mostly ad hoc sets of projects that lack broader strategic cohesion or meaning will continue to define how the United States works with the region, and vice versa. That would be truly a lost opportunity.

## A2 – China DA

### No Internal Link

#### Chinese-Mexican relations are just grandstanding – there’s no actual partnership.

Chris Devonshire-Ellis , 6/7/13 principal and founding partner of Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm provides investment legal and cross border tax advice to mid-cap MNCs from the United States and Europe into China and Asia “China & Mexico Talk of Strategic Partnership Deal, But Much Remains to be Done” China Briefing <http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/06/07/china-mexico-talk-of-strategic-partnership-deal-but-much-remains-to-be-done.html#sthash.3CaRooza.dpuf>

These sorts of meetings, in my opinion, are an excuse for political grandstanding and media exposure. As a result, they mean very little. While the prospect of Mexican-Chinese JVs to target the U.S. market may seem appealing to both, in actual fact, the Chinese side have little incentive to do so. Mexico has no double taxation agreement (DTA) with China, meaning that Chinese investors are subject to Mexican rates of corporate income tax (CIT) and related taxes with no treaty to offset these. Mexico has a higher rate of CIT at 28 percent than China at 25 percent. Although that doesn’t sound like a huge difference – it is more than enough to eat into any available profit gains in such competitive markets. Mexico also levies immediate worldwide income tax claims on all residents – something that is not likely to sit well with Chinese investors. The two countries do have an “Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the Peoples Repubic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,” however this dates back to 2008 and the current statements do little, if anything, to expand beyond the framework within. That was penned five years ago at the time of Beijing hosting the Olympics. So this could simply be another example of an agreement written by Mexico to feed their hungry media and to show off their politicians alongside countries that are firmly in the international spotlight, because it contains little of actual substance. So what does the rhetoric actually mean? From the U.S. perspective, probably not a lot. Without any supporting tax agreements, the Mexico-China talk remains just that – talk. Chinese companies have access to U.S. markets anyway and the Mexican tax code is unattractive to them compared with lower rates back in China.

### No Impact

#### China will not challenge US influence in Mexico or Latin America.

Ariel C. Armony 2013; Director of the University of Miami’s Center for Latin American Studies, designated as a Title VI National Resource Center by the U.S. Department of Education, is also the Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies and Professor of International Studies “Conclusions and Debates on the US-Mexico-China Relationship” In "China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations" 5-1-2013 Edited by: Enrique Dussel Peters, Adrian H. Hearn, Harley Shaiken (2013). University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies Publications. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/clas\_publications/3

A careful reading of the chapters in the volume provides clues as to the features of the TR among the United States, Mexico, and China. The following list summarizes some of the most relevant features: The stability of each of the bilateral ties in the triangle: the fundamental relations in the triangle are US-Mexico and US-China. These ties play a vital role for the countries involved—in particular for Mexico’s relationship with the United States. One way in which China can affect the stability of US-Mexico ties is by posing a “hegemonic challenge” to the United States, that is, by “seeking peer status or attempting to become the new hegemon” (Paz 2012:19). China’s consistent strategy of restraint in Latin America and the US-China institutionalized dialogue on Latin America, among other factors, suggest that China will not rise to challenge the hegemony of the United States in Latin America any time soon.2

#### There’s no trade off or competition between China and the US in Latin America.

Chunsi Wu 2013 Chunsi Wu is the executive director of the Institute of International Strategy Studies and research fellow at the Center for American Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS). “U.S.-Mexico-China Relations in the Context of Regional Cooperation: A Chinese Perspective” In "China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations" 5-1-2013 Edited by: Enrique Dussel Peters, Adrian H. Hearn, Harley Shaiken (2013). University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies Publications. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/clas\_publications/3

Secondly, although the U.S. pays close attention to China’s engagement with Latin American countries, it knows that China does not really have the capability to challenge the position of the United States on the American continent. It is true that Chinese-Latin American relations have developed rapidly over the past ten years, especially in regards to three aspects: Firstly, China has established connections with the entire American continent, not only developing economic relations with the major powers in the region, but also strengthening its cooperation with many medium-sized countries as well as regional organizations. Some countries in the region, however, do not maintain diplomatic relations with Mainland China, and do with Taiwan. Secondly, China has begun to pursue universal cooperation with Latin American nations, with more and more dimensions emerging in its various relationships including tourism, cultural exchange, security issues, climate change, etc. Thirdly, topics of interest between China and Latin American countries have gone beyond the bilateral and regional levels, with these nations exchanging views on the world order and global affairs. Thus, China believes that its relationship with Latin America has “strategic importance.”2 Certain Chinese scholars have pointed out that the Chinese-Latin American relationship has exhibited unprecedented growth in the new century (Zheng and Sun 2009). China’s increasing reinforcement of its relationship with Latin American countries, however, does not imply any intention to enter into geopolitical competition with the United States. Economic development is the primary goal of China’s cooperation with Latin American countries. Indeed, China wants to expand its exchange with Latin American countries to include other areas such as education, culture, politics, security, etc., given China’s belief that one-dimensional relationships are both unhealthy and unsustainable. Chinese-Latin American economic cooperation needs to be both complemented and supported by diplomacy in other areas. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, developing comprehensive relationships with Latin American countries has little to do with strategic or military competition.

### A2 China DA – China in TPP

#### **Including China in the TPP is the only way to solve adversarial US-China competition.**

Prasirtsuk 2013 Kitti Prasirtsuk is Associate Dean for International Affairs in the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University in Bangkok The Implications of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing: A Perspective from Thailand Asia Policy - Number 15, January 2013, pp. 31-37

How should the United States adjust its rebalancing strategy to become a more effective regional partner? The first thing it should do is build up Beijing's confidence that the United States is not working to contain China. Washington should focus on developing economic ties with the region through increased trade and investment rather than on strengthening [End Page 36] military relations, which could lead to confrontation with Beijing. As all countries in Southeast Asia require a peaceful environment, ASEAN expects the United States to re-engage constructively with Asia and not become preoccupied with achieving military goals. Any military mission should be multilateral as much as possible. On trade, the TPP without China would be viewed as a form of containment. To engage China in the TPP would thus be more beneficial for countries in the region. Second, it is advisable that the United States neither generate a dilemma situation whereby regional countries must take sides nor create two poles of power. As mentioned earlier, given that ASEAN states would opt for a hedging strategy, it would be counterproductive for the United States to push too much on its partners. Washington may have to find a "Goldilocks strategy," one that is not too hard and not too soft on China, as well as not too coercive and not too indifferent toward regional partners. Third, the United States should play the role of partner rather than leader in Southeast Asia. Since the situation today is different from that during the Cold War, powerful leadership is not desirable. Washington should respect the principle of ASEAN centrality and key ASEAN norms such as noninterference. In fact, one of the main reasons China has gained so much influence in the region is that Beijing tends to play by ASEAN rules. Therefore, it is desirable to have a U.S. pivot that is less confrontational, more economic-focused, and ASEAN-centered.

### Non Unique – US/Mexico/China

#### China is not a challenger to US economic power in Mexico.

Wang 2013, Ping Wang Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Nankai University, Tianjin, China; senior research fellow of the Institute of Global Studies of Hong Kong and the Chinese Foreign Economic and Trade University “The Impacts of China´s Peaceful Inﬂuence on U.S.-Mexican Relations. A Triangular Perspective” In "China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations" 5-1-2013 Edited by: Enrique Dussel Peters, Adrian H. Hearn, Harley Shaiken (2013). University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies Publications. <http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/clas_publications/3>

There is no doubt that the United States is a superpower, not only among these three countries, but also in the world. Although the International Monetary Fund predicts that China will surpass the U.S. in 2016 to become the world’s largest economy, the fact remains that China is still a developing country and only one of the regional powers in Asia, unlike the United States, which is a leading global superpower. The economic performance of the United States remains very impressive. Even though the economy of the U.S. was signiﬁcantly affected by the international ﬁnancial crisis, and is still in the process of recovering from an economic recession, the United States ﬁnds itself even now in a “unipolar moment” of unchallenged superiority. Therefore, although China is referred to as the second largest economy in the world, such accolades would be dampened if China’s situation were viewed comparatively, as a whole, with the United States. It is clear that China’s economic status has been increasing in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), which is the correct unit of measurement when examining the cost of living. However, “the traditional measure of GDP, calculated in dollars at current exchange rates, [indicates] that the U.S. economy remains nearly six times the size of China’s” (Stallings 2008:241). Furthermore, it is widely known that competitiveness indicates the level of a country’s productivity. According to a report by the World Economic Forum, the U.S. is ranked much higher than both China and Mexico (China: 26th and Mexico: 58th), even though “the U.S. continues its decline for the third year in a row, falling one more place to ﬁfth position” (WEF 2011).

### N/U – US > China

#### US influence still dominant, despite China’s rise

Cerna 11 – graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA (Michael, “China’s Growing Presence,” 4/15, <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/>, CMR)

Even though China has become a major player over the past decade, trade between the China and Latin America still pales in comparison to Latin American-U.S. trade. Regional trade with the U.S. totals $560 billion compared to just over $140 billion in trade with China. But the trend is significant when looking at where China was in 2000 ($13 billion) (Painter, 2008). When we look at Latin American trade over the past decade with both the U.S. and China, one would find that the percentage of trade is slightly shifting. At the beginning of the 2000s the U.S. had more than half of the trade with the region; China had less than 10% for China. Now the U.S. has roughly the same amount of total trade, but China is now nearing 12%. Going back a little further, total U.S. trade in Latin America increased from 7.2% in 1996 to 8.3% in 2009 (Hornbeck, 2011). However, Mexico is the largest trading partner of the U.S., which brings that number up significantly. If trade with Mexico through NAFTA is taken away, U.S. trade growth with Latin America is even less impressive. Meanwhile, Sino-Latin American trade increased tenfold over the last decade and investment has also increased.

#### US still retains predominance in Latin America

Menéndez 5/28/13 (Fernando, economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, a strategic consulting firm providing economic and political analysis to clients, “The Counterbalance in America’s Backyard”, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-counterbalance-in-americas-backyard-2/>, CMR)

Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union – once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons – China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development.

### N/U – Mexico

#### No Chinese influence in Mexico – multiple obstacles

The Economist 6/8/13 (“From pivot to twirl”, <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21579062-chinese-leader-tries-smooth-move-americas-backyard-pivot-twirl>, CMR)

There are big hurdles to overcome, though. The first is that the two countries do not see eye to eye on the size of the trade imbalance. Many Chinese exports to Mexico come indirectly, via America, so China does not count them, says Sergio Ley, a former Mexican ambassador in Beijing.¶ A second problem is a Mexican private sector that believes trade is unfairly stacked in China’s favour, and so keeps its eyes fixed on the American market. Third, Mexico is hitched to an American-led free-trade juggernaut, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that has until now been anathema to China. For all the tequila that Mexico persuades China to buy, it will take more than fancy footwork by Mr Xi and Mr Peña to turn relations from rivalry to revelry.

### China Rise Unsustainable

#### China’s strategy will inevitably backfire – ensures no escalating competition

Scimia 12 (Emanuele, journalist and geopolitical analyst based in Rome, “China pivots to Latin America”, July 18, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/NG18Cb01.html>, CMR)

In spite of its significant economic gains in recent years, China's fast-growing influence in Latin America may backfire, a situation it also faces in Africa. The main sticking point is the same: a trade imbalance, with China exporting almost exclusively manufactured goods towards the region in return for natural resources and raw materials. ¶ Countries like Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Argentina have the potential to export more value added products - Mexico, for instance, as often underscored by ECLAC, and much more than Brazil, is a trade rival of China on the US market. South American countries also complain about the inflow of substandard Chinese goods. ¶ With this backdrop, Latin American countries are gearing up to safeguard their own economies from overdependence on China. Notably, they are lining up with the US and EU against Beijing on the undervalued exchange rate of the yuan and pooling their resources. For instance, Brazilian and Argentine industrial lobbies are making joint efforts to set up a new bilateral body "fighting off growing competition from China", according to a June 27 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit. ¶ In light of the ongoing protectionist trend in Latin America's trade policy, China's proposed FTA with Mercosur appears to be wishful thinking. The EU has sought in vain to strike a free-trade pact with the South American common market since 1995. ¶ Regional and sub-regional institutions in Latin America could play an active role in containing the impact of the Sino-Western race to the continent's riches, notwithstanding their compulsive proliferation and overlapping nature - it is unclear whether organizations such as the Union of Latin American Nations, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, and Mercosur will in future be "clearing houses" or talking shops for grievances with regard to competition between Washington and Beijing along the south-eastern rim of the Pacific Ocean.

### No Internal Link

#### No zero-sum competition for influence – their evidence is hype – prefer experts

Global Times 5/31/13 (“China, US not competing over Latin America: expert”, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Uck5Hfnvtsl>, CMR)

Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region.¶ Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March.¶ While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display."¶ Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." ¶ Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area.¶ "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America.¶ Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said. ¶ China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.

#### No competition for regional influence

Xiaoxia 4/27/13 (Wang, “In America’s Backyard: China in Latin America”, Economic Observer Oneline, <http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml>, CMR)

China's involvement in Latin America doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood; and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S.¶ For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

#### Regional influence not zero-sum

Cerna 11 – graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA (Michael, “China’s Growing Presence,” 4/15, <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/>, CMR)

With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.

### Alt Cause – Asia Pivot

#### Alt cause – Asia, Latin America irrelevant

Hilton 13 – London-based writer and broadcaster, editor of The Independent newspaper (Isabel, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, Feb, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf>, CMR)

China’s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation.

In the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential for increasing competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

### China Influence Bad

#### Impact turn: Chinese influence is bad – explodes trade deficits, risks terrorism, and failure of US leadership – impact is the 1AC

Johnson 5 (Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud­ies, at The Heritage Foundation, “Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America”, Oct 24, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america>, CMR)

However, closer ties to China also have signifi­cant disadvantages for both Latin America and the United States:¶ Growing trade deficits. Latin American lead­ers who sign trade and investment deals with the PRC have noticed that China's exports are more affordable than their own goods, which contributes to trade deficits. Chinese goods are made by laborers who work for one-third of the wages of Latin American counterparts and who tolerate worse working conditions. Officials in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have signaled their unease about trade with such a hot com­petitor. In September 2005, Mexican President Vicente Fox made it clear to visiting President Hu Jintao that dumping electronics and cloth­ing was unacceptable. For every dollar that Mexico makes from exports to China, the PRC makes $31 from exports to Mexico.[9]¶ Disinterest in economic reform. Some ana­lysts believe that the commodities-based trade model used by China will undermine the progress that Latin America has made toward industrialization. While countries like Chile and Brazil have moved beyond raw materials exports, others with powerful presidents or rul­ing oligarchies may be tempted to fall back on plantation economics. Income gaps between the rich and poor may widen as a result. More­over, such narrowly focused economies are vul­nerable to downturns in commodity prices. Some 44 percent of Latin Americans already live below the poverty line. If these countries fail to adopt reforms, social inequality and political instability could depress U.S. exports to the region and increase migration problems.¶ Scramble for resources. To obtain commodi­ties, China offers tempting investments in infra­structure. In contrast, the United States cannot offer direct tie-ins to state industries and can only offer development aid, now in decreasing amounts. Chinese competition may make Mil­lennium Challenge Account (MCA) money a less effective incentive to democratize govern­ments and liberalize markets. The one-to-two year lead time from proposal to disbursement of MCA aid gives volatile governments a chance to back away from market-oriented perfor­mance requirements.¶ Evasion of American-style bottleneck diplo­macy. China's flexibility counters more rigid U.S. approaches. Obtaining any kind of assistance from the United States requires compliance on a battery of restrictions, including observing human rights, protecting the environment, prom­ising not to send U.S. military personnel to the International Criminal Court (ICC),[10] not assist­ing current or former terrorists, and not using U.S.-provided equipment for any other than its stated purpose. American commitments also depend on legislative approval and can be reversed if the mood in the U.S. Congress shifts.¶ Prying eyes on America. From electronic espi­onage facilities in Cuba to port facilities run by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-Shing's Hutchi­son-Whampoa conglomerate in Panama, China has an eye trained on the United States. U.S. intelligence agencies are aware of this, but Washington's penchant for focusing on one threat at a time, such as the war on terrorism, could leave America vulnerable to Chinese industrial and military espionage.¶ What the U.S. Should Do¶ The United States and China have competing inter­ests in Latin America. Washington would like to see its hemispheric neighbors develop into stable, demo­cratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees the region as a source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform for power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In con­trast, China represents an opportunity to temper American dominance with broader alliances.¶ Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries, powerful presi­dents, and influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and indus­trialization that might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of poverty.¶ America's strength is competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that direction. As a good neighbor and in its own and Latin America's interests, the United States should:¶ Accelerate free trade agreements. Free trade agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. pol­icies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricul­tural and steel subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S. trade relations with Andean neighbors (and eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market access for both U.S. and Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth.¶ Adopt more comprehensive relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as counternarcotics, leaves vacu­ums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that other powers can fill. Plan Colombia is working because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism, expand public safety zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the economy, and promote rural peace.[11]¶ Cut red tape on assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest extent possible. Per­formance requirements are blunt instruments that do not cover every situation. Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcot­ics cooperation and Article 98 letters that with­hold security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies in areas of mutual interest. If Congress considers such restrictions absolutely necessary, it should tai­lor them to suspend only economic aid that is not crucial to immediate U.S. interests.¶ Press harder for reforms and use public diplomacy. Once Latin America had elected leaders and fledgling markets in the 1990s, U.S. support for democracy and economic reforms declined. Although each country is responsible for solving its own problems, exter­nal pressure can encourage progress. U.S. pub­lic diplomacy, which is mostly reactive toward Latin America, should be strengthened and more supportive of U.S. development goals.¶ Conclusion¶ The United States has become the greatest power in the world based on its tradition of free choice. Choice goes hand-in-hand with competition, because these keep markets vibrant and govern­ments accountable. In a globalized world, democ­racies have relations with whom they wish and nation-competitors such as China cannot be blocked from visiting the Western Hemisphere. However, the United States can best look after its regional interests by cultivating closer political and security ties with neighbors, advancing free trade, and encouraging respect for the rule of law and lib­eral economic principles among all players- including China.

#### China’s expanding into Latin America---US influence is key to crowd them out and maintain hegemony

Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>, CMR)

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.¶ Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America.¶ In Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the country’s oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy.¶ In Colombia, China is planning a massive “dry canal” to link the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China.¶ In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cuba’s swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba.¶ New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. China’s state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazil’s main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazil’s vast offshore oil fields.¶ The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentina’s petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant.¶ There is good and bad to Beijing’s increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But China’s riches come with strings.¶ For instance, in exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one million barrels per day. It’s worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11 percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S.¶ That brings us to the security dimension of China’s checkbook diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing had “approached every country in our area of responsibility” and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela.¶ The JFQ study adds that China has “an important and growing presence in the region’s military institutions.” Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, “send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC.” In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell “sophisticated hardware…such as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.” The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products.”¶ Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges.¶ To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.¶ This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the region—a challenge that must be answered.¶ First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context.¶ Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.¶ In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.”¶ Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily.¶ That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.¶ Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

### Impact D – No China War

#### No China war---leaders are pragmatic

Goldstein 11—professor emeritus of IR, American U. PhD in pol sci from MIT. Former visiting professor emeritus at Yale (Sept 2011, Joshua, Think Again: War, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war>) CMR

What about China, the most ballyhooed rising military threat of the current era? Beijing is indeed modernizing its armed forces, racking up double-digit rates of growth in military spending, now about $100 billion a year. That is second only to the United States, but it is a distant second: The Pentagon spends nearly $700 billion. Not only is China a very long way from being able to go toe-to-toe with the United States; **it's not clear why it would want to**. A military conflict (particularly with its biggest customer and debtor) would impede China's global trading posture and endanger its prosperity. Since Chairman Mao's death**, China has been hands down the most peaceful great power of its time**. For all the recent concern about a newly assertive Chinese navy in disputed international waters**, China's military hasn't fired a single shot in battle in 25 years.**

"A More Democratic World Will Be a More Peaceful One."

Not necessarily. The well-worn observation that real democracies almost never fight each other is historically correct, but it's also true that democracies have always been perfectly willing to fight non-democracies. In fact, democracy can heighten conflict by amplifying ethnic and nationalist forces, pushing leaders to appease belligerent sentiment in order to stay in power. Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant both believed that selfish autocrats caused wars, whereas the common people, who bear the costs, would be loath to fight. But try telling that to the leaders of authoritarian China, who are **struggling to hold in check**, not inflame, a popular undercurrent of nationalism against Japanese and American historical enemies. Public opinion in tentatively democratic Egypt is far more hostile toward Israel than the authoritarian government of Hosni Mubarak ever was (though being hostile and actually going to war are quite different things).

## A2 –K

### POEs good – bridge Metaphor

#### **The plan is an important and necessary step to emphasize the connectivity of the border as opposed to exclusion.**

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The Mexico–U.S. border exhibits a diverse range of geography, cities, towns, and populations and is bounded by Mexican and U.S. national states. The emphasis has been on how the Mexico–U.S. border deﬁnes the nation state, yet often omitted is the realization that many boundaries frame this expanse. The state of California, for example, where I make my home, is, like other regions and U.S. states, bounded and deﬁned by numerous types of borders. It is not solely the Mexico–U.S. border that deﬁnes the boundaries of the state. The Mexico–U.S. geopolitical boundary frames the south, but California is also bordered and bounded by the Paciﬁc and by other U.S. states—Nevada, Arizona, and Oregon. California’s border to the south is deﬁned as a national border that abuts Mexico, yet it also represents a global condition. The global here refers not only to the intense processes and human mobility of the current period, but also to a deeper identiﬁcation with the Americas. The global border connects the United States to the global south. This is a crucial aspect of the lives of people in Mexico and the southern hemisphere, as well as of those communities that stretch across the borderline. Connections have been instrumental in descriptions of theMexico–U.S. border, yet it is not the border that connects. These connections and crossings are what much of border work is about. But studies of the Mexico–U.S. border continue to be tied, even when discussing crossings, to the horizontal line—that particular cartography, that edge, periphery, and limit—that extends west to east for 2,000 miles from the Playas of Tijuana to the Gulf of Mexico. This bounded-horizontalness, this gaze, is emphasized by particular texts that have deﬁned border studies—a ﬁeld guided by a fundamental sociological and historicalinterpretation that might be viewed as a border trope. For example, Gloria Anzaldua’s (1987) ´ La Frontera continues to be the most referenced imagination of the border. Indeed, it is rare to ﬁnd a border study without reference to Anzaldua’s ´ work, the repercussions of which Anzaldua reverberate in even the most empirical ´ of studies. In a recent article, Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2008) introduces an interesting concept that, although aimed at political activism, is applicable here. Gilmore explores the concept of desakota, a Malay word meaning “town-country” in which settlement, economic activity, politics, demographics and culture “ . . . belie categorization as “either/or”—ambiguous places in the dominant typology of settlement and sector.” The goal of this kind of thinking is to compare “political, economic, territorial and ideological valences that distinguish and might unite disparate places shaped by external control or located outside particular developmental pathways” (Gilmore 2008:35). Desakota becomes a “mix, a region composed of places linked through coordinated as well as apparently uncoordinated forces of habitation and change” (Gilmore 2008:36). When once “the border” was written about as undifferentiated, where towns, people, life, culture, and society shared “border” attributes, now a great variety and diverse processes of border life and society are illustrated. However, there is a certain desakota, an ambiguity about the border in our metaphor that is missing. What are the political, economic, territorial, and ideological valences that both distinguish process and understanding, and unite (bridge) these disparate places outside of the border framework? When once the usefulness of border metaphor was debated, alongside the need for empirical reality (Heyman 1994; Vila 2003), today there is an agreement that the border is real, but that it is also symbolic and metaphorical (Vila 2003). This embodiment, however, has constructed a different type of barrier, which constricts the imagination, the interpretation, and the understanding of social process.

#### Focusing on connectivity is good and redirects our attention away from the nation state.

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One important development in the understanding of speciﬁc sites on the Mexico–U.S. border is the continued focus on speciﬁc links and connections in processes and places. This is especially true for Ciudad Juarez and El Paso. Beginning with Oscar Martinez (1978), Juarez–El Paso has been the focus of signiﬁcant scholarly attention. Sadowski-Smith (2002), Pablo Vila (2000, 2003), Victor Ortiz (2004), and most recently Alejandro Lugo (2008) and Timothy Dunn (2010), among others, provide deep and varied descriptions and understandings of life at El Paso–Juarez. This focus on El Paso–Juarez not only emphasizes the variety of border life in the places once masked simply as border towns, as sister cities, but the deep contrasts and connections in their history. In this depth of account is perceptible the variegated nature and complexity of the border site. In comparison to the range of ethnographic work on Juarez–El Paso there is much less ethnographic depth in studies of the San Diego–Tijuana border. The California–Baja California border boasts two of the largest cities on the border— Tijuana and Mexicali. Until recently, John Price’s (1973) Tijuana: Urbanization in a Border City was considered the only ethnographic work on the area. However, Mur´ıa (2010) reinterprets the border region of the Californias as well as that of Mexico itself. She inserts a speciﬁc Mexicaness into the border and illustrates how Tijuanenses were in part formed by their relationship to the city of San Diego across the line. The context of her study revolves around consumerism in the two nation states and the centrifugal forces of national belonging in which, she asserts, Mexico reclaims this border city. This is not solely about crossing between San Diego and Tijuana, but about the connections and bridging across the border; it also goes to the core of the Mexican nation. Two decades ago the Mexico–U.S. border was a different place, as was the whole region and hemisphere. Events post 9/11, border enforcement, and the changing nature of not only the United States and Mexico but also of Latin America have compounded the complexity, realization, and understanding of what the border is and represents. It is clear that the Mexican–U.S. border is not only a barrier but a conduit, not solely to Mexico but to the Americas, to Asia and “the global south,” through commerce, investment, ports of entry, immigration (Asian, African, and Mexican and indigenous immigration), and industrial transfer (maquiladoras). These and other current processes have altered the border and “bridge” untapped sources and processes that include both land and maritime borders. The role of the nation state beyond its borders raises important questions about the function and utility of “the border” as a concept. Recently, scholars have touted the demise of the nation state, yet the events of the last decade illustrate the rise, not the demise, of the nation state. As the Mexico–U.S. border became more prevalent and inﬂexible, a nascent nativism (aimed at migrants as well as at the power of the state) reared its ugly head. Terrorism, increased immigration, border control, and the emergence of the state’s offshore activity in agriculture, immigration, commerce, as well as the everyday activities of the south, alert us to a connectivity and inﬂuence that traverses the border itself. On one hand, for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) increased the dramatic and geometric growth of import/export exchange between Mexico, the United States, and Canada (Chambers and Smith 2002); on the other, it closed and restricted human mobility along the geopolitical line, and within the U.S. nation (Nevins 2002). This is evident not only in the northern range of the Mexico–U.S. border, but also in the activity of the Mexican nation on the Mexico–Guatemala Border (Galemba 2009). Yet, the border is interpreted as a principal mechanism of nation-state control. This simple perception raises a variety of questions asked by border scholars concerning the role of the nation state, in particular Donnan and Wilson (1999). Is the border synonymous with the nation state? Is the border solely representative of the nation state? Does the border deﬁne the nation state? And if so, in what ways does the geopolitical border delineate the nation state? This reproduces the state-centric focus on security and the maintenance of boundaries. There is an inadvertent recreation at work here, of the boundary that emphasizes the state and its control. There is a need to think not only beyond the Mexico–U.S. border, but also to recognize the various borders that relate to the larger questions of the nation state, its inﬂuence, and power. How, for example, do the Canadian border, the Paciﬁc, and other maritime connections, such as the Gulf of Mexico and the Gulf of California, alert us to the workings of the bounded state, or the deﬁnition of the nation state? The challenge lies in how to imagine the border(s)—the line in the sand—and how we deﬁne what borders are. The epistemology of the border frames the methodology with which we query and ultimately interpret and represent the border. How should the deeper range of border process be encompassed? In what ways do border studies shed light on the broader economic and social processes that are now part of the hemisphere? How do border studies engage the dramatic changes of the new millennium that have altered the globe, changed social and cultural expression, and instilled new forms of hierarchy and structure in which the nation state is central? In 2009, I participated in a workshop at a conference in Australia on food and the postcolonial city. The conference focused on Asian sites and provided a forum to exchange and compare divergent and parallel interests in the topics of food, agriculture, eating, and of course, borders. The ensuing conversations turned to thinking about how Australian and Asian epistemologies contrasted with Western (that is, United States, and particularly Californian) interpretations and experience. A number of themes were covered—immigration, ethnic diversity, agriculture, food justice, culture—that provoked discussion about possible new areas of research. These intellectual bridges connected similar areas of discourse and interest, and they also provided valuable contrasts and comparisons. The discussion turned speciﬁcally on the notion of borders and bridges. The metaphor of borders and bridges provides a refreshing cartography/architecture for border studies. Bridging and connection have been prominent in border studies yet the focus has been one-dimensional in terms of studies of immigration, transborder communities, and commodity chains. Rather than maintaining the horizontal line that dissects and crosses the nation state(s), the notion of borders and bridges provides a speciﬁc verticality and a new dimension. It is not solely the crossings that are important, but the connections, the nodes, and the intervening process involved in the possible focus of study. Connections are not necessarily harmonious (see Grimson and Vila 2002.), and bridges span turbulence and the underbelly, including the ﬁgure of the subaltern. Bridges connect contrasting venues and control crossings in various ways. What I am suggesting is a different analytic to disrupt (not replace) the entrenched epistemology of the border. We are in need of a new architecture that builds on the studies and epistemology of the past, but one that helps break the cartography created to produce new perceptions of analysis and understanding. The actuality and the metaphor of borders and bridges helps query both the current restricted notion of the border and the study of speciﬁc processes that include entrance and closure, connectivity and contrasts, construction, and depth and range in border thinking and empirical study. Rather than be restricted to the horizontal line in the sand, work in this area should be attentive to the broader spans of borderlands, spaces, and places.

### Alt Fails

#### Some immigration restrictions are necessary to advance immigration movements – your alternative has no political potential.

Sparrow, '3 (Wollongong Sociology Professor, http://www.safecom.org.au/noborders.htm)

Advocates of open borders might respond to my criticisms here by proclaiming that they have never intended to offer opening the borders as a serious policy response to contemporary migration issues. It is a political demand, deployed for its rhetorical effects, rather than a goal that could actually be achieved short of radically transforming the world. As I conceded at the outset, the idea of opening the borders does have many advantages in that regard. There is undoubtedly a place for it within the spectrum of political responses to conservative attacks on refugees. But the argument above is intended to show that the theoretical and practical problems with opening the borders **are also limits on its value** as a political demand. Opening the borders would be a sensible policy **only once the world has been radically transformed**. This means that only those who believe in the desirability and possibility of that world are likely to embrace it - or to put it more bluntly, only those who are already committed to international socialism. Its usefulness as a political demand for bringing people to a socialist politics is therefore **limited**. If it provides opportunities to argue for the necessity of socialism, it does so in the context of a refusal to recognise cultural difference that is one of socialism's least convincing theoretical commitments. The open borders demand also has the unfortunate effect of **mitigating against any serious engagement** with issues of culture and sovereignty amongst those elements of the Left where it holds sway. One of the rhetorical affects of the open borders claim is that it places those who are critical of it alongside Howard and Hanson and their ilk. Unless one supports open borders one is a nationalist and by implication a cultural chauvinist and therefore a racist. But a concern for locality and culture need not involve a commitment to race and nationalism. One **need not buy into** the myriad racist myths about refugees just because one admits the necessity of immigration controls **of some sort**. None of this is intended to exonerate the government's policy of mandatory detention of ~ those who arrive by boat, their demonising of refugees, the mean-spiritedness of 'temporary protection visas', or the madness of the so called 'Pacific Solution'. Australia can and should grant refugee status to those who have risked everything to reach our shores in the last few years. Nor is it to embrace the current definition of who is a real refugee. We must work to expand the definition of refugee so as to include those fleeing into bearable circumstances, no matter what their cause. Australia must also do much much more to take on its fair share of the task of resettling refugees. Part of this commitment is a willingness to consider the claims of those who do arrive on Australian shores seeking asylum, whether they arrive by plane or by boat. Most importantly, we must work towards a world in which people are not forced by tragedy in their own lands and communities to move half way across the globe in search of a decent life. In particular, we must end our support for regimes which persecute and oppress their own populations and for structural adjustment programs and other economic policies of neoliberalism which are major causes of international migration flows. Equally well we should cease to attack, or to support attacks on, those same regimes once they have ceased to serve our own or our allies' interests. But all of these things are compatible with a recognition that borders are both a necessary consequence of the existence of political communities and a precondition of democracy, and that national borders are justified when removing them would threaten a people's culture, identity or way of life. None of these is currently threatened by immigration in Australia. Australian culture is likely to be enriched rather than threatened by the presence and activities of the latest group of arrivals. But they might be threatened if Australia's borders were opened while existing injustices in international distribution of wealth remain. Until these injustices have been redressed, opening the borders would have consequences that are unacceptable to the majority of Australians. The demand that we should open the borders is thus **neither practical nor politically compelling**. Its valuable contribution, however, is to remind us that the real 'problem of immigration' is the injustice of the current distribution of the prospects for living a decent human life. If we are concerned about the possibility and effects of large-scale movement of populations we must work to address the inequalities that produce them. Ultimately, **this requires democratic control over the institutions** and choices that govern the distribution of resources internationally. The idea of opening the borders **has only a limited role to play** in the effort to build a political movement to achieve this goal. In the meantime, the problem of formulating **a just immigration policy remains**.

#### Specific policy prescriptions are crucial to combat neoliberal racist colonial border logics.

Peter Hallward, ‘5 (Professor of Modern European Philosophy, Peter, “The Politics of Prescription,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 104(4), p.782-4)

A consequential prescription **requires an effective foothold** in the situation it transforms. Guided by its hunch or anticipation, prescriptive subjectivation is also dependent on the crystallization of historical conditions of pertinence. The axiom of territorial integrity is not pertinent in every political situation; it would be fatal, on the other hand, to assume that a supposedly global condition of postnational mobility has rendered it impertinent. As Edward Said knew all too well, to take only the most obvious example, it is no accident that the armored bulldozer remains the chief weapon of the Israeli occupation. A prescription concerning immigration cannot proceed, today, **on the basis of a utopian rejection** of international borders (although it can and must concern **the “reception” of immigrants here and now**: the quasi-criminalization of refuges, the exploitation of immigrant workers in the domestic economy, the segregation of their communities, etc.). Prescriptions about working conditions **will advance less in the abstract terms** of a campaign against “capitalism” or “globalization” than **through combative opposition** to **particular** neoliberal **policies** or the **elimination of precise forms of corporate power**—for instance, through direct measures like those advanced by Via Compesina or Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement in their campaigns for food sovereignty, fair trade, and land redistribution. Again, the key to the decisive campaign against slavery, according to the most detailed study of the “Haitian revolution from below,” lay less in resolute leadership at the top than in the “self-sustained activities of the masses,” activities that proved powerful enough to transcend the various regional, occupational, and cultural tensions working against their long-term cooperation. These activities were themselves conditioned by structural changes to the plantation economy during its last decades of rapid commercial expansion, and these changes, together with the conjunctural impact of the revolution in France and new divisions within the slave-owning sector, lent the 1791 mobilization against slavery a strategic pertinence that Francois Mackandal’s rebellion, for instance, had lacked back in 1757. Upheld as a strategic imperative, a prescription **says shall** rather than ought. Prescription is **not a matter** of abstract moral reflection, of aspecific obligation, of “objective” rights and wrongs: it is a matter, under the constraints of a given situation, **of practical consequence and material intervention,** of relational struggle, of mobilization and countermobilization.

### A2 – K’s of Competitiveness/Economic Considerations

#### -- Economic policy proscriptions are inevitable—voting aff ensures debaters are educated to evaluate economics correctly and empowers good policy analysis

Timmer 98 (Peter, Prof. of Development studies at Harvard, “Adding Value through Policy-Oriented Research: Reflections of a Scholar-Practitionar, Impact assessment ddiscussion paper no 4, Online)

these factors would seem to include the following: Long-term involvement with the same policymakers, or at least the same policy settings; The need and desire to balance the tension that confidential analysis and policy advising have with the ultimate publication of key models and results; A willingness to stay within the mainstream analytical paradigms of the economic profession while examining the impact of particular deviations from underlying assumptions; and A continuing demand from policymakers for problem-oriented analysis. These factors, in turn, raise issues about how to train policy analysts to be effective in empirical settings and how to make policy analysis more useful and influential. One thing is certain: there will be no end to the debate and controversy surrounding the complex endeavor of using technical knowledge and empirical experience to offer sound policy advice. The debate and controversy have important implications for how policy analysts should be trained. At a minimum, would-be policy analysts should be trained well- enough as technical economists to engage in analytical and methodological debates with their professional colleagues. The goal is not necessarily to have them win the argument, but simply to have it take place, because **many useful insights can emerge** from vigorous debate. However, winning such debates on occasion, especially in a public forum where policymakers are listening, **empowers good policy analysis.**

### Perm Solves

#### The Perm solves – the either/or dichotomy of the alternative fails to understand and appreciate the plurality of encounters of the border/state – only including the aff solves.

Rumford 2012 Chris Professor of Political Sociology and Global Politics at Royal Halloway London “Bordering and Connectivity Cosmopolitan Opportunities.” In Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies Edited by Delanty

The relationship between borders and cosmopolitanism is important because it allows for the possibility of cosmopolitan opportunities. Cosmopolitan opportu nities emerge when choice cannot be reduced to a binary, an either/or, or, an us/them dichotomy. Borders facilitate cul tural encounters which blur the distinction between us and them. In this final section of the chapter L will expand upon these points in order to draw out more fully the importance of cultural encounters to the cosmopolitan imagination. I will do this by opening up briefly two new avenues of exploration. The first of these centres on registering some key differences in terms of the approach offered here from other ways of viewing the self/other, us/them dichotomies in the contemporary literature on cosmopolitanism. The second avenue of exploration is to view the idea of cultural encounters from the perspective of Beck’s notion of the ‘pluralization of borders’. The self/other distinction, blurred in moments of cosmopolitan opportunity on the account offered here, is dealt with differently by other commentators on cosmopolitanism. For instance, Delanty (2009) holds that the interplay of the global and the local conditions the ways in which self and other interact, and the interplay of self: other and the world causes cosmopolitan process to come into play. These formulations suggest that the transformation of self and other under the aegis of cosmopolitanism is of the nature of an internal transformation of discrete entities rather than a merging or blurring of once distinct binaries. What is key for Delanty is the interplay of self and other rather than the erosion of their distinctive status. The argument offered in this chapter is chat we must approach questions of cosmopolitanism without the reassuring framework that such binaries provide. Turning once more to Beck, we can explore the centrality of cultural encounters from a different perspective. For Beck the pluralization of borders’ refers to a multitude of non—identical borders, for example: economical, cultural, political, legal. technological, etc. (Beck 2002: 19). In other words, each of the named domains possesses its own borders which may or may not map on to the borders of the nation—state. Beck draws out the distinctions in the following terms: according to the logic of methodological nationalism these borders coincide; in terms of a methodological cosmopolitanism these borders diverge (Beck 2002: 19). Cosmopolitanization (globalization from within) reveals that ‘borders are no longer predetermined, they can be chosen (and interpreted). That simultaneously also have to be redrawn and legitimated anew’ (Beck 2002: 19). The pluralization of borders points to a multiplicity of possible cultural encounters (in a wide variety of border locations), and a variety of resulting cosmopolitan opportunities.

#### Solves the terminal impact to your K.

**Benhabib, '7** (Seyla Yale Poli Sci Professor, Citizenship Studies, Feb, Vol. 11, Issue 1)

**The boundaries of the political have shifted** today **beyond** the republic housed in **the nation-state**. **The deterritorialization of law brings in its wake a displacement of the political**. It is clear that only multiple strategies and forms of struggle can reassert the ruptured link between consent and the public exercise of power which is the essence of democratic sovereignty. Transnational structures of governance are fundamental in order to tame the forces of global capitalism; but the accountability of transnational elites can only be demanded by their own constituencies who mobilize for post- and transnational citizenship projects. The interlocking networks of local and global activists in turn form an emergent global civil society, in **which new needs are articulated for a world-wide public, new forms of knowledge are communicated to a world-public opinion and new forms of solidarity across borders are crafted**. Popular sovereignty cannot be regained today by returning to the era of the “black box” of state sovereignty: the formal equality of sovereign states must mean the universalization of human rights across state boundaries; respect for the rule of law and democratic forms of government all over the globe. It is an insult to the dignity and freedom of individuals everywhere to assume, as so many today are tempted to do, that human rights and cosmopolitan norms, such as the prohibition of “crimes against humanity”, are products of western cultures alone whose validity cannot be extended to other peoples and other cultures throughout the world. Not only is this a very inadequate view of the spread of modernity as a global project, but it is also a philosophical conflation of genesis and validity, that is to say, of the conditions of origin of a norm with the conditions of its validity. Global human rights and cosmopolitan norms establish new thresholds of public justification for a humanity that is increasingly united and interdependent.16 **New modalities of citizenship, not only in the sense of the privileges of membership but also in the sense of the power of** democratic agency, can only flourish in the **transnational, local as well as global spaces, created by this new institutional framework.** **The multiplying sites of the political herald transformations of citizenship and new configurations of popular sovereignty**.

#### The perm solves – only affirming the border as a connective membrane between the US and Mexico solves the impact to the K.

Dear, 2013

Michael Dear is a professor in the College of Environmental Design at UC Berkeley. The author/editor of more than a dozen books, he has been a Guggenheim Fellowship holder, a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, and Fellow at the Rockefeller Center in Bellagio, Italy. “Kafka at the border

” The Berkeley Blog 3/18/13 <http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2013/03/18/kafka-at-the-border/>

Residents on both sides of the line regard parts of Mexico and the US as their home. For them, the border is a connective membrane, not a line of demarcation. They have more in common with each other than with their host nations, describing themselves as “transborder citizens” oblivious to which side of the border they’re on. This place is distinctive enough to warrant the title of “third nation,” slotted snugly in-between two countries. Besides sentiments of belonging and shared destiny, the third nation is bolstered by synergistic local economies. Border states are among the fastest-growing regions in both countries. Ciudad Juárez, once a city of 1.5 million, lost about a quarter-million inhabitants who fled from drug cartel-related violence to various destinations across Mexico. Yet the city’s industries continue to add jobs, and trade between Juárez and Texas rose almost 50 percent in 2010. In El Paso, the arrival of 30,000 sanctuary-seekers from Juárez created a boom in real estate and restaurant businesses. Cross-border institutions also reinforce bi-national ties. For more than a century, the International Boundary and Water Commission in El Paso has shared responsibility with its Mexican counterpart for maintaining the boundary line and supporting joint development projects. The Commissions make vital contributions to bi-national stability and prosperity. Border communities have been placed in an untenable situation. They are obliged to host an enforcement infrastructure that undermines their well-being. In return DHS has offered little, creating instead a bizarre world of splintered lives, occupying armies, drones, and pulverized landscapes awash with the detritus of partition. The walls separating Mexico and the US are manifestations of failed diplomacy. They do not work, and will come down. The Berlin Wall was demolished virtually overnight, its fragments sold as souvenirs of a calamitous Cold War; and the Great Wall of China became a global tourist attraction. Left untended, the US-Mexico Wall would collapse under the combined assault of avid recyclers, souvenir hunters, and antagonistic residents. Nevertheless, we should preserve sections of the Wall to commemorate that fraught moment in history when the US lost its moral compass.

#### The aff solves interconnections across the border – these connection are a necessary precondition to breaking down fears of border insecurity, immigration and so on.

Dear, 2013  
Michael Dear is a professor in the College of Environmental Design at UC Berkeley. The author/editor of more than a dozen books, he has been a Guggenheim Fellowship holder, a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, and Fellow at the Rockefeller Center in Bellagio, Italy. “Building connections (not more walls) along the U.S.-Mexico border” The Berkeley Blog 5/15/13 http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2013/05/15/building-connections-not-more-walls-along-the-u-s-mexico-border/

As the immigration debate heats up in Washington, D.C., and around the country, various interest groups are lining up to make sure they get what they want from reform, whether it’s more fences, protections for American workers, visas for qualified high-tech workers, or increased immigration quotas for specific nations. One important group has so far been overlooked during current debates on immigration reform — the people who actually live along the U.S.-Mexico boundary line. For them, the border is a connecting tissue, not a divide. The mayors of San Diego and Tijuana understand this, which is why they are working together to realize a shared destiny for their ‘twin cities.’ A centuries-old cross-border mentality unites twin cities along the entire length of borderline, including El Paso/Ciudad Juárez, and Brownsville/Matamoros. Such bi-national collaborations not only benefit localities, they also make vital contributions to international stability and prosperity. Cross-border connections are often informal and spontaneous. For instance, the Mexican village of Boquillas del Carmen (in the state of Chihuahua) was devastated by the loss of tourist income that followed the closing of the border after 9/11. However, it was not long before folks in Terlingua (Texas) began collecting fabric for Boquillas neighbors to sew into quilts for sale back in Terlingua. The money earned from these sales was turned over to the residents of Boquillas to help them weather the economic downturn. More formal cross-border institutions also consolidate bi-national ties, including local business alliances as well as international agreements on trade and environment. In El Paso, the International Boundary and Water Commission and its Mexican counterpart, Comisión Internacional de Límites y Aguas, for more than a century have shared responsibility for maintaining the international boundary line and supporting joint development projects. Their efforts have cleaned up the river-borne pollution that crosses over from the city of Tijuana into San Diego County, protected environmentally-sensitive desert regions between Texas and Chihuahua, and forged important water-sharing agreements pertaining to the Colorado River. Every single day, trans-border unity is further bolstered by the synergies of twin-city economies. Border states are among the fastest-growing regions in both countries. Ciudad Juárez, once a city of 1.5 million, lost about a quarter-million inhabitants who fled from drug cartel-related violence. Yet Juárez’s industrial sector continues to add jobs, and trade between the city and Texas rose almost 50 percent in 2010. In El Paso, the arrival of 30,000 sanctuary-seekers from Juárez created a boom in local real estate and restaurant businesses. In McAllen, Texas, 80 percent of businesses were Mexican-owned by the mid-2000s, a reversal of the proportion from a decade earlier. McAllen draws a greater share of Mexican spending than any other US city, affecting everything from retail sales to home purchases and vacation destinations. Most of the money comes from the major industrial metropolis of Monterrey in Nuevo Léon, only two hours away by toll road. So common is the trip from Monterrey to McAllen that a new Spanish verb was coined: macalenear, literally ‘to do McAllen.’ The troubles in Ciudad Juárez remind us that cross-border connectivity is not solely about positive connections. Drug smuggling and human trafficking across the line are never welcomed, but they nevertheless constitute another kind of cross-border linkage. In turn, they have spawned new forms of collaboration among law enforcement agencies on both sides. Today, U.S. Border Patrol agents in the Texan Big Bend region worry because Mexico’s plans for infrastructure improvement (to transport goods more expeditiously into the US) could expose the remote region to an influx of criminal activity. But the US has not yet moved to upgrade regional transportation infrastructure north of the border. Oblivious to the needs of trans-border communities, reform-minded lawmakers in distant Washington, D.C. persist in demanding yet more barricades between our two countries. Instead, we should be listening to the voices of border residents on both sides, following the lead of twin-city mayors, and working harder to strengthen cross-border ties. Mexico is already ahead of us in developing the border-zone infrastructure needed for bi-national trade and prosperity. Why aren’t we matching these efforts? Paradoxically, our national obsessions regarding security, immigration, and drugs may best be served by encouraging cross-border connections instead of building more fortifications that interrupt transborder lives, jeopardize economic prosperity, and downgrade environmental and community well-being along the line.

### Immigration DA Links

#### The dependence on employers in visa systems recreate neoliberalism that discipline and exploit immigrants.

Payal Banerjee 10 assistant professor of sociology at Smith College Volume 38, Numbers 1 & 2, Spring/Summer 2010 Transnational Subcontracting, Indian IT Workers, and the U.S. Visa System

Given the visa-related life circumstances described in this essay, it becomes imperative to question the set of relationships that the visas forge for these immigrants with regard to their employers, capital, and the state. The intersection between the labor demands of a restructured global economy in neoliberal terms and the various visa systems has created an immigrant labor-dependent subcontracting complex in the IT industry, a system from which this sector in the United States benefits enormously. The visas appear to be rather advantageous for the deployment of these foreign workers to clients for the purpose of sustaining a flexible and fragmented employment regime on a transnational scale. The visas’ function and applicability are most clearlyarticulated, however, when it comes to defining the workers’ relation to their employers. The very same visas fail miserably when it comes to ensuring immigrants’ access to vital necessities, among them health care and state-issued forms of ID such as driver’s licenses or Social Security numbers, or for extending some measure of protection from the threat of losing visa status, abuse, and virtual dependence on companies. It is quite clear that the visa status granted to these immigrant workers seems to have most currency and credence within a narrowly defined sphere of employability and labor in favor of capital’s exigencies. Outside this realm, these immigrants’ documented status as visa-holding foreign nationals has inadequate social meaning and disjointed validity. The visas are able to define and determine immigrants only as value-producing units and bearers of the many advantages of flexible accumulation, but not as workers endowed with a wide range of entitlements. What is made evident from the narratives is that the experiences of these immigrants represent a complex interplay of their visas and the economic mandates of contemporary transnational capitalism. Hence, it becomes vacuous to speak of the stipulations of these visas in their abstraction or of the binary between documented and undocumented immigration status without taking into consideration the institutional context within which these visas are deployed and endowed with meaning. The institutional context of flexible accumulation for profit maximization has come to rely on these visas to obtain labor on its own terms, precisely because the visas can engender and sustain the circumstances that are necessary to make members of this labor force, like their earlier [End Page 107] cohorts, available as a group of dependent, tractable, mobile, and self-motivated employees willing to work with, and within, the demands of flexible employment. The fact that thevisas have come to discipline immigrants exposes how capital’s reliance on these state-legislated documents is predicated on the possibilities of racial and gendered exploitation and manipulation encoded within the visas.

#### Guest worker programs are analogous to slavery in the loss of all political control

Rudrappa**,** assoc. prof of sociology, 2009 ( Rudrappa, Sharmila, "Symposium: the Evolving Definition of the Immigrant Worker: the Intersection Between Employment, Labor, and Human Rights Law: Article: Cyber-Coolies and Techno-Braceros: Race and Commodification of Indian Information Technology Guest Workers in the United States" 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 353, Lexis)

From slavery to the present H-1B Program, foreign labor procurement in the Americas has had racial dimensions. Under slavery, individual men and women became property and were bought, sold, and bartered on the market, their human uniqueness pegged with an exchange value. Their uniqueness mattered, but only so far as what and how much could be harvested from their individual bodies. As political theorist Achille Mbembe notes, the slave condition resulted "from a triple loss: loss of 'home,' loss of rights over his or her body, and loss of political status. This triple loss [was] identical with absolute domination, natal alienation, and social death (expulsion from humanity altogether)." n6The slave ships that brought Africans to the New World were the same ships used to bring Asian coolies to the sugar plantations of the Caribbean. n7 Although coolies were not slaves and not treated as goods to be exchanged on the market, the terms of their recruitment and employment pushed their labor to purer a commodity status.[\*356]While working toward abolishing the transatlantic slave trade, the British were concomitantly establishing the trafficking of Indian and Chinese coolies in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basin in destinations such as Malaysia, East Africa, Cuba, Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica. n8 Between 1840 and 1875, nearly a quarter million Chinese were shipped to the New World as coolie labor, n9 and between 1838 and 1917 more than half a million Asian Indians worked as coolie laborers in the Caribbean. n10 While it is popularly believed that coolies replaced slaves, new research shows that slaves and coolies worked simultaneously; coolie imports in Cuba increased after 1847, but concomitantly, slave imports also increased. n11The next large-scale, systematic importation of workers into the United States was the Bracero Program that operated from 1942 to 1964. n12 The program was a series of agreements between the governments of Mexico and the United States to bring in temporary guest workers from Mexico as a means to address the ostensible labor scarcity in the United States resulting from its World War II mobilization, and subsequently, the Korean War. n13 Through the program, more than 4.6 million contracts were issued to Mexican workers, with approximately 400,000 men brought over from Mexico each year. n14[\*357]While the Bracero Program was still in operation, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 n15 authorized another guest worker program, the H-2 Program, which also included agricultural workers. Whereas the Bracero Program served the American West, workers under the H-2 Program, primarily from the Caribbean, served sugar cane plantations in Florida and apple farms in the Northeast. n16 The 1943 H-2 Program was modified by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, n17 which divided the program into the H-2A Program, which gives temporary work visas to agricultural guest workers, and the H-2B Program, which targets low-wage non-agricultural workers. n18 H-2B workers tend to work in landscaping and construction, as well as seasonal industries. n19While the guest worker programs implemented up to the mid-twentieth century tended to be bilateral agreements with specific nation-states, the late twentieth century guest worker programs are open-ended on the question of national origins. That is, these programs are not specific arrangements between two nation-states, as was the Bracero Program in the United States or the Gastarbeiter Program in Germany. n20 Instead, current guest worker programs are open to workers from various regions of the world. n21[\*358]The H-2 Programs, similar to late twentieth century guest worker programs in other parts of the world, are open to any non-immigrant worker, from any part of the world, who will work in the United States temporarily to fill its labor needs. However, the H-2 Programs have de facto racial ramifications. While these programs might bring in ski instructors and such from Europe, the bulk of the guest workers are from various parts of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Philippines. n22The other guest worker program, causing as much consternation as the H-2 Program, is the H-1B Program. The precursor to this guest worker program was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, n23 which conferred H-1 visas to temporary foreign workers with exceptional abilities who had been sponsored for employment by American firms. n24 By the 1970s, Congress allowed H-1 visa recipients to apply for permanent positions in the United States, and companies began to rely on the program more heavily to bring in foreign workers. n25 The Immigration Act of 1990 n26 capped the number of H-1B visas to 65,000 per year, to be awarded to persons with at least a Bachelor's degree in a specific specialty. n27Firms could now hire guest workers under the following conditions: (1) there was a shortage of qualified citizen workers; (2) foreign workers were not displacing citizen workers; and (3) foreigners were employed on the same terms as American employees. n28 Workers receive visas for up to three years once sponsored by an employer, and the visas are renewable for another three-year term if the employer desires. n29 Unlike other guest worker programs, however, the H-1B Program offers its recruitees an advantage; these guest workers can obtain permanent residency in the United States if sponsored by the[\*359]employing firm. n30 During this period, the guest worker's permanent residency application depends on maintaining a sponsoring employer; that is, the guest worker is essentially obligated to work for his sponsor. n31By the end of the 1990s, the number of H-1Bs awarded had increased dramatically. The American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 n32 raised the H-1B visa cap to 115,000 workers for the years 1999 and 2000, and 107,500 for 2001 but then decreased the number back to the original 65,000 in 2002. n33 Although the number of available visas was increased during this period, this was not enough to meet the demand. For example, by March 2000, the 115,000 visa quota was already reached. n34 Under pressure from industry, the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 n35 was passed, which raised the number of temporary worker visas to 195,000 per year for the years 2001 through 2003. n36 In 2003, 231,030 H-1B petitions were filed with the Citizenship and Immigration Services for both initial and continuing employment. n37 Of these, 105,314 were approved for first time employment, and 112,026 were approved for continuing employment. n38 Since 2004, H-1B visa[\*360]quotas have gone down to their original 65,000, but politicians face constant pressure from the industry to push the numbers to higher levels.Like other late-twentieth century guest worker programs, the H-1B Program is not racially specific or single-nation oriented, yet a large number of these temporary work visas have gone to Indian men. By the late 1990s, over forty percent of all H1-B visas were issued to Indian software workers. n39 In 1998 and 1999, for example, Indians received 47.5% of the H-1B visas, followed by the Chinese at 9.3%. n40 Computer-related and engineering occupations accounted for seventy percent of the H-1B visas, and of these, nearly seventy-four percent of the systems analysts and programmers were born in India. n41 Though the H-1B Program is not a race-based labor procurement program, like the H-2 Programs, it has become a de facto racialized program.The Chinese and Indian coolies of the nineteenth century, the Mexican braceros of the mid-twentieth century, the Latino/a H-2A and H-2B workers, and the Indian H-1B techno-braceros were or are racialized into United States society in radically different ways. However, their status as guest workers results in labor situations that are legally analogous. Regardless of the specific details of each labor procurement program, the fact that these individuals are guest workers, itinerant laborers, and sojourners from the perspective of the law means **they all face similar issues regarding their employers' capacity to impose work place discipline and their own ability to exercise any control over the production process.**